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Abstract  
 
Over the centuries, English law has developed a ‘flexible’ and ‘malleable’ idea of 
property - in particular through the rules of equity - which has proved capable of 
adapting to the continuing changes in market practice.  The question now to be 
addressed is whether this ‘flexible’ idea of property can also adequately represent 
interests in indirectly held securities or whether (as suggested by the Financial 
Market Law Committee) the new financial practice requires statutory clarification.  
 
Unlike most civil law systems, English law has been able to accommodate many 
new issues arising from the practice of intermediated securities within the existing 
framework.  For example, the complex indirect holding structure is built on the 
well-developed institution of trust and sub-trust which allows investors to obtain 
equitable proprietary rights in the assets held for them by the intermediary.  
 
The proprietary characterisation of these types of rights has recently been 
challenged by McFarlane and Stevens, on the grounds that they seem to establish 
the same level of protection against third parties, by classifying the investors’ 
rights as ‘persistent rights’ or ‘rights against rights’.  The main advantage of using 
the concept of a persistent right (rather than a proprietary right) is that it provides 
a better understanding of the legal structure of intermediation, as well as showing 
that no statutory clarification is necessary within the United Kingdom. 
 
The thesis tests the theoretical foundation of McFarlane and Stevens’ argument, 
using the current Lehman insolvencies as a platform for evaluation.  The primary 
objective is to consider whether the idea of ‘persistent rights’ or ‘rights against 
rights’ is better able to explain the precise functions of this new practice and 
overcome the legal uncertainties typically associated with the indirect holding 
system.
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1. Introduction 
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the common law concept of property was 
described by Sir William Blackstone (1723 - 1786) in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England1 as ‘that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in 
the universe.’2  This definition of property, based on an absolute dominion over material 
things, is no longer accepted in the common law tradition.3  The question then to be 
posed is: what is property today? 
 
Since Blackstone, considerable effort has been devoted by academics to clarifying the 
concept of property, in the attempt to identify its exact meaning, define its boundaries 
and establish how it relates to other areas of the law.  Despite these efforts, the concept 
of property has no single or widely accepted definition.  The reason for this is that key 
features of property, which may be applicable in all circumstances, are somewhat 
difficult to identify in rigorous terms. 
 
One could start investigating the compound meaning of property by stating that it ‘deals 
with the relationship between an individual and a “thing” and the effect of that 
relationship on the world at large.’4  In this regard, it is common practice to assert that 
the hallmark of property is its universality.  This means that proprietary rights can be 
asserted erga omnes, i.e. against the whole world and not only against a given individual, 
such as a contracting partner.  However, these universal rights are not invincible, as the 
level of protection that a rightful owner enjoys vis à vis third parties may vary 
significantly in terms of length of time and number or categories of persons against 
whom proprietary rights may be asserted5.   
 
                                                 
1 Blackstone, (1765 - 1769, book 2, chapter 1 - Of Property, in General).  
2 Id.  Blackstone’s idea of property essentially contained two elements: '(i) the physicalist conception of 
property that required some “external thing” to serve as the object of property rights, and (2) the 
absolutist conception which gave the owner “sole and despotic dominion” over the thing', Vandevelde 
(1981, p. 331).  
3 Lawson and Rudden (1982, pp. 1 – 8); Swayze (1915, p. 9) and Vandevelde (1981, p. 357).  For a 
comparative analysis see also Mattei (2000, p. 18). 
4 Bridge (2002, p.12).  See also Lawson and Rudden (1982, pp. 1 – 8).  
5 See nn. 154 - 155 in ch. 2 and accompanying text. 
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Legal theorists typically regard the concept of property as a “bundle of rights” that may 
be exercised by the rightful owner or possessor with respect to a thing.  The interests 
that are associated with property are the three traditional rights of enjoyment, 
management and possession as understood in their broadest, most abstract form.6  By 
enjoyment, one means the right to enjoy the benefits of property and receive an income 
from it.  The right to management is the right to decide how and by whom the thing 
owned or possessed shall be used or transferred.7  Lastly, the right of possession 
consists of two elements: ‘first, the exercise of factual control over the [thing]; and 
secondly, the concomitant intention to exclude others from the exercise of control’.8  
The same “bundle of rights” does not necessarily attach to all forms of property, as 
there may be a need to detach some rights from others and to vest them in different 
persons.  For instance, in the case of a bailment, there may be circumstances in which 
possession is distinguished from the enjoyment of the thing, as the factual control by 
one person (e.g. the hirer of a television set) may provide an income for someone else.  
Furthermore, under a trust the person who is to enjoy the benefits of property (i.e. the 
cestui que trust or beneficiary) is different from the person who has the actual 
management (i.e. the trustee).  Hence, the “bundle of rights” is composed of ‘legal 
building bricks, which can be used and put together in different ways’9, depending on 
the intention of the parties.   
 
This complex scenario clearly demonstrates the shift away from the Blackstonian 
conception of property as an absolute dominion over material things.  The idea that it is 
possible to create multiple interests over the same asset (which can have different levels 
of exigibility against third parties) blurs the perception of property as a close and 
exclusive relationship between an individual and a thing10. 
 
In support of this argument, it should be borne in mind that during these last decades 
the concept of property has faced new challenges due to a significant change in 
economic needs and conditions.  Nowadays, a large proportion of people’s wealth 
                                                 
6 Certain legal theorists commonly divide property into a large number of constituent rights, such as the 
right to the income, the right to possess, the right to use, the right to manage and the right to security.  
For instance, Honoré and Becker identified 11 and 13 different elements, respectively, which constitute 
property. See Honoré (1961, p. 116) and Becker (1980, p. 190). 
7 Honoré, (1961, p. 116). 
8 Bridge (2002, p. 17).  
9 Bell (1989, p. 5). 
10 Schroeder (1996, p. 1286); Id. (1994, pp. 277-305) and Grey (1980, p. 69). 
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consists of intangible (or incorporeal) property.11 In other words, the assets which are 
today considered to be of relevant value to parties are no longer related solely to land, 
goods and other tangible assets but may be extended to a variety of incorporeal 
movables, such as debts12, goodwill, shares in a company and various forms of 
intellectual property.  In addition to the increased use of diverse types of intangible 
property, another factor has significantly developed over the last decades, i.e. the heavily 
intermediated nature of modern markets.  Indeed, a large part of financial and 
commercial practice is now built on the creation of indirect relationships between 
holders of a proprietary right and the underlying asset to which such a right relates.  
This practice is based on the existence of multiple fiduciary relationships where parties 
act in relation to the property or affairs of others.13  Indirect holding systems may be 
used for a variety of purposes, such as tax planning, pension and charity fund 
management as well as investment or banking services14. 
 
In this context, one could question whether the concept of property can also easily 
accommodate rights over intangible assets too, especially where such rights are asserted 
through a number of intermediaries.  For the most part, these concerns are perceived in 
the financial sector, particularly when dealing with the legal framework governing the 
practice of indirectly held securities (also known as intermediated securities).  Today, 
most investors hold their assets (i.e. equity and debt securities) indirectly, through one 
or more intermediaries (such as financial institutions, brokers, depositories and other 
professional investors).  The central point of this practice is that investors may be 
                                                 
11 For centuries, land had been regarded as the most valuable asset.  In the 19th century and the early 20th 
century, as a result of the industrial revolution, the focus shifted from land to manufactured goods.  More 
recently, the traditional concept of property, in terms of material wealth, has undergone yet other 
significant changes.  In particular, over the past fifty years, the importance of intangible property as a 
source of wealth has grown significantly.  See on this point Harris and Mooney (2006, p. 358) and Bridge 
(2002, p. 4). 
12 These ‘assets’ are classic examples of ‘pure intangibles’.  They are defined as 'those legal rights in 
personam to pay a certain sum of money or deliver specified property, which the right holder can transfer 
to someone else by assigning them', Penner (1997, p. 109).  Indeed, such rights represent 'an item of value 
because they can be transferred to a third party by way of sale or security for a loan', Bridge (2002, p. 6).    
13 The fiduciary relationship between the parties may take various forms, depending on the specific terms 
of the contract governing such relationship.  For example, in common law jurisdictions fiduciary 
relationships are typically created through a trust.  The main characteristic of the law of trust is that it 
allows the beneficiary and the trustee to own the property simultaneously in different ways (i.e. through 
legal and equitable ownership, respectively). 
14 For example, William Amos of the Financial Conduct Authority ('FCA') has recently emphasised that 
with regards to financial markets 'in 2013 UK-managed assets stood at £5.2tn and generated £13bn in 
management fees', Amos (2014).  In addition, 'the UK ranked first in Europe and second worldwide, 
after the US, measured by assets under management (AUM). 8% of global financial assets and 36% of 
European financial assets under management were managed in the UK', Id.  
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separated from the issuer of the underlying securities by multiple layers of intermediaries 
(often spanning a number of jurisdictions).  Recent research has aimed to evaluate 
whether this new practice “requires special treatment or whether it can be dealt with on 
ordinary legal principles”15.   
 
Unlike most civil law systems, English law has managed to adapt many new issues 
arising from the practice of intermediated securities within the existing framework.  For 
example, the complex indirect holding structure is built on the well-developed 
institution of trust and sub-trust which allows investors to obtain equitable proprietary 
rights in the assets held for them by the intermediary. 
 
Interestingly, the proprietary characterisation of these types of rights has recently been 
challenged by McFarlane and Stevens, on the grounds that they seem to be able to 
establish the same level of protection against third parties, by classifying the investors’ 
rights as ‘persistent rights’ or ‘rights against rights’16.  Their main argument is that in an 
indirect holding system the investor’s right does not attach to the underlying securities, 
being simply a (sui generis) right against the right held by the intermediary.  The advantage 
of using the concept of a persistent right (rather than a proprietary right) is that it 
provides a better understanding of the legal structure of intermediation, as well as 
showing that no statutory intervention is necessary within the United Kingdom. 
 
This thesis tests the theoretical foundation of McFarlane and Stevens’ argument, 
attempting to demonstrate that the investor’s right is to be classified as proprietary 
rather than sui generis.  In this regard, the author evaluates two alternative solutions to the 
theory of a right against a right (both conferring proprietary status to the investor’s title).  
The first solution is based on the idea of an indirect right in rem which means 
considering the investor as holding a right that attaches indirectly emphasis added to the 
underlying securities.  The second approach is that of an interest in a sub-property and 
is meant to identify the investor’s item of property with “something” that is separate 
and distinct from the underlying securities, corresponding to the right of the 
intermediary.  More specifically, in the latter case the investor holds a proprietary right 
in the intermediary’s proprietary right in the underlying securities. 
                                                 
15 Gullifer (2010, p. 8).  Among others see also Benjamin (2000, paras. 1.105 - 109) and Yates and 
Montagu (2013, paras. 3.10 – 3.55).  
16 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 a, p. 37). 
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The primary objective is to highlight the idea that while an indirect right in rem may 
create certain difficulties when explaining the practice of indirectly held securities, the 
theory of an interest in a sub-property can easily be accommodated to the complexities 
of intermediation.  Indeed, there are many similarities between the idea of an interest in 
a sub-property and the theory of a right against a right; yet the author believes that the 
former should be preferred to the latter due to its closer consistency with the historical 
development of English property law.  
 
The thesis also intends to critically evaluate the idea suggested by McFarlane and 
Stevens that the introduction of changes to the existing legal framework is not 
warranted.  In particular, it will show that neither the theory of a right against a right nor 
that of an interest in a sub-property can really help us overcome all the legal 
uncertainties typically associated with the indirect holding system and that there are 
consequently still definite areas where the case for a statutory intervention may prove 
beneficial.   
 
The thesis is developed over six chapters.  The first chapter introduces the issue of 
indirectly held securities and provides a general background to the latest legal 
developments in relation to securities holding practices.  The second chapter 
demonstrates that there is no need to apply the theory of a right against a right to the 
practice of intermediated securities, as English property law seems capable of explaining 
the nature of the investors’ rights.  The last four chapters identify certain examples of 
legal uncertainty which afflict today’s modern markets and thus seek to determine 
whether the theory of a right against a right or that of an interest in a sub-property can 
provide clear answers to these practical problems. 
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Chapter 1: Intermediated interests in intangible assets 
 
1. A general background 
 
Over the past decades, the practice of holding and transferring securities in financial 
markets has changed substantially, with a definite shift away from direct holdings of 
paper-based securities to indirect (book-entry) holdings.  Nowadays, investors hold their 
financial assets through one or more intermediaries and securities are issued and 
transferred by means of intangible electronic records rather than paper certificates. 
 
Prior to the widespread use of information technology, securities had always been issued 
and transferred in paper-based form.  However, by the early 1970s in the United States 
and the 1980s in the United Kingdom, this practice involving the actual physical 
movement of paper instruments or certificates became subject to ever more severe 
strain.  The administrative burdens and the risk of loss created by the vast amounts of 
paper that had to be moved around the system made paper-based transfer procedures 
labour-intensive and insecure, as well as posing strong limits to the number of transfers 
that could actually be processed.  As a result of this, the physical delivery of paper 
documents has since been largely replaced by electronic settlement, which involves a 
technique called ‘book-entry transfer’.  The new practice entails the use of an electronic 
system, whereby the interest of the investor is represented by a credit entry to his/her 
securities account and transfers are made in the same way as bank funds transfer (i.e. by 
debit and credit entries to such accounts)17.  Consistently with this practice, the credit of 
securities to the account of an intermediary confers on the investor the right both to 
dispose of the securities and to receive the corporate and economic benefits attached to 
the financial assets18. 
 
                                                 
17 Gullifer (2010, p. 16) and English Law Commission (May 2008, para. 2.25). 
18 In the case of debt securities, these benefits include the right to the repayment of the principal sum 
(usually claimed at a specified maturity date) and the right to regular interest payments.  In the case of 
equity securities (also known as shares), the investor generally enjoys the right to receive dividends as well 
as the right to vote as a shareholder.  However, the duty of the intermediary to exercise voting rights on 
behalf of the investor is often excluded in the account agreement.  For an analysis of the rights enjoyed by 
the investor see Article 9 (1) of the UNIDROIT Convention (Kanda et al. 2012, paras. 9-4 - 9-33), 
Principle 3 (1) set out by the European Commission (2010, paras 3.1 - 3.2) and English Law Commission 
(May 2008, paras. 4.38 and 4.42). 
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There are two different models of electronic settlement, namely immobilisation and 
dematerialisation.  The latter is the path that has been largely adopted by the United 
Kingdom and consists of the ‘elimination of physical certificates or documents of title, 
which represent ownership of securities, so that securities exist only as computer 
records’19.  More specifically, dematerialised securities, when issued, are recorded in the 
UK electronic settlement system called CREST, now Euroclear UK & Ireland Ltd (to 
which only certain financial institutions have access) and transfers are recorded in that 
register.  CREST maintains securities accounts in the name of its members, who have a 
direct relationship with the issuer.  Members of CREST may hold securities on their 
own behalf or, more frequently, as intermediaries on behalf of other intermediaries, who 
in turn hold for investors.  In practice, there are often a number of intermediaries who 
hold securities for investors20.  This means that in a very simplified scenario, a member 
of CREST holds for a first-tier intermediary, the first-tier intermediary holds for a 
second-tier intermediary and so on down the chain to the investor (figure 2).  However, 
chains are frequently more complex, since ‘each intermediary may acquire its holdings of 
the same issue from a variety of sources rather than a single one’.21  Hence the tiering of 
relationships creates ‘a pyramid structure in which the issuer can deal with a relatively 
small number of large players who in turn will hold accounts for a greater number of 
smaller participants, and so on down through the pyramid to the ultimate investor’22.  
 
An alternative method to dematerialisation, used in many countries including the United 
States, is immobilisation.  In this case, unlike dematerialisation, paper documents and 
certificates continue to exist.  However, in order to avoid physical movement, such 
instruments or certificates are retained (i.e. immobilised) by a depositary, that is linked 
to a settlement system23.  Accordingly, property rights in securities move between 
market participants in the settlement system by book-entry transfer.  In a typical 
scenario involving immobilisation, large pools of securities of different issuers are 
retained with a central security depository (CSD) and investors hold securities indirectly 
through a tier of intermediaries that are ultimately connected to the central securities 
depository (figure 1)24.  This means that, consistently with dematerialisation, even in 
                                                 
19 The Group of 30 (1989). 
20 Benjamin (2007, para. 19.04) 
21 FMLC (July 2004). 
22  Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6-07).   
23 Id. 
24 In the United Kingdom, UK securities are not immobilised in a CSD.  CREST (now called Euroclear 
UK & Ireland Ltd) is a settlement system through which dematerialised UK securities are held.  This 
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cases like this a number of intermediaries may stand between the investor and the issuer.  
In practical terms, the difference between immobilisation and dematerialisation does not 
affect the holding structure as a whole but only the relationship between the issuer and 
the depositary or CREST member. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 1 and 2  
Source: Gullifer and Payne (2010), p. 3. 
 
The effect of these changes in the financial market infrastructure is to (i) reduce the 
movement of paper involved in the issue and transfer of securities; (ii) facilitate rapid 
dealings; (iii) increase the volume of business in financial markets; and (iv) facilitate 
stock lending as well as sale and repurchase agreements (‘repos’)25.  
                                                                                                                                          
means that CREST 'does not hold securities, since its members hold direct from the issuer', Gullifer and 
Goode (2013), para. 6-07 (n. 33). 
25 These types of secured financing transactions are an efficient source of money-market-funding and are 
typically used by broker-dealers and leveraged investors (such as hedge funds seeking funding). In very 
general terms, a repo consists of a transfer of title in the securities coupled with an agreement to buy back 
the same type of securities at a specified price and at a future date.  A secured loan is economically very 
similar to a repo. Hence, the two transactions are often used as substitutes for each other.  For an analysis 
of repos see (among others) E. Lomnicka (2012 a, paras. 7.58 - 7.71) and Id. (2012 b, paras. 5.56 - 5.69).   
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In 2004 it was estimated that on a worldwide basis, investment bonds, shares and other 
investment securities worth approximately €50 trillion were held indirectly26.  
 
However, it has recently been argued that while the practice of securities markets has 
changed considerably, its legal framework has lagged behind and is now outdated27.  In 
2004, the Financial Markets Law Committee (the ‘FMLC’) proposed legislative 
intervention in the United Kingdom, having found that the existing framework still 
relied on traditional legal concepts based on the assumption that tangible assets held in 
physical form were involved.28   
 
The need to introduce changes to the existing legal framework is also felt at a European 
and international level, in the context of cross-border transactions, which play a 
significant role in securities markets.  This concern was raised by (i) the Legal Certainty 
Group (the ‘LCG’), in its 2008 Advice to the European Commission on the need for 
new legislation on intermediated securities29 (‘LCG Advice’) and (ii) UNIDROIT, in the 
Convention on substantive legal rules regarding securities held through securities 
accounts, which was adopted in 2009 (the ‘UNIDROIT Convention’).30  
 
2. The legal structure of intermediation and its implications on the investor’s 
rights 
 
                                                 
26 UNIDROIT (December 2004, para. 1.2.3).   
27 In England, the practice of indirectly held securities has been studied for over a decade.  Among others 
see Benjamin (2000); Id. (2003 pp. 249 – 304); Gullifer and Payne (2010); Austen-Peters (2000); Yates and 
Montagu (2013); Gullifer and Goode (2013, paras. 6–01 – 6-45) and Micheler (2007). 
28 FMLC (July 2004). Following publication of the FMLC Report in 2004, this matter was referred to the 
English Law Commission. See on this point English Law Commission (May 2008). According to 
Benjamin, this ‘legal anachronism’ may become a source of legal risk in investment securities, M. Yates 
and G. Montagu (2013, para. 1. 15) and Benjamin (2000, paras. 14. 35 – 14.43). 
29 LCG (August 2008). 
30 UNIDROIT Securities Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (Geneva, October 2009).  
The scope of the UNIDROIT Convention is broader than that of the work of the LCG as it aims to 
create a legal framework for intermediated securities that can be applied at worldwide level.  It is not yet 
clear whether the European Commission and the EU Member States will decide to ratify the UNIDROIT 
Convention.  The EU Commission is currently preparing a draft legislation on legal certainty of securities 
law (Securities Law Legislation – 'SLL') on the basis of the recommendation proposed by the LCG.  
Accordingly, a decision by the EU Commission and the Member States on whether to adopt the 
UNIDROIT Convention is not expected to be taken before the final content of the future SLD has been 
clarified (email correspondence with Klaus Löeber, European Central Bank, and Marcel-Eric Terret, 
European Commission, DG Internal Market Financial Markets Infrastructure, Monday 5/10/2010).  
However, setting such a decision aside, it is expected that the 'European Commission will strive to obtain 
a close convergence between the future SLL and the UNIDROIT Convention' (email correspondence 
with Klaus Löeber, European Central Bank, Monday 5/10/2010). 
 
 
17
One of the issues that has captured significant attention among practitioners and 
academics concerns the need to devise a legal structure of intermediation.  Thus, we 
may begin by asking, is it possible to apply existing legal concepts or is it necessary to 
create a new set of rules, which may be applied specifically to this practice?  
 
English law applies the existing principles to describe the indirect holding system.  In 
particular, it primarily adopts the concept of trust31.  Hence, the investor is left as the 
beneficiary under the trust, to retain an equitable interest in the assets held for it by the 
intermediary.  However, since financial practice usually involves a chain of 
intermediaries, a more complex analysis tends to apply, using the concept of a sub-trust.  
This means that the first-tier intermediary holds the assets on trust for the second-tier 
intermediary, who holds them on sub-trust for the third-tier intermediary and so on 
down the chain to the last investor.  Pursuant to the rules of trust, only the first-tier 
intermediary has legal title to the assets32; all the other account holders simply enjoy 
equitable rights.  
 
The main advantage in using the concepts of trust and sub-trust in the practice of 
indirectly held securities is that the investor’s securities are not considered part of the 
intermediary’s own estate but are treated as a separate fund33.  As a result, the investor’s 
assets are protected from the intermediary’s credit risk34.     
 
                                                 
31 There is also another concept which may apply to securities, i.e. the concept of bailment.  In this case, 
the intermediary (who acts as bailee) acquires possession of the securities, while legal ownership remains 
with the investor (who acts as bailor).  However, in order for the bailee to obtain possession the securities 
must be bearer securities.  This means that in the case of intangible assets (namely securities that are 
registered in the register of the issuer or are evidenced by a credit to the account of an intermediary) trust 
is considered the only alternative under English law which enables the investor to be protected against the 
intermediary’s credit risk.  See on this point also Austen-Peters (2000, pp. 26 – 27); Benjamin (2000, para. 
2. 36); Id. (2007, paras. 19.08 - 19.11); Yates and Montagu (2013, paras. 3.12 – 3.13); FMLC (July 2004, 
para. 6.1) and English Law Commission (May 2008, paras. 2.59 and 2.62).  
32 Pursuant to Regulation 24 (6) of the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001, SI 2001 No. 3755 (USR), the 
entry in the CREST register confers to its members the legal title to the financial assets and determines 
the person or entity who is considered as the shareholder for company law purposes.  
33 Pursuant to Section 283 (3) (a) of the Insolvency Act 1986, the assets held on trust by an individual who 
is bankrupt cannot be considered part of his/her estate.  Similarly, when the insolvent trustee is a 
company, the assets of the beneficiary are not available to the trustee’s creditors.  On this point see, for 
example, Habana Ltd v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (Isle of Man) Ltd [2011] W.T.L.R. 275; (2009-10) 12 
I.T.E.L.R. 736; HC (IoM); Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] A.C. 567, [1968] 3 W.L.R. 
1097, [1968] 3 All E.R. 651 and Kayford Ltd (in Liquidation), Re [1975] 1 W.L.R. 279. 
34 Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 3, in FMLC (July 2004, para. 9); English 
Law Commission (May 2008, para. 2.61); Benjamin (2000, para. 2. 35) and Yates and Montagu (2013, 
para. 3.10 – 3-13/ 3-17). 
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This principle of ‘insolvency immunity’ or ‘insolvency ring-fencing’ is considered 
‘fundamental to the viability of an intermediated holding system.’35  The reason for this 
is that an investor would be unwilling to rely on an indirect holding system if such a 
system may not preserve the allocation of risk36.  In market practice, when purchasing 
securities the investor takes on the risk of the transaction as well as being entitled to the 
potential returns that may be generated by the investment whereas the intermediary only 
acts on behalf of the investor and shares neither the investment risk nor its returns.  As 
a result, if the investor’s assets were available to the intermediary’s creditors, the 
allocation of investment risk would be significantly distorted37. 
 
Another benefit related to the concepts of trust and sub-trust is that they can facilitate 
the application of the so-called no-look-through principle which is considered essential 
to the practice of indirectly held securities38. In particular, such a principle requires the 
investor to hold rights only against the intermediary in whose account such rights are 
recorded (i.e. the relevant intermediary).  This means that the investor is prevented from 
making claims against other intermediaries standing further up the chain (i.e. higher-tier 
intermediaries)39.   
 
The reason that lies behind this principle is that in market practice it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to trace the chain of title from the last investor up to the highest-tier 
intermediary.  One of the explanations for this impediment is that each intermediary 
only has details of his/her own account holder and therefore has no direct access to 
information about those parties standing either further up or further down the chain40.  
                                                 
35 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.31).  On the importance of safeguarding the account 
holder’s assets from the credit risk of his/her intermediary see also Gullifer (2010, p. 18); Benjamin (2000, 
paras. 2. 35 and 2.39) and Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 3 in FMLC (July 
2004, para. 9). 
36 English Law Commission (May 2008, paras. 3.2 - 3.4).  
37 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.32 - 1.33) and Id. (March 2006, paras. 1.57 and 1.60).  In 
the 2006 paper on intermediated securities, the English Law Commission emphasised that an 'investor 
ultimately entitled to securities must have confidence that this protection against creditors applies to 
account holders at every level in the custody chain and regardless of the jurisdiction in which the 
securities account is located', Id. (June 2006, para. 1.31).  However, pursuant to the no-look-through 
principle the investor is not necessarily in a position to directly enforce his/her claims against the 
insolvent intermediary (who is standing for example, at the top of the chain).  See text to nn. 189 and 207 
in ch. 2.  
38 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.234) and Gullifer (2010, p. 14).  
39 This principle applies in both common law and civil law systems as well as being stated under Article 9 
(2) (b) and (c) of the UNIDROIT Convention.  On this point see also European Commission (2010, para. 
12.2); English Law Commission (March 2006, para. 1.46) and Id. (June 2006, paras. 1.237 and 1.247).   
40 However, see the case of certain jurisdictions which apply the so-called ‘transparent’ system, English 
Law Commission (May 2008, paras  2.43 - 2.45). 
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For example, the highest-tier intermediary is unlikely to have any record of the lowest-
tier account holder.   As a result of this lack of information it would be difficult for the 
highest-tier intermediary to evaluate the validity of a claim made by the lowest-tier 
account holder without facing considerable expense and excessive delay.41  In order to 
avoid these consequences, the no-look-through principle states that the intermediary is 
only liable to parties that have a direct relationship with the said intermediary, rather 
than to ‘an indefinite number of unidentified’42 parties standing along the chain43.  
 
In certain jurisdictions (including the one in the UK), the level of enforcement of the 
investor’s rights is more restricted, in order to prevent the investor from making claims 
not only against higher-tier intermediaries but also directly against the issuer44.  This 
means that the investor receives the benefits attached to the securities only from the 
relevant intermediary, who is then required to pass the investor’s claims up the chain to 
the issuer.45 
 
These restrictions on the level of enforcement of the investor’s rights are consistent 
with the law of trust which generally prevents the investor, as the beneficiary under a 
sub-trust, from ‘looking-through’ the relevant intermediary (who acts as the sub-
                                                 
41 Gullifer (2010, pp. 14 – 15) and FMLC (July, 2004, para. 6.5). 
42 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.234). 
43 The difficulty in tracing the chain of title through multiple layers of intermediaries is further 
exacerbated by the practice of using netting arrangements.  While netting has the advantage of facilitating 
transfers and settlements, it can also create a number of difficulties in the tracing of securities (or their 
proceeds) from one account to another, as well as in finding the corresponding debit for a particular 
credit entry.  See on this point, Gullifer (2010, p. 14); FMLC (July 2004, para. 6.5) and English Law 
Commission (August 2008, para. 2.46).  As emphasised by most practitioners, the no-look-through 
principle 'allows an intermediary to quantify and manage its risk by reducing most of its system risks to 
bilateral risk assessments', English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.234).   
44 These are the so-called ‘indirect holding’ systems.  They apply to common law jurisdictions as well as to 
some civil law jurisdictions (such as those in Belgium and Luxembourg).  The alternative is a direct 
holding system, (which applies, for example, in Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands and Spain) 
where investors can enforce their rights directly against the issuer.  Pursuant to Article 9 (2) (b) of the 
UNIDROIT Convention, the Contracting States have the choice of determining whether an investor may 
enforce the rights ‘attached’ to the securities directly against the issuer.  See on this point also Principle 1 
(2) of the European Commission (2010, para. 1.2) which states that '[t]he legislation should not harmonise 
the legal framework governing the question of whom an issuer has to recognise as the legal holder of its 
securities.' 
45 However, such restrictions may threaten the effective exercise of voting rights or other discretionary 
rights by shareholders (due primarily to the technical difficulties and the excessive costs incurred by 
intermediaries when passing voting instructions and other relevant information along the chain, European 
Commission (2010, paras 17.1 - 17.2).  See on this point also the Kanda et al. (2012, paras. 28.12 and 
28.13; Mooney (2008, pp. 50 – 51); Mooney and Kanda (2010, pp. 89 – 91) and European Commission 
(2011), para. 3.17.1.3 and LCG (August 2008, para. 14.3.3). For a detailed analysis of the difficulties 
incurred by intermediaries in exercising voting rights on behalf of their account holders see Payne (2010, 
paras. 187 – 218) and Kahan and Rock (2009, paras. 259 – 261). 
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trustee)46.  More specifically, these rules allow the investor to enforce his/her equitable 
rights only against the lowest-tier intermediary who passes the equitable claim up the 
chain to the highest-tier intermediary47.  As the legal owner of the securities, only the 
intermediary standing at the top of the chain is entitled to bring a claim directly against 
the issuer; all the other account holders are restricted to enforcing their equitable rights 
against the relevant intermediary. 
 
Therefore, the co-existence of these equitable interests linked one to another in a series 
of sub-trusts and, more importantly, the limitations posed on the investor in enforcing 
his/her rights along the holding chain of the intermediaries, raises doubts as to the exact 
nature of such rights.  In other words, what is it that is held by the investor on the 
account?48  Is it a right to a ‘thing’ (right in rem or proprietary right), a right against a 
person (right in personam or contractual right) or rather a sui generis right?49 
   
The difficulty in providing clear answers to these questions re-opens an ‘old’ academic 
debate regarding the nature of equitable rights under a trust.  Thus, the next chapter 
analyses the different theoretical approaches to the nature of equitable rights and seeks 
to ascertain which approach is best suited to laying down a solid legal foundation for the 
practice of indirectly held securities and, in particular, to establishing the precise nature 
of the investor’s right. 
 
Such an analysis is truly essential, as it would help us comprehend the complexity of the 
custody chain as well as testing the ability of the exiting principles of trust to fully 
emphasis added explain this new practice. 
                                                 
46 See text to nn. 189 and 207 in ch. 2. 
47 Commentary on Principles for Investment Securities Statute, Principle 2 (d), in FMLC (July 2004, paras. 6.5 and 
9); English Law Commission (June 2006, paras. 1.232 - 1.242) and Gullifer (2010, pp. 14 – 15). 
48 Gullifer and Goode (2013), para. 6–18. 
49 Gullifer (2010, p. 19). 
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Chapter 2: Re-conceptualising securities ownership 
 
1. The nature of the beneficiary’s rights under a trust: proprietary rights or purely 
personal rights?  
 
The nature of equitable rights in property has long been the focus of academic debate. 
Particularly, in the case of trusts some scholars view the equitable right of a beneficiary 
(also known as the cestui que trust) simply as a right in personam (i.e. a personal right) 
against the trustee and not as a right in rem (i.e. a proprietary right) exercisable against 
the trust fund50.   
 
This debate started sometime between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of 
the 20th century, when the historian and legal theorist Frederic Maitland challenged the 
proprietary nature of equitable rights under a trust.  During one of his celebrated 
lectures on equity, Maitland argued that equitable rights cannot be classified as 
proprietary rights as they are not enforceable against certain types of third parties, 
namely bona fide purchasers for value who have obtained a legal right in the assets 
without notice of the trust51.  
 
According to Maitland, this view seems to be consistent with the historical evolution of 
the equitable rights under a trust52.  In this regard, it should be mentioned that as far 
back as medieval law the cestui que trust was considered as having merely a personal right 
against the trustee (i.e. a right to the proper performance of the trustee’s obligations) 
and such a beneficiary was not entitled to prevent third parties from interfering with 
his/her rights53.  It was only later, in the mid-17th century, that the developing rules of 
equity gradually changed this approach by extending the protection of the beneficiary’s 
rights against an increasing number of diverse classes of persons54.  In particular, 
                                                 
50 Maitland (1936, p. 107); Langdell (1908, pp. 5 – 6); Ames (1913, p. 262); Holland (1882, pp. 140 – 261) 
and Stone, (1917, p. 467).   
51 Maitland (1936, p. 120). 
52 For an analysis of the historical evolution of the equitable rights under a trust see Worthington (2006 b, 
pp. 3 – 67); Gardner (2011, pp. 217 - 225); Penner (2012, p. 30) and Waters (1967, p. 219). 
53 This point was emphasised by Sir Edward Coke at the end of the sixteenth century, Coke (1639 p. 272 
b). 
54 The nature of the beneficiary’s rights started to change significantly during Lord Nottingham’s 
Chancery tenure (1673 – 1682). Lord Nottingham re-conceptualised the beneficiary’s right as being 
analogous to legal estates, i.e. portions or slices of ownership over the same assets, Yale (1961, pp. 88 – 
101).  See also on this point also Gardner (2011, pp. 217 - 218). 
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pursuant to the rules of equity the cestui que trust was granted protection against (i) 
purchasers for value who had actual or constructive notice of the trust (i.e. knew or had 
reasons to know that the assets had derived from a breach of trust); (ii) parties who had 
received the trust assets without consideration; (iii) parties who had inherited the trust 
property from the trustee as well as (iv) creditors of the trustee in cases where the latter 
had been declared bankrupt.  This process took over two centuries but by the 19th it was 
evident that the beneficiary could enforce his/her rights against all parties other than 
bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the trust.   
 
While admitting that the equitable rights under a trust had become almost [emphasis 
added] equivalent to proprietary rights, Maitland infers that they had not yet reached 
that status55.  The reason for this is that equitable interests were not considered by 
Maitland as ‘rights against the world at large but [only as] rights against certain 
persons’56.  In other words, the fact that such interests are always vulnerable to a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice of the legal estate means that they cannot be 
asserted erga omnes57 (i.e. they are not universal).  These considerations led Maitland to 
perceive equitable interests essentially as rights of a personal nature that have a 
misleading resemblance to rights in rem.58 
 
This interpretation proposed by Maitland is somewhat controversial.  In particular, his 
approach to equitable rights attracts criticism from those scholars who consider such 
rights as property rather than mere obligation59.  The rationale behind this argument is 
that the ability of the beneficiary to recover the assets from third parties (other than bona 
fide purchasers for value) is incompatible with the beneficiary having no more than a 
right in personam against the trustee.  According to Austin Scott, ‘a right in rem is usually 
defined to be a right available against the world at large, corresponding to a duty 
imposed upon the world at large; and by the world at large is meant indeterminate 
                                                 
55 Maitland (1936, p. 112). 
56 Id.   
57 However, from a comparative prospective, this argument does not seem convincing.  In this regard, 
many civil law systems 'classify ownership as a right in rem despite the fact that their codes contain rules 
whose result is that these rights are not enforceable against a bona fide buyer for value in a large class of 
circumstances', Micheler (2007, p. 36).  See on this point, for example, ss. 135, 136, 883, German Civil 
Code (BGB); s. 365 Austrian Civil Code (ABGB); see also arts. 9, 900, 931, 937, Swiss Civil Code, art. 
1153 Italian Civil Code and art. 2279 French Civil Code. 
58 Maitland describes an equitable right as 'a right primarily good against certa persona, viz. the trustee, but 
so treated as to be almost equivalent to a right good against all [except innocent purchasers for value]', 
Maitland (1936, pp. 23 and 106 – 116).  See on this point also Langdell (1908, p. 6). 
59 Scott (1917, p. 269); Huston (1915, pp. 87 - 90 and Amos (1936/1937, p. 1264). 
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persons, an indefinite number of persons, not necessarily everyone in the world; and it is 
to be distinguished from a right in personam, or obligation, which is a right available 
against determinate persons, corresponding to a duty imposed upon determinate 
persons.’60  
 
This approach is confirmed by Simon Gardner who emphasises that the rights of the 
beneficiary are considered proprietary since ‘they do not simply rest on the trustee 
personally, but are […] attached to the trust assets’61.  Once again, the principal 
manifestations of the proprietary quality of these rights (i.e. the attachment to the trust 
assets) can be identified by the following applications: firstly, the ability to prevent the 
trustee’s creditors from claiming their share of the trust property and secondly, to give 
the beneficiary the possibility to trace the trust assets into the hands of any person other 
than bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the trust.  Indeed, with regard to 
the latter there may be circumstances in which the beneficiary is entitled to make a claim 
against third parties only through the trustee.  However, as will be broached in the next 
section of this chapter, in those cases in which the trustee is unwilling to enforce the 
trust, the beneficiary may bring proceedings directly against third parties under the so-
called Vandepitte procedure.  Thus, following this analysis it is possible to argue that the 
beneficiary enjoys a bundle of interests, which includes not only personal rights against 
the trustee but also proprietary rights in the trust assets.  
 
2. The proprietary nature of the beneficiary’s rights and the role of equity in 
English law 
 
The proprietary characterisation of the equitable rights under a trust has greater 
acceptance among English scholars than Maitland’s view, which assigns mere personal 
rights to the cestui que trust62.  In particular, it is argued that ‘where it appears that the 
right is enforceable against third parties the expression ‘an equity’ has come to be used 
in the sense of a proprietary interest ranking at the bottom of a hierarchy of proprietary 
                                                 
60 Scott (1917, pp. 273 – 274). 
61 Gardner (2011, p. 210).  In particular, Gardner considers to be ‘attached’ to the trust property certain 
fundamental obligations that trustees owe to the beneficiaries, i.e. 'their duties to respect the fact that the 
property is not beneficially their own', Ibid., p. 13.  These obligations on the part of trustees are matched 
by the corresponding rights of the beneficiaries, which, like the trustees' obligations, are also ‘attached’ to 
the trust property, Ibid., pp. 210 – 215. 
62 Gardner (2011, pp. 210 – 225); Virgo (2012, pp. 54 – 57); Martin (2012, para. 1-019); Moffat et al. 
(2009, pp. 249 - 252); Worthington (2006 b, pp. 63 – 67); Gray and Gray (2009, paras. 7.1.1. and 7.1.3) 
and Webb and Akkouh (2013, pp. 29- 30) and Rudden (1987, pp. 239 – 241- 243). 
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interests’63.  This approach is also supported by the English courts64 and by statute law65 
which both recognise the beneficiary as having a proprietary right in the trust assets.  
However, these equitable proprietary rights are generally considered to be of a special 
nature since they do not operate in the same way as legal proprietary rights.  According 
to Martin ‘[t]o argue that a beneficiary’s rights are proprietary is not to say that legal 
rights are the same as equitable or that equitable ownership is the same as legal’66.  On 
the contrary, ‘[…] it is to accept the basic peculiarity of ownership under the English 
law of trusts’67: ‘[t]he trustee is the owner at law and the beneficiary is the owner in 
equity’68. 
  
As mentioned earlier, one of the main differences is that unlike legal proprietary rights 
the equitable interests of a beneficiary under a trust are at all times vulnerable to the bona 
fide purchaser for value.  The rationale behind this principle is that in the case of a trust 
the beneficial interest is ‘hidden’ in as much as it is the legal owner (acting as the trustee) 
who usually has possession of the property.  Hence, under these circumstances there is a 
greater risk that third parties (who acquire such property) will be unaware of the 
existence of a trust69.  This may explain why, according to equity rules, bona fide 
purchasers (to whom trust property is transferred) are protected from the risks created 
by trusts70.   
                                                 
63 Neave and Weinberg (1978-1980 pp. 24 and 38).  For a different view, see Nolan, who defines the 
beneficiary’s proprietary rights as negative or ‘exclusionary’ (i.e. negative 'rights to exclude non-
beneficiaries from the enjoyment of the trust assets' as opposed to positive rights to impose trustee duties 
on such assets, Nolan (2006 a, p. 233) and Id. (2006 b, 19). 
64 Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] I AC 340, p. 371 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669, 705 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) and Foskett v. McKeown 
[2001] I AC 102, 108, 127 (Lord Millett).  See, more recently Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v CRC 
Credit Fund Ltd and others, [2012] UKSC 6; Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (No. 2) [2009] EWCA 
Civ 1161; Pearson v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2011] EWCA Civ 1544 which describe the interests of a 
beneficiary under a trust as property rights rather than mere personal rights.  The European Court of 
Justice, however, reached the opposite conclusion in Webb v. Webb Case C 294/92 [1994] QB 696 (not 
followed in Re Hayward (deceased) [1996] 3 WLR 674 but applied in Ashurst v. Pollard [2001] 2 All ER 75 and 
Prazic v. Prazic [2006] EWCA Civ. 497). 
65 See, for example, Section 22 (1) of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 which 
expressly defines the interests of a beneficiary under a trust as 'interests in property'. 
66 Martin (2012, para. 1-019).  See on this point also Virgo (2012, p. 51).   
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Trusts are apt to mislead third parties: 'the trustee, by virtue of his possession of the property, will 
appear to the outside world to be beneficially entitled to it, whereas in fact the beneficial interest lies 
elsewhere', Webb and Akkouh (2013, p. 35).   See also Hargreaves (2011, p. 174).  This may explain why, 
according to equity rules, bona fide purchasers (to whom trust property is transferred) are protected from 
the risks created by trusts. 
70 This reasoning is consistent with Section 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA) which deals with 
circumstances where a bona fide purchaser can defeat the legal title of an owner.  However, doubts were 
raised about this argument, Webb and Akkouh (2013, pp. 35 - 36). 
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Furthermore, the beneficiary cannot bring a direct claim against third parties who steal71 
or carelessly damage the trust property72.  In these cases, the general rule is that the 
claim for tort of conversion or tort of negligence lies only with the trustee73, who holds 
the legal ownership and has either possession or the right to immediate possession74.  
Should the trustee refuse to make a claim against the third parties, the beneficiary may 
commence an action to compel the trustee to do so.  Alternatively, under the Vandepitte 
procedure the beneficiary may be entitled to sue the tortfeasor but only to the extent 
that the trustee is made a party to the proceedings.   
 
The procedure is known as Vandepitte, after the case Vandepitte v. Preferred Accident 
Insurance Corp. of New York75.  In Barbados Trust Co Ltd (formerly known as CI Trustees (Asia 
Pacific) Ltd) v Bank of Zambia & Anor the court argues that this procedure ‘simply 
provides a short cut to prevent litigation under which the trustee could be forced to sue 
followed by an action under which the trustees sues’ 76.  Indeed, there have to be ‘special 
circumstances’ entitling a beneficiary to take part in the proceeding against the tortfeasor 
(e.g. cases where the conduct of the trustee is subject to criticism or where the trustee is 
unable to sue)77.   
 
Once again, these rules seem to confirm that (as a general principle) the beneficiary can 
only enforce his/her equitable interest indirectly through [emphasis added] the trustee78.  
                                                 
71 See among others, MCC Proceeds Inc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [1998] 4 All E.R. 675 CA. 
According to Palmer, however, a very limited number of cases may lead to suggestions that the 
beneficiary is entitled to claim in conversion, Palmer, (1986, p. 228).  
72 The beneficiary is also prevented from suing for tort of negligence those parties who have damaged or 
caused economic loss to the trust assets.  See on this point, Leigh & Sillivan v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd 
(The Aliakmon) [1986] AC 785, 809 (Lord Brandon). 
73 For a discussion on 'how the courts are currently approaching the issue of direct common law claims by 
the beneficiary against third parties', see Hargreaves (2011, p. 169).  See also Smith (2008 p. 521); Virgo 
(2012, p. 52); Low (2010, p. 507); Hawes (2011, p. 336); Tettenborn, (1996, p. 39) and Barker (1998, p. 
153).  However, this principle (which prevents the beneficiary from directly suing third parties) does not 
apply if the trustee participated in the interference with the trust asset, since in such circumstances no 
wrong would be committed by the third party.  
74 The beneficiary is entitled to bring an action directly against the tortfeasor only in the exceptional 
circumstances where he/she has acquired possession of the property.  However, in such cases the 
beneficiary has to rely on his/her possessory title rather than his/her equitable interest, Healey v. Healey 
[1915] 1 KB 938; International Factors v. Rodriguez [1979] Q.B. 351, 359-360; Stroud Architectural Services Ltd v 
John Laing Construction Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 276; MCC Proceeds Inc v. Lehman Brothers International (Europe) 
[1998] 4 All E.R. 675, 691; London Borough of Hounslow v. Jerkins [2004] EWHC 315 (QB) and Leigh & 
Sillivan v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd (The Aliakmon) [1986] AC 785, 809, 812.  
75 [1933] A.C. 70 P.C. 
76 [2007] 1 CLC, 434, 452.   
77 Hayim v. Citibank NA [1987] A.C. 730 PC, 747 
78 In Roberts v Gill & Co and another [2010] UKSC 22, [2011] 1 A.C. 240, 262, Lord Collins of Mapesbury 
JSC stated that 'joinder […] has a substantive basis, since the beneficiary has no personal right to sue, and 
is suing on behalf of the estate, or more accurately, the trustee'.  See also Parker-Tweedale v. Dunbar Bank 
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The reason why both the tort of conversion and the tort of negligence are restricted to 
cases involving legal proprietary interests or possessory interests lies in the common law 
nature of these actions, since common law does not recognise the equitable title of the 
beneficiary under a trust79.   
 
These differences seem to suggest that equitable ownership is weaker than legal 
ownership in so far as (i) it does not bind bona fide purchasers for value and (ii) it allows 
the beneficiary to bring a tort action against third parties only through the trustee. 
 
The special nature of equitable ownership is deeply rooted in the historical development 
of the concept of trust and, more importantly, in the role that was played by equity in 
creating new forms of property.  
 
The core idea is that over the centuries the rights of a beneficiary under a trust gradually 
changed from purely personal rights into property80.  This was made possible through 
the rules of equity, which have provided the beneficiary’s rights with specific advantages 
typically related to ownership and other proprietary rights.   
 
The creation of this new form of property is part of a broader process that characterised 
the development of certain equitable rights and resulted in a significant expansion of the 
                                                                                                                                          
Pic. (C.A.) [1991] (Ch) 12, 19.  See, however, Shell UK Ltd v. Total UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ. 180, [2011] 
QB 86, where the Court of Appeal considers (i) the beneficiary 'the real owner' of the trust assets, 'the 
legal owner being little more than a bare trustee' (Ibid., p. 99) and (ii) consequently, recognises the right of 
the beneficiary (in his/her capacity as the equitable owner of the assets) to bring a direct claim against the 
third parties (provided that the trustee is made a party to the proceedings) (Ibid., pp. 98 - 103).  In 
particular, the Court of Appeal held that the beneficiary could recover all consequential losses, including 
those that were suffered merely by the beneficiary and not by the trustee (namely, economic losses caused 
by the destruction of the trust property).  This decision was criticized by most legal scholars.  For 
example, according to Hargreaves 'the suggestion that Shell is the "real owner" fundamentally 
misunderstands the orthodox view of the beneficiary’s interest', Hargreaves (2011, p. 166).  Indeed, 
continues Hargreaves, 'it is the trustee who holds the legal title and therefore it is always the trustee who is 
the "real owner"', Id. The Court of Appeal based its decision primarily on the argument that the question 
at stake was not the recovery for the physical damage of the goods but merely for consequential losses 
(which were not suffered by the trustee). However, Hargreaves considers this argument poorly convincing 
since 'if the beneficial owner was unable to recover for damage to the property itself, it would be an odd 
result if he/she can recover for consequential economic losses suffered as a result of the same damage', 
Id.  Furthermore, to provide a direct claim to the beneficiary would come at the cost of unacceptably 
undermining the structure of a trust (in as much as the main purpose of a trust is to centralise in the 
hands of the trustee the 'management and enforcement functions', Ibid. p. 174).  For a similar view on this 
decision, see also Turner (2010, pp. 445 – 447); Edelman (2013, p. 66) and Low (2010, p. 507).  
79 Rushworth and Scott (2010, p. 537); Penner (2009, p. 255) and Hargreaves (2011, p. 164).  In MCC 
Proceeds Inc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [1998] 4 All E.R. 675, 691, Mummery LJ stated that 'an 
equitable owner under a trust had no title to sue in conversion at common law' and that the fusion of law 
and equity by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 had not changed this common law rule.  
80 Worthington (2006-2007, p. 930) and McKendrick and Goode (2009, p. 42). 
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notion of property81.  Equity carried out this process by correcting the common law and 
treating certain personal rights as proprietary.   
 
The development of these equitable interests was achieved by adopting two different 
mechanisms.  Firstly, equity recognised new categories of interests in property under the 
notion of trust and of equitable charges.  It did this by allocating to different parties the 
bundle of rights that are typically associated to ownership82.  For example, with regard 
to a trust, the management of the trust property (including the right of alienation and 
the right of possession) is allocated to the trustee, while the beneficiary retains the 
substantial enjoyment of the thing.  The main characteristic of the law of trust is that it 
allows both the trustee and the beneficiary to own the property simultaneously in 
different ways (i.e. through legal and equitable ownership, respectively).  However, as 
mentioned earlier, this form of ‘dual ownership’ was not a feature of the initial structure 
of trusts.  The right of the beneficiary was originally classified as a purely personal right 
against the trustee and developed into a proprietary right only later.  This change in 
nature was achieved essentially by granting proprietary protection to the beneficiary 
(namely, the power to exclude others from interfering with his/her right).  A similar 
process to the one governing the structure of trusts can be found in relation to the 
creation of equitable charges, since both ‘devices began as contractual arrangements 
(“personal obligations”), and slowly evolved until they were unequivocally recognised as 
delivering new (divided) property interest in the underlying  […] asset’83.   
 
Secondly, equity transformed into property certain interests in intangible assets (e.g. 
debts and shares in a company) which were typically characterised by common law as 
‘personal rights against specific parties’84. Once again, this change was made possible by 
providing some form of proprietary protection to the holders of such rights, as well as 
permitting their assignment to third parties85. 
 
                                                 
81 Worthington, (2009, pp. 7 – 9). 
82 This 'fragmentation of ownership' was already known in common law due to the co-existence of 
different estates (i.e. freehold or lease) or interests (i.e. easement or charge) in land, Lawson and Rudden 
(1982, pp. 76 -97). 
83 Worthington (2006-2007, p. 921).   
84 Ibid. p. 920. 
85 By doing so, these interests were transformed 'from purely personal rights, which could simply be 
enjoyed, to proprietary rights, which could also be traded' (Worthington, 2006-2007, p. 35) and asserted 
against third parties.  
 
 
28
The main difference between these two mechanisms is that in the second case 
(concerning interests in intangible assets) equity simply transformed existing rights from 
personal into proprietary, while in the first case it created new devices or ‘novel 
divisions of bundle of rights’.  These involved interests that were initially classified as 
personal and were later transformed into property (namely, the interest of the 
beneficiary under a trust and the interest of the chargee).    
 
This new idea of property (based on the coexistence of legal and equitable rights) seems 
to support the argument that the interests of a beneficiary under a trust should be 
classified as proprietary rather than merely personal rights.  However, the intervention 
of equity in commercial transactions and its implications on English property law make 
it rather difficult to use the classical Roman law dichotomy of rights in personam and 
rights in rem for these types of rights.  Roman law defines property in terms of a sole and 
absolute dominion over things but this interpretation is not accepted in English law86.  
Hence, it would be rather misleading to define the proprietary nature of the equitable 
interests under a trust using Roman law terminology (i.e. referring to them as rights in 
rem as opposed to rights in personam) 87.  
 
3. The theory proposed by McFarlane and Stevens: not proprietary rights but 
‘rights against rights’ 
 
An alternative approach would be to classify the equitable rights under a trust as sui 
generis rights.  This approach is supported by Pettit, who considers the equitable rights of 
a cestui que trust ‘not quite [proprietary] rights because of the doctrine of the bona fide 
purchaser’ and not quite ‘[personal] rights because of the doctrine of following trust 
                                                 
86 It could be argued that this holistic approach to property (based on a 'sole and despotic dominium' over 
things, Blackstone (1765 - 1769, book 2, chapter 1 - Of Property, in General) was never recognised in 
English law.  Indeed, the practice of reducing ownership into a bundle of rights and allocating each of 
these rights to different parties was already accepted in early common law, Lawson and Rudden (1982, p. 
76).  Hence, the idea of creating multiple proprietary rights over the same asset was simply enhanced by 
equity. 
87 On the reluctance to use this in rem-in personam terminology, see, among others Waters (1967, p. 230); 
Turner, (1931, p. 138 ff. and Nolan (2006 a, p. 232).  In Livingstone v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties 
(Queensland) (1960) 107 C.L.R. 411, p. 448 the in rem-in personam classification was deliberately avoided as 
'more hindrance than help was likely to come from' [using this terminology].  Indeed, 'the courts have 
nearly always been content to examine the rights of the trust beneficiary in a pragmatic manner, very often 
with an eye on the issue between the parties and an intention that the merits of the case shall not be lost 
in theoretical speculation on the effects of the distinction between legal and equitable estate', Waters 
(1967, p. 230). 
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funds’88.  As a result of this peculiar status, Pettit prefers to define the equitable interests 
under a trust as a ‘hybrid’ creation89 or sui generis rights90 rather than ‘trying to force them 
into a classification which is really inadequate’91. The main problem is that Pettit does 
not further investigate into the nature of the beneficiary’s right, as he fails to explain 
what exactly is meant by a ‘hybrid’ creation or sui generis right.   
 
A step forward in this analysis is offered by Ben McFarlane and Robert Stevens who 
define an equitable right not as a ‘right to a thing’ (i.e. a proprietary right), or a ‘right 
against a person’ (i.e. a personal right) but as a ‘right to, or against, a right’ (i.e. a 
‘persistent right’).92  This new category of rights was coined to emphasise that equitable 
rights (e.g. under a trust) can be classified as sui generis rights since they do not attach to a 
‘thing’ but rather attach or flow from the rights of another.93  The advantage for equity, 
in recognising the concept of a right to a right is that ‘it permits B to enjoy the benefit 
of a right without holding that right directly, whilst also recognising that B has more 
than a mere personal right against A, the holder of the right.’94   
 
The starting point of this analysis is to qualify proprietary rights merely as rights that ‘(i) 
relate to the use of [material] things95 and (ii) impose a prima facie duty on the rest of the 
world’96.  This definition strictly confines the concept of property to a very short and 
closed list of rights that does not include what is conventionally described as an 
equitable proprietary interest97.  In particular, it rejects the idea that a proprietary right 
                                                 
88 Pettit (2012, pp. 81 and 83) and Hanbury (1935, p. 62). 
89 This expression was originally coined by Hanbury when he argues that: 'equitable interests must be 
regarded as hybrids, midway between iura in rem and ira in personam' (Hanbury 1935, p. 62).   
90 See on this point also Nathan and Marshall (1967, p. 9) and, in particular, Smith (2008, p. 379) who 
describes the beneficiary’s equitable interest under a trust not as a proprietary right but rather as a separate 
patrimony. 
91 Pettit (2012, p. 83). 
92 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 a, p. 37).  The term ‘persistent right’ 'is used to refer to any right usually 
called an "equitable proprietary right"', McFarlane (2008, pp. 23 - 27).  More specifically, with regard to a 
trust the fact that in certain circumstances equity binds third parties to the trustee’s personal obligations 
towards the beneficiary has prompted McFarlane and Stevens to define the beneficiary’s right as 
'persistent’, McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, pp. 1 – 2). 
93 Id. 
94 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 a, p. 38). 
95 Proprietary rights can only relate to the use of 'an object that can be physically located' (namely, land 
and goods), McFarlane (2008, p. 132).  Hence, this does not include rights over intangible assets that are 
classified by McFarlane either as ‘persistent rights’ (e.g. debts, goodwill or shares in a company) or 
‘background rights’ (e.g. intellectual property rights), Ibid., p. 133. 
96 Ibid., p. 22. 
97 McFarlane and Stevens argue that 'while there is a closed list, or numerus clausus list, of rights against 
things, there is no such limit to the content of rights against rights', McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, p. 2) 
and McFarlane (2008, pp. 32 and 135 – 140). 
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may (i) relate to intangibles and (ii) more importantly, may be recognised in the case of 
an indirect relationship with the asset (whether tangible or intangible) through an 
intermediary (e.g., a trustee)98. 
 
With regard to the equitable right of a beneficiary under a trust, McFarlane and Stevens 
criticise the ‘very common view’ that over the centuries equity has extended the notion 
of property by creating ‘a weaker, more vulnerable version of the proprietary rights 
recognised at common law’.  This ‘orthodox […] view’, continue McFarlane and 
Stevens, ‘overlooks the genius of equity’99, which does not recognise two competing 
concepts of ownership (namely, equitable as opposed to legal ownership) but includes 
the equitable right of a beneficiary into a new category of rights (i.e. ‘persistent 
rights’)100.   
 
Unlike personal interests, this type of rights shares with property a very important 
feature, i.e. the power to bind third parties and not only a specific person such as a 
contracting partner.  This means, for example, that if the trustee is insolvent the 
beneficiary’s right is protected against the trustee’s creditors.  However, it can be 
ascertained that there are certainly differences between a persistent right and a 
proprietary right since the former (unlike the latter) does not relate directly to a thing 
but rather to the right of another person.  In other words, the equitable right of a 
beneficiary is a right against the proprietary right held by the trustee101.  This means that 
in order to enforce his/her persistent right against a third party, a beneficiary does not 
‘need to find a particular thing’ (such as a trust asset) but ‘needs to show that [the third 
party] has acquired a right that depends on the [proprietary] right held by [the 
trustee].’102 
 
These conceptual differences between a proprietary right and a persistent right explain 
why the beneficiary under a trust is prevented from making a claim directly against a 
person who steals or carelessly damages the trust assets103.  According to McFarlane and 
                                                 
98 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, p. 4).  For a different view see Penner (2009, p. 254). 
99 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, p. 2). 
100 Id.  
101 McFarlane (2008, pp. 23 – 24). 
102 Id. 
103 If the beneficiary ('B') is regarded as having a right against the ownership of the trustee ('A'),  'B has a 
prima facie power to impose a duty on anyone who acquires A’s ownership of the [trust assets]' (e.g. A’s 
creditors in cases of bankruptcy or parties who have inherited the assets from A). Hence, when B decides 
 
 
31
Stevens, the reason for this limitation is not simply that common law does not recognise 
the equitable title under a trust but rather that the beneficiary has no rights to the trust 
property and, consequently, ‘no claim, either at law or in equity, against the parties who 
steal or damage such property.’104  Indeed, the third parties do not derive any title to the 
trust property from the trustee since they have just committed a wrong against the latter 
and, consequently, violated his/her proprietary right.  In accordance with this reasoning, 
the trustee is the only person entitled to make a claim for conversion or negligence 
directly against the tortfeasor105.  As mentioned above, if the trustee is unwilling to make 
such a claim, ‘the beneficiary can apply to the court to force the trustee to do so’106.   
 
However, in this case the claim of the beneficiary is ‘an action against the trustee, not 
against a third party in connection with the trust property’107.  Similarly, the cestui que trust 
may exceptionally decide under the so-called Vandepitte procedure to join the legal 
owner in the action against the third parties.  Once again, this procedure confirms that 
the beneficiary has no direct claim against the tortfeasor as the latter has not infringed a 
right against the beneficiary but rather against the trustee108.   
 
The limitations imposed on the beneficiary seem to support the argument that an 
equitable right under a trust cannot be considered a competing ownership to the legal 
ownership but should be classified as a persistent right109.  In other words, in order to 
explain these limitations it is more appropriate to rely on the conceptual rather than the 
historical distinctiveness of an equitable interest under a trust110.  The main point is that 
‘equity does not simply provide a different answer to the same question’ but offers a 
‘conceptually distinct new right’ (i.e. a persistent right)111. Hence, the ‘anomalies’ related 
                                                                                                                                          
to exercise such a power, the third party is under a duty to B not to use the assets for any purpose other 
than B’s interest, Ibid., p. 30.  
104 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, p. 4). 
105 Since B has no right to the trust property, the third party who steals or damages such property ('X') 
does not commit a wrong against B but only against A. Hence 'B has no power to impose a duty on X, as 
X has not acquired a right from B', McFarlane (2008, p. 29). 
106 'It is worth noting that, as A holds his ownership of [the assets] on trust for B, A is under a duty to use 
that right, and its products, for B’s benefit.  So if, for example, (i) A refuses to bring a claim against X, 
then, (ii) B can apply to court to force A to make such a claim', Id. 
107 Smith (2008, p. 521). 
108 McFarlane (2008, p. 30). 
109 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, p. 4). 
110 McFarlane and Stevens reject the idea of equity as a distinct set of rules that are peculiar to English law 
and were developed by the Court of Chancery in parallel with common law. This perception 'is 
unfortunate in a jurisdiction where the administration of law and equity has long since been fused', Ibid., 
p. 28. 
111 Ibid., p. 9.  
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to an equitable proprietary right ‘depend not on the localized tradition of equity but 
rather upon the exportable concept of rights against rights.’112 Indeed, one of the main 
benefits they propound for identifying this new concept is that it ‘allows for the export 
of equitable property rights to jurisdictions with no tradition of equity: any legal system 
can recognise the concept of a right against a right.’113   
 
4. Criticism of McFarlane and Stevens’ approach to equitable rights 
 
McFarlane and Stevens offer a theory that is meant to describe the existing principles of 
trust (and more in general of equity) from an innovative perspective.  This means that 
their intention is not to propose normative changes but simply to show that (in contrast 
with the traditional approach to the law of trust) the concept of a right against a right 
provides a better understanding of the existing legal framework114.  
 
The argument, however, is difficult to accept given that firstly, the traditional approach 
to the law of trust does not effectively create any form of friction or inconsistency with 
general principles of property and secondly, the application of a right against a right is 
likely to undergo criticism for both theoretical and practical reasons. 
 
4.1 The proprietary theory is adequately capable of explaining English trust law 
The aim of this chapter is to defend the approach that views the equitable interest of a 
beneficiary as a proprietary right, rather than a right against the trustee’s ownership (i.e. 
a persistent right).  One way to support the proprietary nature of the beneficiary’s right 
is to accept the view suggested by Penner to define such an interest as an ‘indirect’ right 
in the trust assets115.  Indeed, the main feature of a trust is that the beneficiary is 
generally entitled to assert his/her rights against third parties through [emphasis added] 
the trustee116.  This means that the proprietary nature of the equitable rights under a 
trust is based on an indirect relationship between the beneficiary and the trust assets.  
                                                 
112 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 a, p. 28). 
113 'Practically, the concept of a right against a right has a powerful explanatory force.  It can be used to 
show how other jurisdictions either already have the same concept or could readily adopt it', Ibid., pp. 2-3.  
See also McFarlane and Stevens (2010 a, p. 58). 
114 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, p. 2). 
115 Penner (2009, p. 254) and Id. (2014, pp. 477 and 480). 
116 In other words, 'any claim in relation to the trust property is […] vested in the trustees who, as part of 
their duty to protect the trust property, have a duty to sue third parties who interfere with the trust', 
Hargreaves (2011, p. 165).  Hence, 'the trustee is the proper claimant', while 'the beneficiary can only 
enforce their beneficial interest indirectly through the trustee', Id.   
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Such a relationship is created by the rules of equity that allow the beneficiary, through 
the trustee, to trace the trust assets into the hands of third parties117.  McFarlane and 
Stevens respond to this argument by stating that if the right of the beneficiary (‘B’) is 
indirect, it cannot be ‘in rem’ but only a right against the right of the trustee (‘T’)118.  
Penner disagrees on this point and states that ‘nothing is provided to ground [this] 
assumption.’119  In particular, he argues that ‘if B has a right against T’s ownership, then 
B has a right against whatever makes it the right it is, including its in rem aspects’120.  In 
other words, ‘the point about the in rem quality of B’s right against T’s ownership is that 
B’s rights turn on what happens to the property, not on what happens to T [emphasis added].’121  
For example, in cases regarding the claim for tort of conversion and tort of negligence, 
‘B acquires a right to sue T to sue C’ (i.e. the tortfeasor) because ‘C interfered with the 
property [emphasis added], not because he interfered with T’s property right [emphasis 
added]’122.  Hence, B’s right is ‘linked to what happens to the property, and is perfectly 
logically seen as a right in rem’123. 
 
One must reject McFarlane and Stevens’ assumption that equitable ownership is 
competitive [emphasis added] to legal ownership124.  Indeed, nowadays it is rather difficult 
to contend that English law ‘recognises two competing interests in the same asset, the 
                                                 
117 Id.  See also Gardner (2011, p. 247).  
118 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, pp. 2 – 4). 
119 Penner (2009, p. 254). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. For an in depth analysis of Penner’s argument see Penner (2014, p. 476 ff.). 
123 Id.  In support of the orthodox approach Virgo mentions the decision of the Court of Appeal in Shell 
UK Ltd. v. Total UK Ltd 2010] EWCA Civ. 180, [2011] QB 86.  In this case an explosion seriously 
damaged pipelines and tanks in which the claimant, Shell UK Ltd., stored its oil.  The explosion was the 
result of the negligent overfilling of a fuel storage tank (which was caused by the defendant, Total UK 
Ltd.).  As required by statute, the pipelines and tanks were held on trust for the claimant by two 
companies, United Kingdom Oil Pipelines Ltd ('UKOP Ltd') and West London Pipeline and Storage Ltd 
('WLPS Ltd').  The question for the Court of Appeal was whether the beneficiary was entitled to sue the 
defendant.  The Court decided in favour of a beneficiary’s claim against the tortfeasor (provided that the 
trustee was made a party to the proceeding).  As already mentioned in this chapter, the issue at stake was 
not the compensation for physical damage to the goods but for consequential economic losses that were 
suffered only by the beneficiary and not by the trustee (namely, losses caused as a result of the 
beneficiary’s inability to supply fuel to his/her customers).  In this case, following the ‘right-against-rights 
thesis’ the third party would have committed a wrong not against the beneficiary but only against the 
trustee.  Hence, the beneficiary would have a right to the compensation for damages 'that would be 
obtained by the trustee suing the tortfeasor for the interference with the trustee’s legal proprietary right', 
Virgo (2012, p. 56).  Virgo considers McFarlane and Stevens’ approach too 'artificial'. In his view, in this 
case the trustee has 'no right to obtain damages', since he/she has not suffered any loss.  On the contrary, 
'the loss was suffered by the beneficiary and the rights arising from this loss need to be attached to the 
trustee’s right to sue for interference with the proprietary right,' Ibid., 57.  Virgo’s argument may attract 
criticism.  Indeed, although the trustee did not suffer stricto sensu any losses, he/she does acquire a ‘right to 
damages’ in as much as management and enforcement functions are concentrated in the trustee’s hands.  
For an analysis on this point, see above n. 105 in this chapter.  
124 Penner (2009, p. 254). 
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common law recognising the trustee as owner, equity recognising the beneficiary as 
owner’125: ‘[i]f the trustee does not have the rights he has, then the beneficiary cannot 
have the right he has, and no court of equity has ever expressed a view to the 
contrary126.’  In this regard, it has been recently argued by certain legal scholars that 
equitable ownership is ‘derivative of’ rather than ‘competitive with’ legal ownership127.  
According to Penner and Matthews, this statement is not inconsistent with the idea that 
the interest of a beneficiary is linked [emphasis added] to the property128. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the claim for tort of conversion and tort of negligence lies 
only with the trustee does not prevent the equitable rights under a trust from being 
classified as proprietary rights.  On the contrary, these limits on the level of 
enforceability of the beneficiary’s rights seem to be consistent with the purpose of a 
trust.  The main argument is that equity created the structure of trust by allocating to 
different parties the bundle of rights that are related to ownership.  As mentioned by 
Lawson and Rudden, the ‘habit of splitting ownership into its component parts’129 and 
conferring them to different parties is a practice which was already in use in early 
common law130. This means that equity just confirmed and strengthened the idea of 
‘fragmented’ ownership131.  Particularly, with respect to trusts it allows the benefits of 
ownership to be ‘split from the responsibilities of management’132. The ‘separation’ 
between management functions and enjoyment of the trust property explains why the 
beneficiary cannot bring a direct claim against third parties who steal or carelessly 
damage the trust assets.  Indeed, the management responsibilities of a trustee, ‘by their 
very nature, encompass protecting the trust property from third parties133.’  Hence, if the 
beneficiary were allowed to sue the tortfeasor directly, this ‘would be tantamount to 
overriding the discretion of the trustee, which would unacceptably undermine the 
structure of a trust134.’  Accordingly, the beneficiary is entitled to enforce his/her rights 
directly against third parties only in those circumstances where the trustee (i) breaches 
                                                 
125 Id., (2014, p. 475). 
126 Id. 
127 Penner (2009, p. 254).  See also on this point Matthews (2002, p. 206).  
128 Id.  
129 Lawson and Rudden (1982, p. 76).  
130 See above n. 85 in this chapter.  
131 Lawson and Rudden (1982, 76).  
132 Worthington (2006 b, p. 75). 
133 Hargreaves (2011, p. 174). 
134 Id.  In those circumstances where the trustee unreasonably refuses to sue the third party, the 
beneficiary is entitled to demand that the trustee be replaced by another person who would instead bring 
action, Ibid. 179.   
 
 
35
his/her fiduciary obligations (e.g. in cases of fraudulent transfers) or, alternatively, (ii) is 
unable to carry out the terms of the trust (i.e. in cases of bankruptcy or death of the 
trustee).  
 
There are also practical concerns that prevent the beneficiary from directly suing third 
parties135.  For example, ‘in a complex trust, the trustee may be balancing the interests of 
multiple different beneficiaries so it makes sense that the trustee is responsible for any 
third party actions136.’  In these cases, the ‘recovery by the trustee will ensure the 
property is properly distributed to the correct beneficiaries at the correct point in 
time137.’   
 
These considerations on the special nature of the trustee-beneficiary relationship show 
that the concept of an equitable ownership can certainly provide convincing arguments 
to explain the limits to the beneficiary’s rights.  Hence, it is not quite clear why the 
concept of a right against the trustee’s legal ownership should be considered necessarily 
more persuasive than the better known theory of a proprietary right created by the 
fragmentation of ownership (although classified as a peculiar form of property relating 
only indirectly to the trust assets). 
 
An argument addressed in favour of the theory of a ‘right against a right’ is that it avoids 
the ‘inconsistencies’ that are typically related to the orthodox approach.  In particular, 
McFarlane and Stevens reject the theory of an extensive notion of property (based on 
the coexistence of legal and equitable interests in both tangibles and intangibles) and 
criticise the practice of asserting that (unlike other interests) proprietary rights are 
transferable and exercisable against third parties.   
 
The reason for this criticism is that the orthodox approach does not provide ‘a stable 
[emphasis added] meaning to the term property right’138, which is consistently applicable 
in all circumstances.  In this regard, ‘it is not true to say that all rights’ that are 
                                                 
135 Low (2010, p. 512). 
136 Hargreaves (2011, p. 182). 
137  Id. In addition, a direct common law claim by the beneficiary (additional to the trustee’s claim) could 
lead to a risk of double liability for third parties.  According to Hargreaves, where it is a bare trust, 'this 
can be straightforwardly resolved by requiring joinder of the trustee, as the Court of Appeal did in Shell v. 
Total', Hargreaves (2011, p. 182).  This, however, 'is not so simple where the trust is more complex and 
some beneficiaries choose to bring direct actions whereas others rely only on the trustee’s claim', Id.  See 
on this point also Low (2010, p. 512). 
138 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 a, p. 35). 
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transferable and exercisable against third parties ‘are viewed as proprietary rights’.  For 
example, it is possible for certain types of personal obligations (namely, contractual 
rights) to be transferred to third parties, while the assignment of proprietary rights may 
be subject to restrictions.  Similarly, proprietary rights are not the only interests that can 
be asserted erga omnes since the right to physical integrity and to reputation also imposes 
a prima facie duty on the rest of the world.   
 
For these reasons, McFarlane and Stevens believe that the orthodox approach ‘does not 
draw a useful distinction between property rights […] and personal rights […]’139.  By 
contrast, the idea of confining the concept of property to a restricted list of rights (that 
does not include equitable proprietary rights) is considered more appropriate in as much 
as it places property within sharp and definitive boundaries140.   
 
Once again, these conclusions are open to criticism in so far as the orthodox approach 
does not create inconsistency within English law.  The traditional approach is intended 
to recognise proprietary rights as ‘exercisable’ against third parties and generally 
‘transferable’.  This means that the attributes of ‘excludability’ and ‘transferability’ are 
regarded by most English scholars as the characterising features of property.  However, 
this general statement cannot be interpreted in rigorous terms and, moreover, is not 
used under the orthodox approach to distinguish property rights from all other interests 
[emphasis added].  Particularly, with regard to the attribute of excludability, the general 
view is that not all rights exercisable against third parties are classified as proprietary 
rights.  As emphasised by the greater part of English scholars, the attribute of 
excludability is not a unique feature of property but is used primarily to draw a line 
between proprietary interests on the one hand and personal (mainly, contractual) 
interests on the other: a proprietary right ‘can be asserted against the world at large’141 
while a personal right is exercisable ‘against another individual such as a contracting 
partner’142.  Setting aside this main distinction, nothing prevents us from recognising 
that (unlike contractual interests) there may be other types of rights which share with 
property the feature of ‘excludability’ (e.g. the right to physical integrity and to 
reputation).  The reason for this is simply that certain interests receive greater protection 
than others as a result of the importance in a community of setting socio-political and 
                                                 
139 Ibid. p. 36. 
140 Id. 
141 Bridge (2002, p. 12). 
142 Id. 
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economic priorities (e.g. the need to protect private property as well as the right to 
corpus143, fama144 and dignitas145).  This principle seems to be consistent with the 
classification (typically applied in civil law systems) of ‘absolute’ versus ‘relative’ rights 
‘depending on whether they involve a legal remedy erga omnes’ (i.e. against the whole 
world) or only inter partes (i.e. against a given individual).  Following this classification, 
personal obligations are considered ‘relative’ since they are only effective against a 
specific person (such as a contracting party).  On the other hand, the category of 
‘absolute’ rights comprises both proprietary rights (i.e. real rights or rights in rem) and 
the so-called ‘personality rights’ (e.g. rights to physical integrity, to reputation and to 
privacy) which can be enforced against every person who interferes with such rights.  As 
a result of this analysis, nothing prevents us from stating that unlike personal 
obligations, proprietary rights are exercisable against third parties. 
 
With respect to the attribute of transferability, ‘it is no longer possible to suggest that 
“property” is assignable, but […] contract rights, are not’146: ‘the modern rule is that 
both are assignable’147.  This argument (supported by McFarlane and Stevens) is 
certainly true and brings us to partially reconsider the traditional view according to 
which ‘the truly essential features of property rights are that the right-holders can transfer 
[emphasis added] […] and can exclude third parties from interfering with their rights’148.  
The reason for this is that such a statement is now only partially indicative of property.  
For a number of centuries the twin attributes of ‘excludability’ and ‘transferability’ were 
strictly used to separate proprietary rights from contractual rights.  It was only between 
the latter part of the 19th and the early 20th century that the attribute of ‘transferability’ 
was gradually conferred to an increasing number of rights (that were typically classified 
by common law as purely personal).  This process was made possible through the rules 
of equity which then started treating certain types of personal rights as ‘transferable, 
usable wealth’149 (e.g. the right to receive payment from a customer).  Furthermore, in 
certain circumstances the assignment of proprietary rights may be subject to specific 
                                                 
143 ‘Bodily integrity’. 
144 ‘Reputation’.  
145 ‘Dignity’. 
146 Worthington (2006 - 2007, p. 927). 
147 Id.  
148 Ibid., p. 920.   
149 Id. 
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restrictions either on public policy grounds150 or as a result of the parties agreeing to 
such limitations (namely, by inserting a no-assignment clause in the contract)151.  The 
result of this practice was to gradually confine the main distinction between property 
and obligation to the concept of excludability.  Hence, today the general perception is 
that proprietary rights differ from contractual rights since they are better protected than 
the latter.  In other words, the distinctive [emphasis added] feature of property is its 
universality152. 
 
This demonstrates that there is no uncertainty arising from the orthodox approach in so 
far as it is still possible, through the attribute of ‘excludability’, to draw a distinction 
between proprietary rights on the one hand and contractual rights on the other.  
Nevertheless, although proprietary rights are exercisable against third parties, this 
statement cannot be interpreted in too rigorous a fashion, since there are exceptions to 
the general rule.  As emphasized by Sarah Worthington, ‘there are no assets that entitle 
their holder to absolute [emphasis added] rights to enjoy, to transfer, and to exclude 
others’153.   This means that with respect to the attribute of excludability, ‘common law 
property rights may in certain instances be overridden154, and equitable rights, for 
example the interest of a trust beneficiary in the trust assets, are always vulnerable to the 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the legal estate’155.  In other words, there 
are different degrees of exigibility of proprietary rights that can either be imposed by law 
or contractually created by the parties.  These exceptions to the general rule apply 
regardless of whether the notion of property relates merely to ‘physical things’ (as 
                                                 
150 'Consider the restrictions on assignment of certain categories of land, or certain categories of goods 
(such as national art treasures, or petrol in periods of national shortage)', Worthington (2006 - 2007, p. 
928).  'Put another way', continues Worthington, 'public policy determines whether a particular bundle of 
rights is assignable'. 
151 Bridge, ‘Unassignable Rights’ in Bridge et al. (2013, para. 29-028).  See, for example, on this point 
Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 145; [2003] 1 WLR 1606 note; Re Celtic Extraction Ltd [2001] 
Ch 475, CA; Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock Exchange [2001] 1 WLR 1150; Don 
King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291. 
152 Bridge (2002, p. 12).   
153 Worthington (2006 – 2007, p. 923). 
154 Common law proprietary rights may be overridden by legislation for reasons of public interest (e.g. 
environmental restrictions on the use of land) or for the protection of certain groups of people (e.g. 
compulsory licensing and government use of a patent).  Furthermore, in relation to land a person’s 
ownership of property may be limited by the competing existence of different estates (i.e. freehold or 
lease) or interests (i.e. easement or charge) in land.  See on this point Lawson and Rudden (1982, pp. 76 -
97) and McFarlane (2008, pp. 6 – 12).  
155 Bridge (2002, p. 12).  Moreover, the exigibility of an equitable proprietary right may be subject to 
statutory limitations or other conditions, which are based on the type of interest involved.  For example, 
with regard to competing charges over the same assets, if the debtor becomes insolvent a floating charge 
holder has lower priority than the fixed charge holders as well as various statutory creditors. 
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suggested by McFarlane and Stevens) or is extended to intangibles (as supported by the 
orthodox approach).  
 
According to this reasoning, it is difficult (if not almost impossible) to confine the 
notion of property within sharp and definitive boundaries.  English law has developed a 
‘flexible’ and ‘malleable’ idea of property, particularly through the rules of equity, which 
has proven capable of adapting to the continuing changes of market practice156.  As a 
result of this process, the concept of property cannot be analysed by strictly using a ‘tick 
box’ approach157, with the aim of identifying in rigorous terms its features (as if they 
were applicable consistently in all circumstances).  In contrast with a stable [emphasis 
added] definition of property (based on a rigorous dominion over material ‘things’), 
‘property rights are more or less expansive, more or less limited, and some property 
rights are not freely transferable at all’158.  This means that the orthodox approach can 
operate regardless of the absence of clear boundaries between proprietary rights and 
contractual rights. 
 
4.2 The concept of property entails a dynamic (and not static) relationship between an individual and a 
thing 
 
The development of a flexible idea of property is best described by a diagram (figure 1), 
graphically representing proprietary rights, consisting of a horizontal plane with a 
vertical axis intersecting the plane at the origin. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
156 The terms ‘flexible’ and ‘malleable’ are used by James Penner in relation to the concept of property.  
On this point see Penner (1996, p. 723). 
157 Worthington (2006 – 2007, p. 923). 
158 This aspect was emphasised by Michael Bridge during a joint meeting (of senior Chancery, Queen’s 
Bench judges and senior academics) at London Law Club on April 2010.  See on this point also Bridge, 
‘Unassignable Rights’ in Bridge et al. (2013, para. 29-033).  These changes have led Worthington to 
challenge the existence of a boundary between property and obligation. In particular, she states that 
'[e]quity […] has effectively eliminated the divide between property and obligation, or between property 
rights and personal rights', Worthington (2006 – 2007, pp. 917 – 918).  This approach seems on the one 
hand to be quite valuable in support of the idea that English property law cannot be analysed in rigorous 
terms but on the other, probably too audacious since it is still possible to consider the attribute of 
excludability as the sole essential feature of property, Id.   
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Proprietary rights as they are applied to a trust 
 
 
The vertical axis indicates the different degrees of exigibility of a proprietary right: the 
higher the proprietary right is positioned along the vertical axis, the greater the level of 
protection a rightful owner or possessor enjoys vis-à-vis third parties generally.   
 
On the horizontal plane the three sectors of a circle represent the power to use and 
enjoy proprietary rights in whichever way one should choose, subject to any specific 
limitation under the applicable law.  In other words, it comprises the ‘bundle of rights’ 
which are typically associated to property, i.e. the rights of enjoyment, management and 
possession.  
 
By joining the coordinates positioned along the vertical axis and the horizontal plane, 
proprietary rights may take on various forms and acquire different levels of intensity in 
terms of power of the rightful owner or possessor to exclude all others from the use or 
enjoyment of the ‘thing’. 
 
In figure 2 the different proprietary rights are shown as they apply, for example to 
trusts.  The interest of the beneficiary in a trust fund (‘B’) is represented in yellow by the 
coordinates wps, as plotted on w along the vertical axis and on ps along the horizontal 
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plane.  Similarly, the interest of the trustee (‘A’) is represented in blue and red by the 
coordinates zps, as plotted on z along the vertical axis and on ps along the horizontal 
plane.  It can be seen from this diagram that the proprietary right of a beneficiary is 
rather limited, both in terms of its enforceability against third parties and of its power to 
dispose of the trust fund.  On the other hand, the trustee has a right to manage and use 
the trust fund, but only in the interest of the beneficiary.  Accordingly, if the trustee (in 
breach of trust) uses the assets for his/her own benefit, the beneficiary is entitled to 
trace such assets to any person other than a bona fide purchaser for value159. 
 
The example of a trust shows that the relationship between an individual and a ‘thing’ 
(on which the meaning of property is based) is a dynamic relationship, as its content is 
liable to change depending on the intention of the parties.160  This means that many 
different kinds of proprietary rights can be created in relation to the same asset.  
Property may be sliced into multiple interests, which may vary significantly in terms of 
extent and duration.161  The main objective of a coexistence of multiple layers of 
proprietary interests is to maximise the economic value of the asset. 
 
Furthermore, the diagram reveals that this flexible idea of property is now based almost 
exclusively on a non-rigorous definition of excludability.  In this regard, it might be 
argued that certain rights are now ‘regarded as “property” rather than “obligation” since 
commercial practice demanded that these rights be recognized as enforceable against 
third parties’162.  This has certainly been the key factor that resulted in the adaptation of 
the beneficiary’s rights under a trust from personal to proprietary.  Indeed, over the 
centuries equity extended the protection of the beneficiary’s rights by permitting its 
enforcement not only against the trustee but also against third parties.  These changes 
                                                 
159  This means that if the trust assets are acquired by a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, there 
is no proprietary claim available to the beneficiary but only a contractual right, which can be enforced 
against the trustee for breach of trust.  
160 Gray and Gray (2009, pp. 8 - 14). 
161 Figures 5 and 6 in Appendix to Chapter 2, offer another scenario in which diverse proprietary interests 
may be attached to the same asset.  This example shows that in addition to the interest of the beneficiary 
C (which is represented by the coordinates wps) and the interest of trustee A, (which is represented by the 
coordinates hpt), it is possible to identify also the interest of bailee B, which is represented by the 
coordinates zts).  In accordance with a bailment at will, possession is transferred for a limited period of 
time from the bailor (who in this case acts also as the trustee) to the bailee (coordinates ts).  It can be seen 
from the diagram that the legal interest of the bailee is limited in terms of its enforceability against third 
parties (coordinate z).  The reason for this is that such a title can be enforced only for a limited period of 
time, which the bailor determines at his/her discretion.  
162 Worthington (2001, p. 260).  This statement refers specifically to shares, but it can be extended to 
other proprietary rights, such as the right of the beneficiary under a trust.  
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were gradually introduced by the courts of equity in response to persistent commercial 
pressure.  The trend toward affording greater protection through the recognition of 
proprietary rights has developed over time and continues to be present today in so far as 
courts have recently emphasised that the proprietary nature of an interest depends on 
the intention of the parties: if the purpose was to create a right that is ‘sufficiently 
strong’163 to be asserted erga omnes, then such a right can be classified as proprietary164. 
 
4.3 Difficulties in accepting the concept of a right against a right 
 
In support of the proprietary nature of equitable rights under a trust, it could also be 
claimed that the idea of a right against a right is likely to encounter certain reservations 
from both the theoretical and practical points of view.   
 
Firstly, the concept of a ‘right against a right’ is alien to English law, which classifies the 
equitable interest of a beneficiary under a trust as ‘proprietary’ rather than ‘persistent’ 
rights.  In this regard, courts and statute law are generally more inclined to address 
commercial needs by accommodating existing principles rather than creating an entirely 
new class of rights.  This practice has been established over the centuries not only by 
creating the idea of an equitable ownership under a trust or by granting new forms of 
charges to secured creditors165, but also by extending the category of proprietary rights 
to include interests over an increasing number of intangibles.  This trend was recently 
confirmed when statute law introduced a rather ‘singular’ idea of possession, which 
applies to all types of assets (whether tangibles or intangibles).  In particular, the 2010 
Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral 
Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations (‘FMIR’) overrides the common law 
requirements (which have traditionally confined the concept of possession to the idea of 
physical and exclusive control [emphasis added]) by allowing a secured creditor to take 
possession over investment securities (regardless of the nature)166. Although this 
                                                 
163 Pearson and others v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 253. 
164 Ibid., para. 225.  
165 See, however, McFarlane and Stevens, who on the one hand classify the interest in a fixed charge as a 
persistent right and on the other, regard the interest in a floating charge as a power to acquire a persistent 
right.  With regard to mortgages, if the mortgagor holds a persistent right (e.g. a right under a trust), the 
mortgagee acquires that same type of persistent right.  See on this point, McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, 
p. 26 and McFarlane (2008, pp. 583 – 633).   
166 See on this point text to n. 572 – 592 in ch. 6.    
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innovative provision has attracted some criticism167, it does confirm a general trend in 
favour of adapting (wherever possible) existing legal concepts to commercial needs 
rather than creating ex novo different categories of rights.  
 
McFarlane and Stevens disregard this general trend and elaborate an abstract theory 
which seems to be detached from English case law and statute law.  Although the 
intention was to draw up a set of interests whose boundaries are clear and well defined, 
this has been achieved at the expense of not taking into account the historical 
development of English property law.  The question remains, can a particular concept 
within a legal system be described without tracing its historical roots?  Certain 
comparative lawyers believe that from a methodological point of view this cannot be 
considered a correct approach to legal analysis168, as it may lead to a distorted or 
misleading idea of the true, characteristic features of a particular legal system169.  
 
Secondly, one must reject the argument that the theory of a ‘right against a right’ ‘allows 
for the export of such [a concept] to jurisdictions with no tradition of equity’170 
(particularly, civil law jurisdictions).  Indeed, there is no evidence to support this 
argument.  Although it is true that non common law systems do not recognise the 
notion of equitable ownership, it is difficult to believe that they would find it easier to 
accept the theory of a persistent right.  The reason for this is that ‘rights are abstract 
relations’171 and the idea of a right against someone’s proprietary right is alien not only 
to common law traditions but also to civil law traditions. 
 
                                                 
167 Id.  Part of the purpose of this recent provision was to overcome the uncertainties concealed in the 
wording of the FCD, particularly of Art. 2(2) which deals with the methods of perfection of a security 
interest over investment property (namely, bearer securities in certificated form and securities in 
dematerialised form).  According to the EC Directive, a security agreement is effective against third 
parties when the secured creditor acquires ‘possession’ or ‘control’ of the assets.  Unlike possession, the 
notion of control is unknown to English law.  Hence, rather than introducing a new method of perfection 
which applies specifically to securities in dematerialised form, the FMIR opted for an extension of the 
idea of possession.  The UK provision may be subject to criticism since it does not appear to be 
consistent with the wording of the FCD.   
168 See among others, Gorla (1981, p. 730) and Id., (1964, p. 930).   
169 In this case for example, McFarlane and Stevens embrace the idea (common to civil law jurisdictions) 
that definitions and classifications of legal concepts descend from the formulation of absolute theories 
rather than being constantly accommodated to practical needs.  However, as highlighted by Lawson, this 
approach does not seem to reflect English legal culture and style (in terms of the manner typically used by 
English Courts to deal with legal problems), Lawson (1975, p. 24). 
170 McFarlane and Stevens (2010 b, p. 28). 
171 Penner (2009, p. 254). 
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One last aspect that deserves careful consideration is the idea of a ‘right against a right’ 
being part of a broader theory (proposed by McFarlane and Stevens) which confines the 
notion of property to a restricted list of rights that does not include interests in 
intangible assets172.  This approach could raise doubts from a practical point of view as it 
is in contrast with the general trend toward granting increasing importance to 
intangibles rather than tangibles.173  As emphasised by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), ‘in most countries the investment in 
intangibles is growing rapidly’ and in certain cases it also ‘matches or exceeds investment 
in traditional capital such as machinery, equipment and buildings’.174 Hence, by 
accepting McFarlane and Stevens’ approach to intangible assets, the importance of 
proprietary rights would be significantly reduced while persistent rights and background 
rights175 would start to be associated to a large and increasing portion of people’s wealth.  
To a certain extent, it could be stated that this restrictive approach to proprietary rights 
would not be easily accepted either in common law or civil law jurisdictions.  While 
there are considerable differences among legal systems, the general trend in most 
countries is to classify at least certain types of interests in intangibles as proprietary (e.g. 
intellectual proprietary rights).  As a result of these practical reservations, the approach 
suggested by McFarlane and Stevens is likely to be confined to the academic debate and 
unlikely to be accepted in practice. 
 
5. The proprietary character of a right against a right  
 
At this point, the author suggests that a third possible measure could be to confer 
proprietary status to a right against a right.  In this regard, one could argue that for the 
purpose of a trust the beneficiary holds a proprietary right in the trustee’s right in the 
                                                 
172 See above n. 95 in this chapter.  McFarlane and Stevens's approach can be challenged also for a 
theoretical prospective.  Foe example, Harris highlights that 'nostalgia for a true property limited to 
physical objects is a false lead', Harris (2002, p. 62).  More specifically, 'if there is a libertarian case for 
exclusive and autonomous use of land and chattels, there is surely also one for autonomous transacting 
with one's money, bank accounts, intellectual property-holdings and company shares', Id.  'To deny this', 
continues Harris, 'is to insist on too literal an application of the domain conception of rights', Id.  "Tt s 
true that the idea that property entailing exclusive and autonomous use can be most directly drawn 
around our physical property-holdings, but there is nothing to prevent the extension of the idea to 
portions of wealth', Id.  For a different opinion see Pretto-Sakmann (2002, p. 79) who believes that 'the 
physical or at least locatable idea of property preserves the taxonomical value of the category 'of 
proprietary rights, Id.     
173 See on this point Rahmatian, who criticises the authors’ view that proprietary rights can only attach to 
tangible ‘things’, Rahmatian (2009, pp. 878 – 879). 
174 OECD (September 2011). 
175 See above n. 95 in this chapter. 
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main property.  For example, if A holds a bicycle on trust for B, B acquires a 
(proprietary) right in A’s (proprietary) right in the bicycle (rather than a sui generis right or 
an indirect right in the bicycle). 
 
The general idea lying behind this argument is that the beneficiary’s right does not 
attach to the original property, which led to the creation of the trust (i.e. the bicycle) but 
attaches to a separate asset which is strictly linked to such a property.  In other words, 
what the beneficiary really acquires is an interest in a sub-property that derives from the 
property immediate above it.   
 
The key issue is to try to establish what precisely is meant by ‘sub-property’.  In the 
example mentioned above, the sub-property can be identified with the trustee’s 
(management) right in the bicycle which allows B to enforce a series of rights against A 
that are typically related to proprietary rights (such as a right to enjoy the benefits of the 
bicycle, to pass the bicycle on to his/her heirs and to be protected against A’s creditors 
in cases where A is declared bankrupt). 
 
This description of B’s right in a sub-property shows that there are many similarities 
between such a solution and the theory of a right against a right given that in both cases 
B acquires a package of rights against A.  The only difference is simply the proprietary 
or sui generis characterisation of B’s right.  More specifically, while the theory suggested 
by McFarlane and Stevens considers a right against a right as a sui generis title, the 
alternative option (proposed by the author and based on the concept of an interest in a 
‘sub-property’ or in a ‘derivative asset’) identifies A’s right in the bicycle as the item of 
property held or owned by B176.  This means that the debate should not really be about 
the nature of B’s right but rather about the subject matter of B’s proprietary [emphasis 
added] right under a trust.  
 
McFarlane and Stevens would most likely disagree with this analysis, stating that 
proprietary rights only attach to tangibles and not to abstract concepts such as rights.  
This argument, however, can be rebutted since (as emphasised in the previous sections 
of this chapter177) English law has frequently shown that even a simple right (such as a 
                                                 
176 The principle assumes an even clearer perspective if one considers that A’s proprietary right is solely a 
right to manage the bicycle in the interest of B [emphasis added].   
177 See supra text to nn. 83 – 85 in this chapter. 
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debt) can be recognised as an item of property.  Hence, there is no reason to reject the 
idea of conceiving the management functions of the trustee as an asset. 
 
A further objection to the proprietary characterisation of a right against a right is that it 
can clash with the idea of fragmented ownership.  Once again this criticism does not 
seem very convincing.  A closer look at the concept of an interest in a sub-property 
shows that although it does not comply stricto sensu with the conventional trust law, it 
does reach the same conclusions as those of a general model of fragmented ownership.  
In particular, such a concept confirms the tendency in English law to allocate to 
different parties a bundle of rights which are somehow (whether directly or through a 
sub-property) related to the same asset.  The objective in this case is clearly to maximise 
the economic value of that asset by allowing the cestui que trust to enjoy the benefits of 
property through the right of the trustee. 
 
For these reasons the concept of an interest in a sub-property is likely to be preferred to 
that of a right against a right, as it seems to be more in line with English case law (which 
has often highlighted the proprietary nature of the beneficiary’s right) and it does not 
depart from English legal taxonomy. 
 
6. The nature of the investor’s rights in the practice of indirectly held securities: 
the application of the proprietary theory.   
 
After having examined the different theoretical approaches to the nature of equitable 
rights under a trust, it is now necessary to establish which of these approaches is best 
suited to describe the nature of the investor’s rights in the practice of indirectly held 
securities.  As mentioned earlier, English law uses the concepts of trust and sub-trusts to 
explain the legal structure of intermediation.  This means that, for example, the first-tier 
intermediary (‘A’) holds the securities on trust for the second-tier intermediary (‘B’), 
who holds them on sub-trust for the benefit of the last investor (‘C’).  Hence, the 
question at stake is to understand how to classify B’s and C’s respective rights.  In other 
words, are they purely contractual rights? sui generis rights (i.e. ‘rights against rights’)? or 
proprietary rights (described either as indirect rights in rem or, alternatively, as rights in a 
sub-property)?   
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6.1 The concept of an interest in securities 
 
Most scholars and practitioners stress the importance of defining the account holder’s 
rights as proprietary, rather than merely contractual rights178.  The rationale behind this 
analysis is to ensure that the investor’s rights in the securities are protected against third 
parties, particularly fraudulent transferees179 and the intermediary’s general creditors in 
the event of its insolvency180. 
 
These considerations lead Benjamin to define B’s and C’s rights as ‘interests in 
securities’181.  In this regard, C enjoys a bundle of interests, which include personal rights 
against B and proprietary rights in relation to the assets held for C by B182.  Although 
such interests are linked with the original rights embodied by the underlying securities, 
they are ‘legally distinct’183 from them, being considered separate ‘assets’ from the 
underlying securities184. 
 
As a result of this analysis, assuming for example that (unlike A) B and C do not hold a 
proprietary right in the underlying securities, the question remains: what is it exactly that 
they own?  Benjamin does not address this issue.  However, an answer to this question 
is suggested by the concept of an interest in a sub-property which in the author’s view 
can provide a plausible theoretical foundation to Benjamin’s description of an interest in 
securities.  More specifically, it could be argued that B and C own the (management) 
right of the relevant intermediary.  The combination of these interests represents the 
different items of property (ultimately linked to the underlying securities) that are held 
                                                 
178 Benjamin (2000, paras. 13.02 – 13.63) and Gullifer (2010, p. 228).  However, this argument is not 
uncontroversial, especially for civil lawyers, who are traditionally bound to the idea of ownership based on 
the exclusive dominion over ‘things’.  In this respect, particular concern was raised about the possibility of 
property rights subsisting in relation to intangible assets, especially where such rights are held by 
intermediaries and in the absence of allocation.  See among others Pretto-Sakmann (2005, pp. 23 – 35) 
and Gardella (2007, pp. 87 – 126). 
179 The right of recovery is, however, subject to any defence the transferee might have against the original 
owner (such as the defence of a good faith purchaser). 
180 As mentioned above, 'the enduring usefulness of proprietary rights […] lies in the ability to bind third 
parties', Benjamin (2000, para 13.29).  Benjamin considers this ability as the ‘practical reason’ for treating 
the investor’s right as a proprietary right.  For a critique see Pretto-Sakmann (2005, pp. 197 – 212) who 
argues that the nature of a right is not determined by the nature of the judgment or the level of protection 
that may be asserted against third parties.  See on this point also Stone (2017, p. 468) and Cook (1915, 
232). 
181 Benjamin (2000, para. 1.05). 
182 Ibid., paras. 1.108-1.109.   
183 Id. 
184 FMLC (July 2004, para. 9) and English Law Commission (May 2008, paras. 2.25/ 2.28). 
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by B and C, respectively.  This proprietary position allows B and C to enforce a package 
of rights against the relevant intermediary, including rights to receive dividends or other 
distributions from the issuer, rights to pass on voting instructions and rights to be 
protected from the intermediary’s creditors in cases of insolvency.   
 
Looking at this description from a trust law perspective, the layering of intermediaries 
produces a hierarchy of trusts where the beneficiary acquires a proprietary right in the 
sub-trustee’s right that in turn derives from the main trustee’s right in the property.  
This structure of intermediation can be compared to the image of a train composed of a 
locomotive and two carriages, where the locomotive represents A’s right in the 
underlying securities while the two carriages correspond to B’s and C’s rights.  In 
particular, each carriage represents a separate asset where the last carriage is directly 
linked to the first, which in turn is connected to the locomotive185. 
 
To a certain extent, the idea of an interest in securities is probably the closest one can 
get to the solution offered in the United States under the 1994 revision to Article 8 UCC 
that introduces the concept of ‘security entitlement’.  In Comment 17 to § 8-102 UCC, 
the Drafting Committee for the revision to Article 8 emphasises that ‘a security 
entitlement is both a package of personal rights against the securities intermediary and 
an interest in the property held by the securities intermediary’186.  This means that once 
again C does not hold an interest in the underlying securities but in ‘something’ rather 
different.  In particular, any reference in Article 8 UCC to ‘property’ or ‘financial assets’ 
held by B for C should be regarded as a conventional term referring to whatever it is 
that the intermediary holds for the account holder at a certain point in time (i.e. a 
bundle of rights that can be enforced directly only against the relevant intermediary)187.   
 
The main difference between Benjamin’s approach and Article 8 UCC is that in the 
latter case the concept of security entitlement does not rely on a trust law analysis but is 
based on statutory provisions that were specifically designed to explain the structure of 
                                                 
185 Another image could be the one used by Benjamin, who compares the structure of intermediation to 'a 
series of Russian dolls, one inside the other, with the smallest doll containing a jewel.  Each doll is 
different from every other doll, although the value of all the dolls derives alike from the jewel.  The jewel 
equates by analogy to the underlying securities, and each doll to a different interest in securities', Benjamin 
(2000, paras. 1.108-1.109).  
186 Official Comment, § 8-102 UCC para. 17.   
187 These considerations were elaborated following a telephone conversation in May 2014 with James S. 
Rogers, Reporter NCCUSL (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) Drafting 
Committee to Revise UCC Article 8.   
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intermediation.  As highlighted in the Official Comment to Article 8 UCC, ‘[t]he 
technique used in [this provision] is to acknowledge explicitly that the relationship 
between a securities intermediary and its entitlement holders is sui generis, and to state the 
applicable commercial law rules directly, rather than by interference from a 
categorization of the relationship based on legal concepts of a different era’188.  In the 
absence of ad hoc legislation on intermediated securities under English law, the idea of an 
interest in securities attempts to reach similar conclusions to the ones adopted under 
Article 8 UCC by looking at the existing principles of trust and sub-trust from a novel 
perspective (where A, B and C seem to hold assets which are legally distinct from one 
another).  
 
The reasoning underlying the decision to elaborate a theory whereby the ‘interest in 
securities’ or ‘security entitlement’ attaches to separate assets189 (rather than to the 
underlying securities) is based on the (necessary) application of the no-look-through 
principle.  The main argument is that if the investor is considered to hold rights only 
against the relevant intermediary (being prevented from making claims against the issuer 
or against higher-tier intermediaries), it would be difficult to establish whether his/her 
proprietary right attaches directly to the underlying securities.  
 
Another advantage related to the concept of ‘interest in securities’ or ‘security 
entitlement’ is that it can facilitate the choice of law in cross-border transactions.  More 
specifically, when the resolution of proprietary issues is involved, a key factor that is 
traditionally used to determine the applicable law is the place where the assets are 
located (i.e. the lex rei sitae rule or simply situs rule).  According to this principle, if one 
were to accept Benjamin’s theory or the US approach the applicable law ‘should be 
determined solely by reference to factors involving the relationship between the investor 
and the relevant intermediary’190.  In the European Union, such a solution is in 
                                                 
188 Prefatory Note, Official Comment Article 8 UCC, p. 719.   
189 In the context of an indirect holding system, a US lawyer would most likely avoid the use of 
expressions such as ‘interests attaching to separate assets’ (given that such a wording is typically associated 
to existing principles of property law).  Nevertheless, assuming in this case that the asset is not regarded as 
a ‘specific identifiable thing’ but simply as a ‘package of rights against the intermediary’, one would not be 
jeopardising the purpose and meaning of a security entitlement by using this type of expression.   
190 Rogers (2006, p. 287).  A completely different outcome would be obtained, if the rights of B and C 
were considered property interests in the underlying securities.  In this case, the lex situs would be 
identified with the law where the underlying securities are located, which is not considered by most 
practitioners to be an appropriate solution for conflict of laws issues, given that it can produce 'absurd 
results in the indirect [holding] system, especially with respect to secured lending transactions,' Vaaler 
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accordance with the provisions of Article 9(2) of the Settlement Finality Directive 
(98/26/EC) ‘SFD’ and Article 9 (1) of the Directive on financial collateral arrangements 
(2002/44/EC) ‘FCD’ that apply the so-called ‘Place of the Relevant Intermediary 
Approach’ (‘PRIMA’)191. 
 
6.2 The theory of an indirect right in the underlying securities 
 
An alternative (proprietary) solution to the one suggested by Benjamin or Article 8 UCC 
could be to fit Penner’s theory on the nature of an equitable right under a trust to the 
practice of intermediated securities and, therefore, to consider the proprietary right of 
both C and B as an indirect [emphasis added] right in the underlying securities. 
 
According to this reasoning, only A would have immediate access to the underlying 
securities (being considered the ‘legal’ and ‘direct’ owner of those assets) while all the 
other account holders standing further down the chain would have a sui generis  
(equitable) proprietary right which attaches indirectly to the underlying securities.  In the 
latter case, the peculiar nature of the entitlement (i.e. its ‘indirectness’) would explain 
why, for example, B and C are prevented from enforcing their claims directly against the 
issuer (who would not recognise them as the ‘owners’ of the underlying securities).  The 
reason for this limitation could be that B’s and C’s proprietary rights are concealed 
behind A’s interest in the underlying securities.  In other words, only A is registered on 
the books of the issuer as the ‘holder’ of those securities, while B and C derive their 
                                                                                                                                          
(1996, p. 275).  See also Rogers (1996, pp. 1457 – 1460); Benjamin (2000, paras. 1.109 / 7.13 – 7.52); Ooi 
(2003, p. 126 ff.); Bernasconi et al. (2002, pp. 27 – 30) and Goode et al. (1998, p. 9).   
191  For similar measures see also Article 14 of the Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 
(2000/1346/EC) and Articles 24 and 31 of the Directive on the reorganisation and winding up of credit 
institutions (2001/24/EC).  In contrast with the European Union, the United States has chosen to adopt 
a variant of the basic PRIMA approach in order to give effect to party autonomy.  In particular, § 8-110 
(b) (e) and § 9- 305(a) (3) UCC identify the law governing transactions in intermediated securities with the 
law selected by the intermediary and his/her customer (i.e. ‘consensual PRIMA’ as opposed to ‘factual 
PRIMA’).  The US approach was also adopted in the 2002 Hague Convention on the law applicable to 
certain rights in respect of securities held with an intermediary (which however, was not signed by any 
member state).  The advantages and drawbacks of the different options related to PRIMA (i.e. consensual 
and factual PRIMA) were discussed by Paech during the conference ‘Investing in Securities’ held at Harris 
Manchester College, University of Oxford on May 16th 2014.  See also Paech (November 2012, p. 14); 
Goode et al. assisted by Bernasconi (2005) and Rogers (2006, p. 287 ff.).   
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proprietary titles from the account managed by the relevant intermediary192.  Hence, the 
issuer is not in a position to verify B’s and C’s indirect ownership193. 
 
The longer the custody chain the higher the risk that those investors (standing at the 
bottom of the chain) will encounter technical difficulties in enforcing their proprietary 
rights effectively 194.  For example, operational errors and delays can frequently occur 
when processing voting instructions through the holding chain of intermediaries. These 
difficulties could be considered a consequence of the indirect nature of these types of 
proprietary rights and more importantly of the complexity of the custody chains195.  
 
The main benefit of using an approach based on the concept of an ‘indirect’ right in the 
underlying securities is that it can easily be adapted to the conventional way of 
interpreting the law of trust and the idea of fragmented ownership196. 
 
One could argue that in an indirect holding system, property is split into a number of 
separate rights that are distributed among all the account holders (standing in the 
holding chain of intermediaries).  Pursuant to the rules of trust and sub-trust, in this 
case the benefits of ownership are granted to C while the management functions are 
divided between A and B.   
 
The coexistence of multiple (proprietary) interests over the same assets (i.e. the 
underlying securities) should not create any friction between the parties, given that each 
of these rights is subject to specific conditions and limitations which have been designed 
to avoid any potential conflict between the parties.  This shows why, for example, B is 
entitled to manage the securities for the benefit of his/her customer (i.e. C) but is 
prevented from enforcing his/her (management) rights directly against the issuer.  
Indeed, if B were entitled to make claims against the issuer, the (management) rights of 
                                                 
192 This may lead to considering 'the account as the root of title', Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6–21). 
193 The indirect nature of B’s and C’s interests in the underlying securities would also explain certain 
restrictions imposed on equitable owners under Section 126 of the Company Act 2006.  In particular, this 
provision states that 'no notice of any trust … shall be entered on the register of members'. 
194 Payne (2010, pp. 187 – 218) and Micheler (2014, pp. 3 – 7).  For these reasons the investor’s voting 
rights are sometimes subject to certain contractual restrictions.  Cfr. n. 45 in ch. 1.  
195 An additional risk related to the indirect nature of these proprietary rights occurs in cases of fraudulent 
behaviour by the relevant intermediary.  For example, if C’s assets are transferred by B to a third party in 
breach of trust, it would be almost impossible for C to trace those assets in an indirect holding system 
(see on this point text to nn. 426 – 429 in ch. 4.   
196 As mentioned earlier, it is usually suggested that under English trust law the beneficiary enjoys a 
proprietary right in the underlying asset. 
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A would be significantly compromised (creating some form of friction between the 
existing interests).  Similarly, C is entitled to enjoy the benefits of property but is 
prevented from managing the securities, given that such a conduct would compromise 
the management functions of both A and B.  The need to avoid any form of conflict 
between the parties is also the fundamental reason for preventing A from bypassing B 
so as to gain immediate access to C’s account. 
 
These considerations could show that English law has managed to establish a definite 
balance between the different proprietary interests over the underlying securities.  Such 
an outcome broadly reflects what financial practitioners would define as the application 
of the ‘no-look-through’ principle197.  Hence, at first glance it could be argued that there 
is no inconsistency in using the idea of an ‘indirect right in rem’ to explain the practice of 
intermediated securities.  
 
In line with this argument, the diagrams below (figures 3 and 4) show the different 
proprietary rights as they apply within a very simplified scenario of an indirect holding 
system198.  Once again, the graphs reveal that property may be divided into multiple and 
separate ‘slices’, each of them representing a direct or indirect interest in the underlying 
securities. 
 
                                                 
197 In most English cases, third parties who may have acted to the detriment of the trust assets do not 
owe a duty of care to the beneficiary.  The reason that lies behind this principle is that '[t]he rights of a 
beneficiary have already been recognised and protected under the existing equitable principles dealing 
with the trust and the rights of the beneficiary against the trustee', Parker-Tweedale v Dunbar Bank p.l.c. (No. 
1) [1990] 2 All ER 577, 586-587.  See also Roberts v Gill & Co [2010] UKSC 22; [2011] 1 A.C. 240.  This 
principle also applies to the beneficiary under a sub-trust who attempts to enforce his/her equitable rights 
directly against the head trustee (e.g., decision of the Privy Council - Hong Kong Hayim v Citibank NA 
[1987] A.C. 730).  There are, however, exceptions to this general rule.  See for example, Nelson v Greening 
& Sykes (Builders) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1358 and the leading case Saunders v Vautier [1841] 41 E.R. 482 
(which under certain conditions allows the beneficiaries to obtain legal ownership and thereby terminate 
the trust).  In order to avoid these exceptions, in market practice custody agreements usually include 
clauses which strictly prevent the investor from making direct claims against the issuer or higher-tier 
intermediaries, Micheler (2014, p. 6) and English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.237).  Both the 
FMLC and the English Law Commission believe that a statutory clarification on this point is probably 
necessary, given that 'the practicalities of fast moving settlement systems and the need for market 
efficiency require a clear prohibition against looking through to higher tier intermediaries […]', English 
Law Commission (May 2008, paras. 2.71 – 2.72).   See however, Section 150 (now Section 138 D) of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ('FSMA') which allows an investor to make a claim against a 
higher-tier intermediary as long as such intermediary is (i) an authorised person for the purposes of the 
FSMA and (ii) in breach of certain regulatory rules (including the rules regarding the holding of client 
assets and client money, i.e. 'client assets' rules or 'CASS' rules), English Law Commission (June 2006, 
para. 1.237).  
198 It is worth mentioning that in practice the indirect holding structure is frequently more complex, 
indeed so complex that it is almost impossible to offer a comprehensive graphic representation showing 
all proprietary rights related to indirectly held securities.   
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Proprietary rights as they are applied within a very simplified scenario in an 
indirect holding system 
 
 
On the vertical axis of the first diagram (figure 3), the coordinates z and w show the 
different levels of enforceability of the right of each account holder.  The first-tier 
intermediary (i.e. A) holds a legal interest and all the other account holders (i.e. B and C) 
have an equitable interest over the assets.  On the horizontal plane there are three 
sectors within the circle that represent the management functions of A, the management 
functions of B and the benefits of property enjoyed by C, respectively199.  The second 
diagram (figure 4) represents the different ‘slices’ of interests in the underlying securities.  
In particular, it shows that A has the ability to enforce his/her rights against the issuer, 
while B can only bring a claim against the issuer through A.  The diagram also reveals 
that A has no direct access to C’s account as such an action would compromise the 
management functions of B.  In other words, ‘[C] should be considered to have a 
relationship exclusively with [B]’200. 
 
Notwithstanding these considerations, a further analysis of the theory of an indirect 
right in rem shows that certain concerns can still be raised over its consistency with the 
practice of intermediated securities. 
 
                                                 
199 The right of possession is not included in the diagram given that traditionally such a right has never 
been applied to intangibles.  See, however, on this point text to nn. 576 – 581 in ch. 6.   
200 Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6–19). 
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One principal objection to this theory is that difficulties can arise when selecting the 
applicable law in cross-border transactions.  More specifically, in these cases the well-
established lex situs rule would correspond to the law of the country where the 
underlying securities are located, which is not considered an appropriate solution for the 
indirect holding system, as well as being in contrast with PRIMA, that is applied in both 
Article 9 (2) SFD and Article 9 (1) FCD.  These reservations certainly raise an 
interesting point.  Nevertheless, the problem can be partly overcome by stating that 
PRIMA is not simply a development of the traditional lex situs rule but rather a new 
concept that applies in cases where securities are held through a chain of 
intermediaries201.  At present, PRIMA is only included in SFD and FCD which relate 
specifically to collateral arrangements.  Hence, it would be necessary to introduce a 
statutory provision that extends PRIMA to all dealings in intermediated securities202. 
 
7. A diverse explanation of the indirect holding system: the investor’s right as a 
right against the intermediary’s right 
 
McFarlane and Stevens criticise the proprietary characterisation of these interests in 
securities, in so far as they seem to establish the same level of protection against third 
parties by classifying B’s and C’s rights as ‘persistent rights’ or ‘rights against rights’.  
According to McFarlane and Stevens, this new theory is helpful in explaining the nature 
of an account holder’s rights in a multi-tiered structure as: ‘whether positioned at the 
end of the chain, or in the middle of a chain, an investor acquires (i) personal rights 
against the party with whom he deals, and (ii) a right to the right held by that party’203.  
The crucial feature of a persistent right is that although it cannot be treated as a 
                                                 
201 One could argue that the lex situs rule was 'not designed with this kind of holding mechanism in mind', 
Collins et al. (2012, para. 24-071) and that its application in the context of intermediated securities would 
be not only impractical but also meaningless.  The rationale behind this well-established principle is that 
'the country of the situs' is usually the place where the (intangible) assets 'are properly recoverable or can 
be enforced', Collins et al. (2012, para. 22-025).  In an indirect holding system, however, the situs of the 
assets (i.e. the underlying securities) does not seem to coincide with the place where the investor’s 
interests are enforceable, given that for example, (i) C can only enforce his/her proprietary right through 
B and (ii) title is evidenced solely by book entry in the account of the relevant intermediary.  For these 
reasons the whole purpose of applying the lex situs rule is void, while PRIMA seems to be the most 
appropriate solution in this context.  
202 Such a solution would be welcomed by the market since 'a fragmented approach depending on the 
purpose of the transfer is conceptually and practically unsatisfactory', Yates and Montagu (2013, para. 
5.60) and Goode et al. (1998, p. 26).  An attempt to extend the PRIMA approach to all transactions 
related to intermediated securities can be found in Principle 14(1) European Commission (2010, para. 
14.1).  See on this point also the 2002 Hague Convention on the law applicable to certain rights in respect of securities 
held with an intermediary.  
203 FMLC (July 2004, para. 9). 
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proprietary right it gives ‘the investor more than […] mere personal right[s] against 
his/her contractual partner’204.  This means that ‘the investor’s position […] does not 
depend on the solvency of his/her contractual partner or on that of any intermediaries 
higher up the chain’205.  
 
Another point to their argument is that by using the theory of a persistent right an 
explanation can also be given to the application of the no-look-through principle in the 
practice of intermediated securities.  Indeed, in this case it would ‘make no conceptual 
sense to say that B can declare a sub-trust in favour of C and then drop out of the 
picture: the sub-trust depends both for its creation and its continued existence on B 
continuing to hold a right against A: that right of B forms the subject matter of the 
sub-trust in favour of C'206.  Hence, on the basis of these considerations it seems clear 
that C cannot make a claim directly against A since C’s right is strictly linked to B’s right 
which in turn derives from A’s right. 
 
Another benefit claimed by McFarlane and Stevens is that the theory of a persistent 
right can facilitate the application of PRIMA in cross border transactions.  The idea 
lying behind this theory is that C has no right in the underlying securities but simply a 
right in B’s right in A’s right in the underlying securities.  This means that the applicable 
law should not be identified with the lex rei sitae but rather with the law governing the 
relationship between B and C.    
 
Considerable doubts on this approach have been raised by practitioners. For example, 
Moss argues that the idea of a right against a right ‘does not entirely meet, as a matter of 
gut feeling, [the investor’s] expectations’207 in as much as the latter feels more secure 
when regarded as the owner of the intermediated securities rather than the holder of ‘a 
right to somebody else’s right to someone else’s right and so on’208.  
                                                 
204 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 38). 
205 Id. According to McFarlane and Stevens, by accepting the theory of a ‘right against a right’ it is easier 
to explain why the securities should be traced through the chain of intermediaries. 
206 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 47). 
207 Moss (2010, p. 65). 
208 Id.  This statement is certainly persuasive, although it fails to emphasise that the investor does not have 
immediate access to the underlying securities.  Hence, what the investor really holds is either an indirect 
(proprietary) right in the underlying securities or (most likely) a right in a sub-property, which is ultimately 
linked to the underlying securities.  In the latter case, it is possible to use the term ‘intermediated 
securities’ to describe the sub-property as a distinct item from the underlying securities.  Indeed, it would 
be less confusing for the investor to be regarded as the owner of ‘the intermediated securities’ rather than 
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In support of this argument, the proprietary characterisation of the investor’s rights was 
recently confirmed in Pearson and others v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA209 (which concerned 
the nature of the interests in intermediated securities acquired by Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (LBIE) for its affiliates).  In his judgement, Briggs J finds that ‘the 
question whether [the affiliate company] has a proprietary interest [emphasis added] in the 
[asset] acquired by [LBIE] depends upon the mutual intention [of the parties], to be 
ascertained by an objective assessment of the terms of the agreement or relationship 
between [LBIE] and the [affiliate company] with reference to that [asset]’210.  The 
purpose of this analysis, continues Briggs J, is to determine whether the parties intended 
to create rights that are ‘sufficiently strong’211 to be enforceable against third parties, 
particularly the intermediary’s general creditors in cases of bankruptcy.  This shows once 
again that the central feature of a proprietary right lies almost exclusively in its ability to 
bind third parties (regardless of whether such a right refers to tangibles or intangibles, to 
a direct or indirect relationship with the underlying securities)212.  
 
Nevertheless, the main point is to understand whether the theory suggested by 
McFarlane and Stevens can offer a significant contribution to the practice of 
intermediated securities and therefore, overcome issues of legal uncertainty which may 
arise when using the two approaches based on the proprietary nature of the investor’s 
rights (namely the concepts of an indirect right in rem and an interest in securities). 
 
Indeed, McFarlane and Stevens sustain the theory that a right against a right is to be 
preferred to a proprietary concept given that the former (unlike the latter) can provide a 
better understanding of the legal structure of intermediation and ‘adequately meet the 
practical problems of intermediated securities’213.  
 
                                                                                                                                          
the owner of the ‘intermediary’s right in the underlying securities’.  Hence, by using the expression 
‘intermediated securities’ one is simply choosing a more convenient way to describe the concept of sub-
property.  
209 [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch). 
210 [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 225. 
211 Ibid., para. 253 
212 The judge’s decision was confirmed in almost all its aspects by the Court of Appeal, (2011 EWCA Civ. 
p. 1544).  For a critical analysis of the proprietary nature of these types of rights see Pretto-Sakmann 
(2005, p. 202).   
213 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 33). 
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In this regard, McFarlane and Stevens’ main argument is that (unlike the proprietary 
concept) the idea of a right against a right demonstrates that no statutory intervention is 
necessary within the United Kingdom as the existing legal framework can effectively 
respond to the needs of market practice and ultimately protect the investors’ rights214.  
This position is open to criticism, as already in 2004 the FMLC proposed the 
introduction of legislative changes in the United Kingdom215.  This proposal derived 
from concerns to render the legal framework more effective and cost-efficient.   
 
It is true that English law, particularly through the rules of equity, has developed on a 
‘pragmatic’ and ‘common-sense basis’216 and that, unlike most civil law systems, it offers 
a flexible idea of property capable of adapting more easily to market practice.  Benjamin 
emphasises ‘the enormous technical contribution that trusts have made to financial law, 
by permitting a range of innovative proprietary structures that could not otherwise have 
arisen’217.  However, she also argues that ‘while the traditional principles of English law 
operate well in the electronic environment, there are (unsurprisingly) […] also areas 
where the case for law reform is clear’218. 
 
8. A choice between a right against a right, an indirect right in rem or an interest 
in securities 
 
The next four chapters evaluate the validity of the three theories in cases where 
fraudulent behaviour or insolvency of an intermediary arise219.  In particular, the study 
identifies certain examples of legal sensitivities affecting the current legal framework, 
namely (i) the problem of certainty of the subject matter in the trust; (ii) the need to 
increase clarity over the allocation of shortfalls in an omnibus account; and (iii) the 
importance of identifying a clear definition of control and possession over intangibles.  
 
The overall objective is  
 
                                                 
214 Id. 
215 FMLC (July 2004, para. 1.2).  See text to nn. 27 – 28 in ch. 1.  
216 Benjamin (2000, 14.28 – 14.43). 
217 Ibid., para. 14.29. 
218 Ibid., para. 14.38. 
219 Various Lehman entities were involved in the indirect holding system of securities. 
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 firstly, to show which of the three approaches described above provides a better 
understanding of the practice of intermediated securities: a right against a right, 
an indirect right in rem or an interest in securities; 
 
 secondly, to establish whether and to what extent there is a need for statutory 
clarification, notwithstanding McFarlane and Stevens’ suggestions that the 
existing legal framework can effectively ensure ‘client asset protection’. 
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Chapter 3: The uncertainties surrounding omnibus accounts  
 
1. The need to ensure an efficient functioning of indirect holding practices: 
individual segregated accounts or omnibus accounts? 
 
In market practice, there can be said to be two ways of holding and transferring 
securities through intermediaries.  
 
During the greater part of the 20th century, it was customary for the intermediary (who 
would hold securities for more than one investor) to create separate accounts for each 
client rather than commingling all securities of a particular issue in a single account220.  
To do so, the intermediary would open several client accounts with the issuer or with 
the higher-tier intermediary and would register each account in the name of one of 
his/her clients.    
 
Since the 1990s, there has been a definitive shift from individual segregated securities 
accounts to pooled securities accounts221, so much so that in most countries (including 
the United Kingdom)222 intermediaries nowadays usually hold all securities of the same 
type in a global or omnibus account, maintained with the issuer or with the higher-tier 
intermediary, rather than segregated accounts for each client.  This means that the 
second-tier intermediary (standing at the bottom of the chain) will open an omnibus 
account in his/her name with the first-tier intermediary, for example, and will then 
usually register the clients’ interest in the pooled account in his/her own books223.  As a 
result of this practice, with omnibus accounts ‘the only reference to a clients’ specific 
                                                 
220 Micheler (2010, p. 132) and Benjamin (1996, para. 2.74).   
221 Although in most countries pooled accounts were introduced relatively recently (i.e. in the 1990s) in 
Germany and Austria they became ‘standard practice’ directly after the First World War, Micheler (2010, 
p. 132).  Cfr. n. 228 of this chapter. 
222 The possibility of opening and operating omnibus accounts is recognised, for example, in Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Luxemburg, Poland (only very recently), Singapore, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  In each of these jurisdictions, this practice may be subject to 
different conditions and restrictions (e.g. access to pooled accounts limited only for certain categories of 
investors).  There are certain jurisdictions (such as those of France, Greece, Italy and the Scandinavian 
countries) where clients’ securities are not allowed to be placed in omnibus accounts and, therefore, need to 
be segregated in individual accounts.  See on this point also IOSCO (February 2013); AFME (March 
2012) and English Law Commission (May, 2008, paras. 2. 51 – 2.53).  925 
223 The practice of using omnibus accounts does not affect the requirement to segregate clients’ assets from 
the intermediary’s assets.  Hence, in this example two separate accounts would typically be opened with 
the first-tier intermediary (i.e. an omnibus account for the clients’ assets and a ‘house’ account for the 
second-tier intermediary’s assets).   
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allocation is made in the [second-tier] intermediary’s account and not in the account of 
[the first-tier] intermediary or in the register of the issuer’224. 
 
Omnibus accounts are used primarily to simplify the intermediaries’ management of 
clients’ investments and more broadly to provide a greater efficiency in the practice of 
indirectly held securities.  This new method allows the intermediary to transfer securities 
from one customer to another (e.g. 10,000 shares from customer M to customer N) 
simply by recording such a transfer on his/her own books (i.e. by debiting M’s account 
and crediting N’s account with the 10,000 shares).  Conversely, with individual 
segregated client accounts, an intermediary is required to enter this transaction not only 
in his/her own books but also in the books of higher-tier intermediaries or in the 
register of the issuer.  This very simplified scenario225 (which is represented in figure 
1226) shows that unlike the individual segregation system, omnibus accounts have the 
advantage of drastically reducing the operational steps that an intermediary needs to 
undertake on a daily basis in order to manage his/her clients’ investments227.  Other 
benefits (related to omnibus account structures) may also include the reduction of 
administrative costs228 and operational risks229.  Moreover, when only one account is 
needed for many investors (i) fees associated with maintaining the account are 
significantly lower230 and (ii) the likelihood of any technical failure is more limited231.  
                                                 
224 English Law Commission (May 2008, para. 2. 17).  See also Benjamin (2000, paras. 2.73 – 2.74) and 
FMLC (July 2004, para. 2.3) and Johansson (2009, para. 3.2.4).  
225 In market practice the holding chain between the investor and the issuer is frequently more complex, 
especially in the case of cross-border transactions.  In this regard, securities of the same issue can be held 
through multiple (e.g. three or four) tiers of intermediaries, each of which may (i) be located in different 
countries; (ii) act on behalf of a large number of clients (hundreds, if not thousands) and (iii) engage 
regularly in a variety of transactions for each of these clients (e.g. buying, selling and lending).  
226 Figure 1 shows how transfers are made when all client securities are commingled in a single account.  
In this case, if M wishes to sell 10,000 shares to N, the transfer is only recorded in the account of the 
second-tier intermediary. 
227 AFME (March 2012); Chan et al. (August 2007, p. 6). 
228 This may explain why in certain countries omnibus account structures became standard practice at times 
of economic distress.  This point was clearly highlighted by Micheler who states that interestingly in 
Germany and Austria, 'pooled accounts were introduced on a large scale in 1925 when years of 
hyperinflation forced banks to find a more cost efficient [emphasis added] mechanism of holding securities', 
Micheler (2010, p. 132). 
229 Johansson (2009, para. 3.2.4) and Guynn (1996, pp. 24 – 25). 
230 The practice of using omnibus accounts has the advantage of also reducing the costs related to 'transfers 
where credit and debit entries offset and the settlement processing technique permits internalised (or net) 
settlement', Turing (August 2005, p. 2).  On this point, see also AFME, (April 2013, 4). 
231 This aspect is highlighted by the AFME, Post Trade, cit. 8 – 9: 'There are two fundamental principles 
driving the use of omnibus accounts higher up the chain of intermediaries, rather than the use of more 
segregated account structures. The first is the principle of simplicity, rather than complexity; the second is 
the principle of data uniqueness (i.e. the principle that data should be stored and maintained in one place 
only, and not stored in multiple locations, so that –if the data were to change – there would not be the 
requirement that the update be effected in multiple locations, with the associated risk that not all updates 
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The combination of all these advantages (i.e. a greater simplicity, cost savings and lower 
operational risks) can facilitate the flow of capital and provide quicker access to 
liquidity232.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Source: Gullifer and Payne (2010), p. 13. 
 
Setting aside the advantage gained by ensuring the efficient functioning of the market, 
omnibus or pooled accounts also have a downside and can create difficulties in protecting 
the investors’ rights.  One of the main characteristics of using a single client account is 
that all the assets are held by intermediaries on a ‘fungible’ and ‘unallocated’ basis.  This 
means that the securities (i) are ‘interchangeable with each other (typically as a result of 
having the same terms and conditions [as well as referring] to the same series of 
issue)’233 and (ii) cannot be identified as belonging to a specific investor (since they are 
part of a large bulk of assets held in custody for all clients).  As emphasised by 
Benjamin, ‘while it is possible at any time to determine how many of the individual 
securities comprised in the client holding are attributable to a particular [investor], it is 
not possible to determine [specifically] which ones’234.  A corollary of this peculiar form 
of custody is that ‘the redelivery obligation owned by the intermediary to each client is 
not an obligation to return the assets originally delivered in specie, but merely an 
obligation to return assets equivalent to those originally delivered’235. 
                                                                                                                                          
are effected in the same manner, or at the same time). [...]  These two principles suggest that the operation 
of omnibus accounts over segregated accounts is preferable both for reasons of cost (as simplicity is 
cheaper to manage than complexity) and for reasons of risk (as the maintenance of data in multiple 
locations creates the risk of inconsistencies between the data locations)'.  On this point see also Turing 
(August 2005, p. 2) and Chan et al. (August 2007, p. 6).  
232 The author is grateful to Joanna Benjamin for highlighting this point. 
233 English Law Commission (May 2008, para. 2.17).   
234 Yates and Montagu (2013, para. 3.25). 
235 Id. 
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This practice of holding securities on a ‘fungible’ and ‘unallocated’ basis challenges the 
proprietary nature of the investors’ rights in so far as such ‘rights do not attach to 
particular assets’236.  The core idea is that ‘a property right creates a relationship between 
the owner and an asset and for a property interest to arise we need to be able to 
determine the asset to which the interest relates’237.  Under English law this main 
principle applies to both legal and equitable ownership.  In particular, with regard to 
equity, the ‘identification of the asset’ is also necessary for a successful creation of a 
trust.   
 
These concerns lead us to seek answers to the following questions: (i) can ‘a trust [be 
created] in favour of a client whose interests in securities are […] commingled together 
with those of other clients […]’?238 (ii) which of the three theories proposed in the 
second chapter (i.e. a right against a right, an indirect right in rem or an interest in 
securities) can better reflect the commercial reality of how securities are commonly held 
by intermediaries? and (iii) does this point warrant the introduction of a statutory 
clarification?  In the following sections of this chapter an attempt will be made to reply 
these questions.  
 
2. The lack of sufficient certainty in omnibus accounts: is there a valid trust?  
 
Pursuant to general principles of English trust law, three requirements must be satisfied 
in order for a valid trust to arise.  These requirements are better known as the ‘three 
certainties’ and they include (i) ‘certainty of intention’ (i.e. parties should be willing to 
create a trust239) (ii) ‘certainty of beneficiary’ (i.e. the beneficiary should be known or 
ascertainable240) and (iii) ‘certainty of subject matter (i.e. it is necessary to establish which 
assets are held on trust241).  The first two ‘certainties’ can easily be met in the securities 
                                                 
236 Benjamin (2000, para. 2.72). Hence, the ownership of a share in a fungible pool may be recharacterised 
as a mere contractual right. 
237 Micheler (2007, p. 122).  See also Gullifer (2010, p. 22).   
238 Benjamin (2000, para. 2.80). 
239 In order to evaluate the mutual intention of the parties, English courts will not consider merely the 
wording used in the contractual agreement (e.g. technical legal language of trust law) but the substance of 
what the parties intended to achieve.  On this point see In re Kayford Ltd (in liquidation) [1975] 1 WLR 279 
and Tito v. Waddell (No 2) [1977] (Ch) 354. 
240 Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements [1970] AC 508 and McPhail v. Dalton [1971] AC 424. 
241 This point is clearly highlighted by Webb and Akkouh, who state that '[a]s trusts involve the imposition 
of obligations in respect of the holding of property, we need to know to which property the trust relates', 
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markets, subject to the condition that the contractual agreement is sufficiently clear as 
regards the objective of the parties as well as the identity of the beneficiary242.  On the 
contrary, the requirement for certainty of subject matter can create difficulties in 
practice, as it does not seem to be fulfilled in those cases where all securities are 
commingled in a single client account (as opposed to being segregated in multiple 
accounts). 
 
The debate on this issue was triggered off by the case Re London Wine Company (Shippers) 
Ltd243 in which the Court decided that a trust in a pool of fungible units cannot be 
considered valid if the parties are not able to clearly ascertain the items of property that 
are held for the beneficiaries.  The case concerned a company that had sold wine to 
customers while retaining the possession of the wine in various warehouses.  Following 
the insolvency of the company, the purchasers tried to assert a proprietary interest in the 
wine but their claim was rejected since it was not possible to specify which particular 
cases of wine included in the bulk were attributable to a specific contract of purchase244.   
 
Consistent with this reasoning, for most of the 20th century the general view was that a 
trust could not be created over a commingled pool of goods in the absence of a clear 
identification and segregation of such goods in favour of the beneficiaries245.  However, 
if this principle were applied to omnibus accounts there would be serious implications for 
the financial market.  Particularly, in cases of insolvency of the intermediary the 
                                                                                                                                          
Webb and Akkouh (2013, p. 46).  'Moreover', Webb and Akkouh continue, 'if there is more than one 
beneficiary we need to know their respective entitlements in relation to the property; in other words, what 
part of the total fund each beneficiary gets', Id. 
242 The intermediary usually registers the names of the account holders in his/her own books. 
243 Re London Wine Company (Shippers) Ltd [1986] PCC 121. 
244 In other words, in Re London Wine Company (Shippers) Ltd it was not really the mixing in itself that was 
fatal, but the non-attribution or earmarking of specific goods (comprised in the bulk) in favour of the 
beneficiaries, Ibid., 137.  Similar conclusions can be found in Re Wait [1927] 1 (Ch) 606 which concerned a 
contract for the sale of goods (and not a trust).  In this particular case, the Court of Appeal held that the 
owner of a large bulk of goods (i.e. 1000 tons of wheat) could not transfer to another person an 
unallocated amount of that bulk (i.e. 500 tons of wheat).  The main argument was that a proprietary right 
arises only in those circumstances where the goods can be 'earmarked, identified or appropriated as the 
[goods] to be delivered […] under the contract', Id. 629 (Atkin LJ).  See, however, the dissenting opinion 
of Sargant LJ in Ibid. 645.  For an analysis of this case see Bridge (2014, para. 3.31).  In relation to the 
sales of tangible assets, the principle that no proprietary right can be transferred to the buyer prior to 
ascertainment was modified by the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 (‘SGAA 1995’). 
245 Another case (which supports this idea of a lack of sufficient certainty of the subject matter under a 
trust) is Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 (PC), 90.  In this case a gold dealer (Goldcorp Exchange) 
agreed with certain customers to hold gold on their behalf on an unallocated basis.  Following the 
company’s insolvency, the customers tried to assert the proprietary nature of their right.  However, the 
Privy Council rejected their claim in so far as the assets had not been allocated to any specific customer 
(i.e. there was no ‘customer name tag’ on the gold bullion).  For a detailed analysis of the case see 
Micheler (2007, p. 124). 
 
 
64
investors would be prevented from claiming a proprietary right in the custody assets 
(being recognised as having merely a contractual right against the custodian)246. 
 
Luckily for the custody industry in the early 1990s this lack of sufficient certainty in 
omnibus accounts was overcome thanks to the decision in Hunter v. Moss247.  Robert 
Joseph Moss was the registered holder of 950 shares in Moss Electrical Company Ltd. 
(‘M.E.L.’).  In 1986 he made a declaration of trust over 50 of those shares in favour of 
David Morris Hunter.  Once again, there had been no specific designation of which 
assets (forming part of the bulk) were to be allocated to the beneficiary248.   The court at 
the first instance held that when a trust is created over intangibles (such as shares), the 
requirement for certainty of subject matter does not apply.  Indeed, in this case Moss 
‘did not identify any particular 50 shares for Hunter because to do so was unnecessary 
and irrelevant’249.  All 950 shares which were held by Moss ‘carried identical rights’250 
and therefore were perfectly interchangeable.  Hence, according to Rimer QC ‘any 
suggested uncertainty as to subject matter appears [in this case] theoretical and 
conceptual rather than real and practical’251.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision 
of first instance by stating that a trust was validly created in favour of Hunter252.  In this 
regard, Dillon LJ argued that ‘[j]ust as a person can give, by will, a specified number of 
his shares of a certain class in a certain company, so equally, in [his] judgment, he can 
declare himself trustee of 50 of his ordinary shares in M.E.L. […] and that is effective to 
give a beneficial proprietary interest to the beneficiary under the trust’253.  
 
Hunter v. Moss was followed by Neuberger J. in Re Harvard Securities Ltd254.  Although 
with some reservation255, the latter case confirms that the requirement for specific 
allocation of trust assets is not applicable to shares (as opposed to chattels)256.   
                                                 
246 Yates and Montagu (2013, para. 3.29). 
247 Hunter v. Moss [1993] 1 WRL 934, [1994] 1 WRL 452. 
248 In other words, which 50 of Moss’s 950 shares were to go to Hunter? The impact of this uncertainty is 
clearly addressed by Hayton:  'If Moss subsequently sells 50 shares how do the revenue know whether he 
is selling his own shares, so that he is chargeable to capital gains tax, or if he is selling Hunter’s shares so 
that Hunter is so chargeable? If the proceeds of sale are profitably or detrimentally reinvested does the 
new investment belong in equity to Hunter or Moss?', Hayton (1994, p. 336).  
249 Hunter v. Moss [1993] 1 WRL 946. 
250 Id. 
251 Id.  With regard to the difficulty in establishing which of the trustee’s subsequent dealings are related to 
the trust property, Rimer QC argues that 'if any uncertainty were to arise, that would not be because the 
trust fund was uncertain as to subject matter, but rather because the trustee failed to keep proper account 
showing how he had subsequently dealt with it', Id. 
252 Hunter v. Moss [1994] 1 WRL 452. 
253 Ibid., 459. 
254 Re Harvard Securities Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 369  
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The decision in Hunter v. Moss was, however, subject to some criticism.  According to 
certain scholars257, there is no basis in law for asserting that trusts over intangibles 
should be treated differently from those over tangibles258.  Moreover, it must be 
remembered that in English law the requirement for certainty of subject matter is 
considered essential also for trusts over money held in bank accounts259.  Hence, it is 
somewhat difficult to understand why segregation should be required for certain types 
of intangibles (such as cash) but not for other types (e.g. shares).  
 
Contributing to this debate, Goode offers a theory that attempts to reconcile the 
decision in Hunter v. Moss with the views expressed by those scholars who have criticised 
this judgment.  In particular, Goode confirms the decision in Hunter v. Moss regarding 
the part on the validity of a trust over a pool of shares but provides different grounds 
on which such a conclusion can be reached.  The starting point of Goode’s analysis is to 
qualify interests in shares or in other securities (e.g. bonds) as co-ownership rights of a 
‘single, legally indivisible asset’260 rather than interests in individual units.  The rationale 
behind this definition is that shares and debt securities are considered no more than 
fractions or portions of an identified bulk, namely the share capital of the issuing 
company and the aggregate principal amount (and interests thereon) issued under a 
particular debt instrument261.  Such a bulk is indivisible in the sense that transfers of any 
                                                                                                                                          
255 Neuberger J takes into consideration the arguments that were addressed by certain scholars against the 
decision in Hunter v. Moss.  Nevertheless, he comes to the conclusion that although he can see 'the force of 
these points', he still considers such a decision to be a binding precedent for the court, Re Harvard Securities 
Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 369, 575 - 579.  The reason for this is that Hunter v. Moss was not decided per incuriam 
and, therefore, it cannot be overruled, Id.  Hunter v. Moss was applied (less reluctantly) in the Hong Kong 
case of Re CA Pacific Finance Ltd. [2000] 1 BCLC 494.  
256 '[…] it seems […] that the correct way for me, at first instance, to explain the difference between the 
result in Hunter , and that in Wait , London Wine and Goldcorp , is on the ground that Hunter was concerned 
with shares, as opposed to chattels', Ibid. 578. 
257 Hayton (1994, pp. 337 – 338); Hudson (2009, p. 104) and Id. (2013, p. 41).  See also the Australian case 
of White v. Shortall [2006] NSW SC 1379. 
258 It should be noted that 'on the particular facts of the case, it was clearly in the interests of justice that a 
valid trust should be found in the absence of a contractual entitlement', Yates and Montagu (2013, para. 
3.40).  Indeed, 'the judgment, which was pragmatic, focused more on the merits of the dispute before the 
court than the wider principles of equity', Id.  For a favourable opinion regarding the decision in Hunter v. 
Moss see Worthington (1999, p. 6). 
259 See, for example, Mac-Jordan Construction Ltd v. Brookmount Erostin Ltd [1992] BCLC 350; Re Jartray 
Development Ltd. [1982] 22 BLR 134; Rayack Construction v. Lampeter Meat Co. Ltd. [1979] 12 BLR 30; Neste 
Oy v. Lloyds Bank plc [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658 and Concorde Constructions Co Ltd v. Cogan Ltd. [1984] 29 BLR 
120.  As pointed out, however, by certain scholars 'these cases may be distinguishable on the basis that 
they relate to generic and not ex bulk assets', Yates and Montagu (2013, para. 3.40 n. 2).    
260 Goode (2003, p. 384). 
261 This theory applies to shares and bonds regardless of the circumstances or whether a specific number 
or code has been allocated to each one of these securities.  According to Goode, 'numbering is merely a 
form of accounting allocation and does not give a share [or a bond] an existence distinct from the […] 
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part of it (e.g. of a certain number of shares) are simply transfers of a portion of the 
bulk and, therefore, can only give rise to co-ownership of what constitutes a single 
asset262.  This means that securities ‘are not like bottles of wine, gold bars or potatoes’263 
in so far as they cannot be physically divided ‘into separate units [which are] capable in 
law of being separately owned’264.   
 
The main difference between the decision in Hunter v. Moss and the theory of co-
ownership is that the latter, unlike the former, does not accept the idea that a 
proprietary right can arise under a trust without attaching to a specific asset.  According 
to Goode when a trust is created over a pool of intangible assets (such as shares) the 
requirement for certainty of subject matter continues to apply, albeit in a different 
manner from tangibles.  In these cases ‘there is no uncertainty of subject matter, 
because the trust property comprises the entire [bulk of assets]’265.  In particular, the 
interest of each beneficiary attaches to a fraction or a portion of a single, indivisible pool 
of intangibles.   
 
For example, with respect to intermediated securities, if the intermediary holds shares of 
a particular class for a certain number of investors, these customers will be considered 
as co-owners of the common pool of securities (rather than holders of an interest in 
separate assets)266.  These considerations suggest that ‘the true basis of the [decision in 
                                                                                                                                          
issue of which it forms part', Id.  Similarly, bearer securities are not treated differently from registered 
securities.  Once again 'it is true that bearer certificates are susceptible to individual ownership as pieces of 
paper, but the paper has no independent value, it merely embodies an entitlement to a co-ownership 
interest in the securities issue itself', Id. 
262 According to Micheler, Goode’s theory is not in line with current company law principles in so far as 
'shareholders do not own the share capital', Micheler (2007, p. 130).  The reason for this inconsistency is 
that 'the share capital does not exist as an asset, it is rather a figure on the company’s balance sheet 
reflecting the contributions made or owed by the shareholders to the company and serving as a tool to 
determine distributions of dividends and of other benefits', Id.  
263 Goode (2003, p. 384). 
264 Ibid., 383.   
265 Benjamin (2000, para. 2.82). 
266 This idea of co-ownership applies regardless of whether securities are held in an omnibus account or in 
individual segregated accounts.  Indeed, Goode rejects the view that with individual segregated accounts 
the customer retains ownership of particular securities (which do not belong to the common pool), 
Goode (2003, p. 387).  In particular, he argues that the practice of using individual segregated accounts 
'does not render the securities … any more divisible than they were before' the creation of such an 
account, Id.  Hence, 'the customer’s interest remains an indirectly held co-ownership interest with other 
investors in securities of the same class', Id.  The difference between these two types of accounts is 
highlighted primarily in a situation of shortfall, since only clients using the omnibus account model are 
exposed to sharing potential losses caused by the intermediary in the pooled account.  See on this point 
Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6.14).     
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Hunter v. Moss] was not the intangible nature of shares, but rather their indivisible 
nature’267. 
 
In agreement with Goode’s theory, Benjamin argues that in custody arrangements the 
requirement for certainty of subject matter is automatically satisfied by an implied co-
ownership arrangement among the custodian’s clients268.  Indeed, in these cases ‘the 
custodian holds the client holding under a single trust for all clients to whose accounts it 
has credited the relevant security, as equitable tenants in common’269.   
 
This argument (based on the idea of an implied ‘co-ownership’ arrangement between 
the investors) assumes that the intermediary holds clients’ assets separately from ‘house 
assets’.  The general rule, under financial service regulations270 and general principles of 
trust law, is that an intermediary needs to segregate clients’ assets from his/her own 
deposits271.  The main objective of this principle is to ensure that customers’ assets are 
safeguarded in the event of the financial failure of the intermediary272.  Benjamin argues 
that when the intermediary complies with such a requirement, co-ownership rights in an 
omnibus account arise automatically273.  The reason for this argument is that all the 
circumstances at stake seem to imply that it is the customers’ common intention to (i) 
commingle all their assets in a single client account and (ii) acquire such assets as tenants 
in common.274  English case law is not, however, clear on this point275.  For this reason, 
                                                 
267 Benjamin (2000, paras. 2.87 - 2.88) (particularly n. 158). 
268 Id. 
269 Yates and Montagu (2013, para. 3.42) and Benjamin (2003, p. 263). 
270 See, for example, Rules 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 of Client Asset Sourcebook (CASS).  The rules contained in 
CASS are designed to implement certain requirements under Articles 13 (7) and 13 (8) of the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (EC) 2004/39 ('MiFID') and Article 16 (1) (d) of the Commission 
Directive (EC) 2006/73, whose aim is to ensure that regulated firms make adequate arrangements to 
safeguard clients' ownership rights. See also Article 16 (8) and paragraph 51 in the preamble of the EC 
Directive 2014/65 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and 
Directive 2011/61/EU ('MiFID II') which is intended to comprehensively revise MiFID and is expected 
to take effect from January 2017. 
271 This means that separate accounts will be opened by the intermediary, depending on whether they 
relate to its own securities or to its clients’ securities (see figure 1). Cfr. n. 223 in this chapter. 
272 European Commission (2010, para. 13.2).  Indeed, this segregation ensures the speedy recovery of 
clients’ assets following the insolvency of the intermediary.  In other words, it reduces the market impact 
of the insolvency of an investment firm. 
273 Benjamin (2000, para. 2.83). 
274 This analysis is consistent with Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd., Re Ellis, Son & Vidler Ltd [1994] 1 WRL 1181, 
[1995] 1 All ER 192 where the Court held that the customers of a wine company were 'jointly interested, 
as tenants in common, in the bulk' (1198 and 210).  The facts of this case are very similar to those in Re 
London Wine Company (Shippers) Ltd [1986] PCC 121.  There are, however, certain differences that explain 
the contrasting outcome of the two cases.  In Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd the bottles or cases of wine intended 
for the customers had been carefully recorded and segregated from the company's trading stock, before 
being commingled in the warehouse stock ([1994] 1 WRL 1181, 1194).  On the contrary, in Re London 
Wine Company (Shippers) Ltd) the customers’ goods had never been identified and physically segregated 
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in market practice intermediaries are expressly advised to provide a co-ownership status 
in their clients’ documentation276. 
 
The precise nature of the investors’ rights in an omnibus account was specifically 
addressed by the FMLC in its Commentary on Principles for Investment Securities 
Statute in 2004.  The FMLC recommends the introduction of specific rules which state 
that, unless otherwise agreed, the intermediary’s clients have co-proprietary rights in the 
pooled account.  Such ‘rights are proportioned to the entitlement of each customer’ and, 
therefore, do not attach to specific securities but to a fraction of the co-owned pool277.  
The wording of the proposed rules is in line with the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (‘SGA 
1979’) which introduces the concept of an implied co-ownership.  In particular, Section 
20 A states that title to a share in the identified bulk passes to the buyer once the 
purchase price has been paid.  In this case, the buyer acquires an ‘undivided share in the 
bulk’278 and ‘becomes an owner in common of the bulk’279.  The purpose of this 
provision is clearly to extend the existing concept of tenancy in common to ‘a contract 
for the sale of a specified quantity of unascertained goods’280.  Hence, Section  20 A is 
not intended to apply to intangibles (such as intermediated securities) but only to cases 
involving sales of goods. 
 
Notwithstanding the FMLC’s proposal, a statute on intermediated securities (comprising 
similar rules to those stated in Section 20 A SGA 1979) has not yet been introduced in 
the United Kingdom.  Hence, scholars and practitioners have been eager for a solution 
on omnibus accounts (based on the idea of co-ownership) to be developed at least 
                                                                                                                                          
from the assets of the company.  The difference in circumstances between the two cases led the Court in 
Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd to assert the existence of a tenancy in common in the bulk between the customers.  
275 As emphasised by Benjamin 'Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd related only to legal interests arising in the sale of 
goods' Benjamin (2000, para. 2.88, n. 144). Conversely, 'Re London Wine Company (Shippers) Ltd) considered 
the position both at law and in equity, and indicated […] that very clear wording would be required in 
order for an equity in common to arise'.  This shows that Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd can hardly be used as 
authority in relation to trusts over intangible property. 
276 Benjamin (2000, para. 2.88). 
277 Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 2 in FMLC (July 2004).  See, on this 
point, Article 25 (4) of the Geneva Convention (Kanda et al. (2012, para. 25.15) that leaves to Member 
States the possibility of choosing which technique to allow in market practice (i.e. individual segregation, 
omnibus accounts or both options). 
278 Section 20 A (2)(a) SGA 1979 
279 Section 20 A (2)(b) SGA 1979. 
280 Section 20 A (1) SGA 1979.  More specifically, the SGA temporarily re-characterises the contract for 
the sale of goods as a contract for the sale of a share in goods. Only when the goods are subsequently 
separated from the bulk does the contract go back to being simply characterised as a sale of goods.  
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through case law281.  Such an opportunity to deal with this matter arose in Pearson and 
others v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA (better known as the Rascal case)282. 
 
The case concerned the beneficial ownership of securities (worth in excess of US$ 1.5 
bn) which were acquired by Lehman Brothers International – Europe (‘LBIE’) on 
behalf of its affiliates before the collapse of Lehman Brothers Group.  The relationship 
between LBIE and its affiliates had been structured in a rather unusual manner in so far 
as LBIE (who acted as the trustee) was entitled to (i) hold all securities acquired both for 
itself and its affiliates in un-segregated accounts and (ii) use such securities ‘as part of its 
own business assets’283.  These circumstances were inconsistent with a typical trustee-
beneficiary relationship and led LBIE to challenge the beneficial title to the securities 
upon the affiliates.  The parties had elaborated a very complex mechanism to overcome 
certain regulatory restrictions while at the same time preserving the Lehman Group’s 
global settlement practice.  In this regard, it was customary for LBIE to settle all the 
securities which were acquired for the affiliates into its own account rather than into a 
separate account.  These securities were usually used by LBIE either to raise finance for 
the Lehman Group by lending the assets to third parties or, alternatively, to cover short 
positions (which may arise inadvertently due to settlement failures).  This practice ‘was 
perceived to be very beneficial to the [Lehman] Group in terms of efficiency and 
economy, but it was also perceived to create, at least potentially, [certain] problems for 
[LBIE]’284: primarily (i) the need to comply with the regulatory requirements regarding 
the segregation of securities acquired by LBIE for his/her clients (including the 
affiliates) and (ii) the fact that ‘the use of securities for the raising of finance […] 
required [LBIE] to be able to transfer absolute and unencumbered title to [third 
parties]’285.  In order to address these problems, the Lehman Group introduced the so 
called ‘RASCALS’ scheme which involved the use of repo contracts and stock loan 
agreements so that each affiliate could sell LBIE its beneficial proprietary interest in the 
underlying securities ‘in exchange for monetary consideration, […] leaving the affiliate 
with a contractual right against LBIE to recover its proprietary interest in equivalent 
                                                 
281 Benjamin (2000, para. 2.85) and Birks (1998, p. 230). 
282 [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch) and (2011 EWCA Civ. 1544).  For an analysis of this case see Dilnot and 
Harris (2012, p. 272); Toube (2011, p. 74); Sherman & Sterling LLP (2012, p. 77); Cooke (2011, 136); 
Lyons et al. (2012, p. 195); Goodman (2012, p. 57). 
283 [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 72. 
284 Ibid. para. 8.   
285 Id. 
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securities, again for monetary consideration, at a future date’286.  This mechanism 
enabled LBIE to maintain a ‘non trustee-like conduct’ for as long as it held beneficial 
title to the asset, pursuant to repo contracts and stock loan agreements.  Taking into 
consideration all these circumstances, LBIE claimed in Court that no beneficial title was 
ever acquired by the affiliates (due to uncertainty of subject matter or uncertainty of 
terms in the trust).  
 
Briggs J. rejected LBIE’s argument by stating that ‘the law should not confine the 
recognition and operation of a trust to circumstances which resemble traditional family 
trust, where the fulfillment of the parties’ commercial objective calls for the recognition 
of a proprietary interest in [the affiliates]’287.  More specifically, Briggs J confirms the 
idea that a trust which is created over a large pool of securities for the benefit of 
different parties is not void for the lack of certainty of subject matter288.  In support of 
this judgment, Briggs relies on Goode’s theory when stating that in this case a ‘trust 
works by creating a beneficial co-ownership share in the identified fund [emphasis added], rather 
than in the conceptually much more difficult notion of seeking to identify a particular 
part of that fund which the beneficiary owns outright’289.   
 
One should mention, however, that Briggs J does not look into the nature of the 
underlying securities to reach these conclusions and therefore he does not seem to 
comply in toto with Goode’s analysis.  Indeed, there is no reference in the judge’s 
decision as to whether the underlying securities should be classified as ‘a single, 
indivisible asset’ as opposed to separate units.  Unlike Goode, Briggs J bases his 
judgment simply on the idea that under the circumstances of the case it was the parties’ 
common intention to create a single trust over all the securities held in the pooled 
                                                 
286 2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 11. 
287 Ibid., para. 225.  The reason for this decision is that 'at the heart of any repo or stock loan [agreement, 
lies] a mutual assumption that, prior to its taking effect, the […] seller or stock lender [should have] some 
form of proprietary interests in the underlying securities' (para. 297).  Indeed, in line with the RASCALS 
scheme, the parties' commercial objective was divided into three main phases: firstly, to confer an 
equitable proprietary interest upon the affiliates by way of creating a trust; secondly, to transfer such an 
interest to the trustee (i.e. LBIE) so as to preserve the Groups’ global settlement practice and thirdly, to 
re-transfer the beneficial ownership back to the affiliates.  This ‘three-phase process’ was repeated by the 
parties on a daily basis until the securities were finally sold on the market.   
288 [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 225 (principle iii): 'a trust of part of a fungible mass without the 
appropriation of any specific part of it for the beneficiary does not fail for uncertainty of subject matter, 
provided that the mass itself is sufficiently identified and provided also that the beneficiary’s 
proportionate share of it is not itself uncertain'.   
289 Ibid., para. 232.  Briggs J applies the concept of co-ownership also in LBIE v. RAB Market Cycles [2009] 
EWHC 2545 (Ch), para. 56. On this point see the Australian case White v. Shortall [2006] NSW SC 1379, 
paras. 153 – 192 and 212. See also Hayton et al. eds. (2010, paras. 814 – 8.22) and Morton (2003, p. 298).   
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account290.  Accordingly, there was no uncertainty of subject matter because the trust 
property comprised the entire account holding rather than just unidentified parts of it291.  
This means that when clients’ securities are held by an intermediary in an omnibus 
account, each investor is entitled to a proportionate share in the trust property.  Such a 
principle is considered as ‘the basis upon which securities are intermediated in the 
modern world, and therefore a principle to which the law should lend the broadest 
possible support’292.   
 
The decision in the Rascal case goes even further when it emphasises that a trust is valid 
even in those cases where the property is ‘a constantly changing fund beneficially co-
owned by a constantly changing class of the clients of the trustee’293.  Furthermore, a 
trust does not fail for want of sufficient certainty ‘merely because the trustee has, at the 
date of the creation of the trust, yet to acquire property answering the relevant 
description’294. 
 
In December 2011, Briggs J’s judgement was for the most part upheld on appeal, 
confirming that the investors (whose assets are held in the pooled account) are 
considered co-owners of the trust property295. 
                                                 
290 See on this point also LBIE v. RAB Market Cycles [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch), para. 56; Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) (in administration) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd and others [2010] EWCA Civ. 917, para. 171 
and Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch), para. 14 (g).  As emphasised by 
Gullifer, the idea that shares or debt securities are fractions of an indivisible bulk (and that, consequently, 
they cannot be identified as single units) 'has not been the subject of much discussion in the literature or 
the cases', Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6.14).  However, certain reservations have been raised by 
Morton who believes that such an approach can create some form of inconsistency in practice.  'Take [for 
example] the question of voting rights', Morton (2003, p. 298).  'According to [Goode’s] analysis', 
continues Morton, 'the voting rights of shareholder A and shareholder B form part of a single asset which 
they hold in common with each other and the other shareholders': '[i]s it not odd that they can exercise 
these common rights in opposite ways?', Id.  Furthermore, with regard to intermediated securities, 
Micheler emphasises that shares or bonds can be segregated from other units of the same issue by 
entering separate entries for each investor in the shareholders’ register.  Although these entries cannot be 
considered as physically separate, they are still techniques which allow the allocation of specific units to 
certain investors, Micheler (2007, p. 130).  For a different opinion see, Benjamin (2003, p. 263) and Ooi 
(2003, para. 3.14). 
291 [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 233.  See on this point Re CA Pacific Finance Ltd. [2000] 1 BCLC 494.  
Furthermore, a trust does not fail for want of sufficient certainty 'merely because the trustee has, at the 
date of the creation of the trust, yet to acquire property answering the relevant description', Pearson and 
others v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA, [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), paras. 225 (principle iv) and 235.  See also 
Tailby v. Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523.  
292 [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 227.  
293 Ibid., para. 233.  See on this point also Re CA Pacific Finance Ltd. [2000] 1 BCLC 494. 
294 Pearson and others v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA, [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), paras. 225 (principle iv) and 
235.  See also Tailby v. Official Receiver [1888] 13 App Cas 523.   
295 [2011] EWCA Civ 1544 (paras. 71 – 73).  The Court of Appeal confirmed Justice Briggs’ decision in 
the part where it stated that a valid trust was created between the parties and that consequently the 
beneficial title had passed from LBIE to the affiliates.  The next issue was to understand whether the 
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The approach taken in the Rascal case seems to be in line with Section 20 A SGA 1979 
which applies the concept of co-ownership to a bulk of goods in cases involving 
contracts of sales.  Of course, with trusts as with sales the idea of co-ownership can be 
applied only in those circumstances where (i) the bulk is sufficiently identified; (ii) the 
parties’ proportionate share in the fund is not itself uncertain and (iii) the bulk is 
comprised with fungible assets.  Provided that these conditions are met, it is possible to 
argue that it was the parties’ common intention to acquire a proportionate share in the 
identified bulk. 
 
A similar idea of co-ownership in omnibus accounts was introduced in the United States 
under §8-503 (b) UCC.  This provision confirms that when clients’ securities are 
commingled in a single account, each investor is entitled to a ‘pro-rata proprietary 
interest in the fungible pool of underlying securities held by the intermediary’296.  
 
3. The application of the idea of co-ownership to the theories of a right against a 
right, an interest in securities and an indirect right in rem 
 
McFarlane and Stevens believe that the problem of uncertainty of the subject matter in 
omnibus accounts may be overcome by using the concept of a right against a right (as 
opposed to that of a proprietary right).   
 
The main point of this argument is that the theory of co-ownership proposed by Goode 
can be applied without difficulty to the concept of a right against a right.  In particular, 
McFarlane and Stevens confirm the idea that for a trust to be valid, ‘there is no need for 
the intermediary to segregate any specific [securities] before declaring a trust in favour 
                                                                                                                                          
beneficial title to the securities had been reacquired by LBIE as a result of the RASCALS scheme.  At first 
instance, Justice Briggs held that 'LBIE [had] paid the price on the on-leg of the first repo by offset 
against [the affiliates]'s debt for the acquisition price', [2011] EWCA Civ. 1544, para. 123 and [2010] 
EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 20). Hence, the beneficial title had passed to and had remained with LBIE until 
the securities were sold back to the street.  The Court of Appeal agreed with these conclusions, although 
it based its decision on a different reasoning.  In particular, (in contrast with Briggs’ decision) the Court of 
Appeal stated that no effective payment had been made on the on-leg of the first repo by way of offset of 
the debt owed to LBIE by the affiliates.  Nevertheless, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the 
RASCALS arrangements the affiliates were estopped by convention from denying that the beneficial title 
had passed to LBIE.  
296 Rogers (1995, p. 692). As emphasised by Vaaler, 'although the term "fungible bulk" used in the 1978 
version is not used in Revised Article 8 (based, perhaps, on lack of euphony) the concept is the same, i.e. 
the account holder acquires a property interest in the fungible pool of securities held by the intermediary', 
Vaaler  (1996, p. 282, n. 119).                                                                                                                                                    
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of an investor’297.   The reason for this is that ‘a requirement of segregation may be 
justified in relation to [tangibles] but is irrelevant when considering [securities]’298.  For 
example, ‘a notion of an individual share, unlike the notion of an individual sheep, 
makes no sense’299.  Shares cannot be divided into separate units in so far as they are 
simply ‘proportionate right[s] against the company and other shareholders’300.  This 
means that the holder of 100 shares out of an issue of 1,000 shares has a tenth share in 
the company.  Similarly, with regard to a trust, if a company issues 200 shares of which 
A holds (as a trustee) 100 for B, there is no inconsistency in stating that B has not only a 
personal right against A but also a right against A’s half share in the company (i.e. a right 
against A’s right to the 100 shares). 
 
This analysis has shown that there is scope for Goode’s theory to be applied to the 
concept of a right against a right301.  Nevertheless, two further considerations can also 
be raised regarding this analysis.  Firstly, McFarlane and Stevens do not offer a new 
solution to the problem of uncertainty of the subject matter in a trust but simply rely on 
the existing theory of co-ownership elaborated by Goode.  Secondly and more 
importantly, they do not necessarily demonstrate that the theory of co-ownership is less 
effective when using the idea of an interest in securities.  In this regard, it should be 
mentioned that Goode never challenged the proprietary nature of the investor’s right in 
an omnibus account but simply stated that what the investor really acquires is a beneficial 
co-ownership [emphasis added] in a single, indivisible asset, rather than in separate units.  
Hence, following the example mentioned above, there can be no difficulty in arguing 
that B acquires both a personal right against A as well as an interest in 50% of the share 
capital of the company.  More specifically, the proprietary right of the beneficiary attaches 
[emphasis added] to a sub-property, which is ultimately connected to a portion of the 
share capital of the company)302.  The difference between the idea of a right against a 
right and that of an interest in securities is more a question of labels rather than of 
substance, given that in the first case B acquires a right in A’s right in the share capital 
                                                 
297 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 40). 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 Unlike Goode, however, McFarlane believes that in this case a shareholder would not acquire a portion 
of the share capital but simply a percentage of a set of personal rights against the issuer (e.g. a right to 
dividend and a right to vote at meetings), McFarlane (2008, p. 136). 
302 See, however, n. 262 of this chapter. 
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of the company whilst in the second B acquires a proprietary right (i.e. a right in a sub-
property). 
 
The same argument could be used with regard to the approach of co-ownership, given 
by Briggs J in the Rascals case.  This means that such an approach can be applied to a 
trust over a pool of securities, regardless of whether the interest of the beneficiary is 
classified as a sui generis right or as a proprietary right303.  Once again, the only difference 
between these two classifications would be that in the first case, the trust fund 
comprises simply a bulk of multiple rights against the intermediary, whilst in the second 
it consist of a bulk of separate assets304.  
 
It is possible to argue that also the concept of an indirect right in the underlying 
securities can be applied to the two approaches of co-ownership.  This means that if A 
holds 100 shares for B, nothing should prevent us from stating that B can have an 
indirect right either in the share capital of the company or in the individual securities 
comprised in the client account.   
 
Doubts, however, could be raised regarding the possibility of accepting the idea of an 
indirect right in rem when investigating certain consequences related to the practice of 
omnibus accounts, mainly the lack of transparency in the indirect holding system.  As 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, with omnibus accounts the investor’s interest 
in the securities is only shown in his/her intermediary’s books and cannot be traced 
higher up the custody chain.  This means that the investor is not in a position to know 
where and with whom his/her securities are held.  For example, if A holds the securities 
on trust for B, who holds them on sub-trust for C, it is difficult for C (without B’s 
intervention) to monitor his/her securities, as no reference is made in A’s account to C’s 
proprietary right in the underlying securities305.  Although these circumstances 
significantly weaken C’s interest in the underlying securities, such reasoning could be 
                                                 
303 For a different approach see Micheler (2010, pp.144 – 149) who argues that shares have a special 
purpose that makes them different from property and obligation.  In particular, 'securities are fungible 
instruments that are issued by companies […] with a view to raising money for their business […]', Ibid., 
144.  Micheler emphasises that the law is designed to facilitate this purpose and to make the circulation of 
securities cost efficient.  These special characteristics explain why the ordinary rules of identification do 
not apply to securities but only to tangibles. 
304 Of course, if one were to accept the concept of an interest in securities, the item of property held by 
each account holder would correspond to the package of rights against the intermediary. Cfr. text to nn. 
184 – 185 in chapter 2. 
305 Similarly, the issuer would only recognised A as the owner of the securities, as there is no reference in 
his/her books to either B or C.   
 
 
75
based on the peculiar nature of C’s proprietary entitlement, i.e. its indirectness.  In other 
words, one could say that A is not aware of C’s ownership status, since C’s interest is 
strictly related to B’s interest in the underlying securities306.  This argument is not very 
convincing, however, since it is difficult to view C’s proprietary right as ‘attached’ to the 
underlying securities if there is no clear tracing thread between the investor standing at 
the bottom of the chain and the securities issued by the company. 
  
On the basis of this analysis, it would seem clear that the practice of using omnibus 
accounts could easily be explained by the theories of a right against a right and an 
interest in securities, but that it could conflict with the theory of an indirect right in rem.  
 
4. Identifying legal sensitivities in the current legal framework 
 
The final question that remains unanswered is whether recent developments in case law 
have removed the uncertainties surrounding omnibus accounts.  
 
In contrast with the FMLC’s recommendations, McFarlane and Stevens argue that no 
statutory intervention is necessary to overcome the lack of sufficient certainty in omnibus 
accounts.  
 
Indeed, the problem raised by most practitioners with regard to pooling seems to be 
resolved by the court’s current understanding of the conceptual rules.  In particular, 
Briggs J confirms the idea that a trust is valid despite the fact that clients’ securities are 
held on an unallocated basis by the intermediary.  This statement has even greater value 
if one considers that in the Rascals case the parties do not really challenge the principle 
of co-ownership itself but only its application to the specific circumstances of the case 
(‘where the intermediary [was] free to deal with the securities as it pleases and to mix 
them with others held for other affiliates and for its own benefit’307). 
 
                                                 
306 Of course, C’s reliance on B is primarily due to the legal structure of intermediation as well as the 
application of the no-look-through principle (regardless of whether the securities are held in an omnibus 
account or in an individual segregated account).  Yet, the lack of transparency typically associated to 
omnibus accounts significantly exacerbates such reliance on B, making it impossible for C to track his/her 
securities along the holding chain. 
307 [2011] EWCA Civ 1544, para. 72. 
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A lack of legislation, however, raises the question of how an omnibus account can operate 
in practice308.  In particular, if the intermediary’s clients are to be considered as co-
owners of the pool of securities, it is necessary to establish whether each of these clients 
should obtain the consent of the other co-owners in order to dispose of his/her assets.  
In relation to goods forming part of a bulk, a solution to this problem was expressly 
provided by the SGA 1979 which introduces the concept of an implied consent among 
the co-owners.  In particular, Section 20 B states that each co-owner can deal with 
his/her share in the bulk without having to obtain the express consent of the others.  
Conversely, in the case of intermediated securities there are no specific rules confirming 
the existence of an implied consent among the parties.  For these reasons, 
intermediaries are advised to expressly provide for a similar principle in the account 
agreement309.  Hence, a statutory clarification on this point would certainly be useful310.  
 
5. The future of omnibus accounts in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse  
 
Notwithstanding the problem related to the allocation of specific securities, the practice 
of opening omnibus accounts also entails other sensitive implications for financial market 
infrastructures.  In particular, earlier in this chapter it was emphasised that omnibus 
accounts reduce the level of transparency in the indirect holding system, in so far as the 
investor’s proprietary interest is only recorded in his/her intermediary’s account311.  This 
means that neither the issuer nor the higher-tier intermediaries have any relevant 
information regarding the amount, location, value and ownership status (including the 
                                                 
308 Ibid., para. 2.85 
309 The trend towards an implied consent between the parties streamlines and expedites the process 
relating to the transfer of securities. 
310 While admitting that the theory of co-ownership has now been accepted by the courts, Moss infers 
that 'uncertainty has [not] been [completely] "squeezed" out of […] the problem' regarding omnibus 
accounts, Moss (2010, p. 66).  A satisfactory solution would be to regard the trustee as holding a pool of 
shares on trust, not only for the clients but also for his/her own benefit.  According to Moss 'there is 
nothing conceptually difficult about all the shares being held on trust in this way and the terms of the 
trust decide who gets which of the shares', Id. 'The awkwardness here', continues Moss, 'is that 
intermediaries don’t normally regard shares that they own themselves as shares held on trust for 
themselves and documentation is unlikely to be drafted on this basis', Id.  The idea that the property can 
be beneficially shared with the trustee is consistent with general principles of trust law (which allow a 
party to act both as the trustee and the beneficiary of a trust fund).  With regard to intermediated 
securities, this general principle has been recently confirmed in the Rascals case where Briggs J argues that 
a trust is valid even if the property is beneficially shared by the intermediary with his/her clients, 2010] 
EWHC 2914 (Ch), para. 233.  In other words, nothing prevents a party from being both the trustee and 
the beneficiary of a trust fund.  In this case, the trustee/beneficiary may also decide to share the beneficial 
ownership of the fund with other parties. 
311 See supra text to nn. 221 - 224 of this chapter. 
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existence of liens or encumbrances) of the investor’s assets.  In view of the 
concentration of all these data in only one place (i.e. the relevant intermediary’s 
account), the application of appropriate rules is warranted to safeguard the client’s assets 
and minimise the risk of loss or misuse in cases of insolvency or fraudulent behaviour 
by the intermediary. 
 
The European Commission has recently raised certain reservations on the practice of 
using omnibus accounts. In particular, it argues that one of the main obstacles to 
‘promoting the book-entry in an account […] as the definitive proof of rights is […] the 
pooling of securities in omnibus accounts’ which has the effect that ‘the holding chain is 
complex and opaque [emphasis added] and rights of the accounts holders are unclear 
[emphasis added] and may even be exercised more than once over the same security.’312  
The core idea is that omnibus accounts may have contributed to the problems 
encountered in the failure of Lehman Brothers in so far as these types of accounts make 
it ‘difficult to identify who owns what, where risk is concentrated and who is exposed to 
whom.’313 
 
This argument was subject to severe criticisms by most practitioners who believed that 
‘such a reasoning is, at best, misconceived’314.  There is no clear evidence that in the 
Lehman Brothers case the lack of protection of the investors’ rights was caused 
essentially by the practice of using omnibus accounts315.  On the contrary, it seems that 
this problem was related to the existence of substantial inadequacies in the firm’s 
existing policies and procedures for holding clients’ money and assets316.  One of the 
main difficulties faced during the insolvency procedure was the considerable lack of 
certainty surrounding the clients’ entitlement over money and assets.  This problem was 
caused by several factors, which included (i) insufficient and inaccurate record-
keeping317, (ii) lack of communication within the Lehman group318, (iii) inadequate trust 
                                                 
312 European Commission (October 2012).  For an analysis of this paper see Yates and Montagu (2013, 
paras 7.191). 
313 European Commission (May 2013). 
314 Yates and Montagu (2013, para.7.191). 
315 The author is deeply grateful to Joanna Benjamin for these considerations. An extensive analysis of the 
main problems arising in the Lehman Brothers case has been evaluated by Joanna Benjamin in a 
forthcoming research paper which was very kindly discussed with me in ante prima. 
316 Benjamin (2014, p. 334).  More broadly, as emphasised by Joanna Gray and Peter Metzing 'during the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers regulators, competitors and even the Lehman's management could not 
identify their exact financial exposures to one another on a timely basis, which contributed to the systemic 
effects of its demise', Gray and Metzing (2013,  p. 237) 
317 FSA (September 2012, para. 4.14) and Id., (January 2010, para. 1.4). 
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letters for client money319, (iv) failure to strictly comply with segregation requirements 
between house accounts and clients’ accounts320 as well as (v) the use of complex 
secured financing arrangements which jeopardised the protection of clients’ assets321.  
 
Of course as mentioned earlier, with pooling clients are more exposed to the risk of 
inadequate behaviour by the intermediary.  However, this could be overcome by 
introducing more effective rules that promote the safeguarding of clients’ assets and 
enhance the supervision of the intermediaries by the regulatory authorities322.  In this 
regard, the Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’) has recently undertaken a fundamental 
review of the client money and custody assets regime323. The objectives include, for 
example, to improve ‘systems and controls for maintaining accurate and up-to-date 
records of client assets holdings’324 as well as enhancing ‘the information provided to 
consumers (both retail and wholesale) about how their money and assets are held by a 
firm’325.   
 
Other regulatory initiatives (undertaken both nationally and internationally) that may 
indeed enhance client asset protection, include proposals or recommendations to (i) 
enhance the existing duties to cooperate and share information in an insolvency 
proceeding326; (ii) increase the transparency of a firm’s intra-group relations327; (iii) 
                                                                                                                                          
318 This point was highlighted by Joanna Benjamin in a forthcoming research paper. 
319 'Some firms could not locate trust acknowledgements for each of the firms’ client money accounts or 
produce evidence that the trust status extended to the deposit or money market facilities they used' FSA 
(January 2010, p. 5).  According to the FSA 'having this documentation in place is an important 
requirement' as '[l]etters confirming the trust status of the account acknowledge that a statutory client 
money trust has been established for the proper segregation of client money', Ibid. 2.1.8.  See, on this 
point, also CASS 7.8.1. 
320 'Appropriate segregation and accurate record-keeping of client money is essential for the effective 
operation of the trust that is created to protect client money', Ibid., 2.2.23.  As emphasised In the matter of 
Lehman Brothers International Europe (in administration) [2012] UKSC6, the lack of strictly complying with this 
requirement as well as the ambiguities revealed in the regulatory framework (CASS 7.4.11) were factors 
that caused significant delay in the return of clients’ money.  A similar situation arose in connection with 
the segregation of clients’ securities.  In the Rascals case, although the parties did not stricto sensu breach 
the segregation requirement (CASS 6.2.1) they had devised a scheme for the sole purpose of 
circumventing the regulatory restriction. This scheme was so complex and atypical that it created 
significant uncertainty as to ‘who owns what’ and, consequently, delays in returning the assets.     
321 For example, in RAB Capital Plc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2008] EWHC 2335 (Ch) LBIE’s 
prime brokerage clients faced considerable difficulties in retrieving their assets. 
322 The author is deeply grateful to Joanna Benjamin for her thoughts on this point. 
323 FCA (June 2014, paras. 2.1 and 2.2) and Id. (July 2013, para. 1.11). 
324 IOSCO (February 2013, Recommendations 1 and 3) and Id. (January 2014, Recommendations 2, 5 and 
6).  See also FCA (June 2014, paras. 1.9 - 1.15/5.28 – 5.97/6.10/7.153 – 7.157) and Id. (2013, para. 1.24). 
325 FCA (July 2013, para. 1.6) and Id. (June 2014, paras. 1.6 and 9.1 – 9.33).   
326 Bloxham (January 2014, Recommendations 21-27).  See also Regulation 13 of the Special 
Administration Regulations 2011. 
327 Bloxham (April 2013, para. 5.38). See also FCA (June 2014, paras. 5.23 – 5.26). 
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introduce a clear distinction in a firm’s records between securities 
held on a purely custody basis and those which are subject to more complex contractual 
arrangements (mainly, the use of custody portfolio as collateral for financing)328; (iv) 
increase the transparency of securities financing transactions329; (v) strengthen fiduciary 
duties of investment intermediaries330 and (vi) introduce limits to the practice of 
rehypothecation (along the lines of US law)331.   
 
Although these regulatory initiatives may be warranted for all types of client accounts 
(whether segregated or pooled), they are certainly considered essential when using 
omnibus accounts332. 
 
In support of this argument, Benjamin recognizes that ‘the use of individually 
segregated client asset accounts is an option that certain particularly risk averse clients 
prefer’333.  However, she also points out that, unlike pooling, this method ‘is 
operationally costly, as it is incompatible with the aggregation and netting of inputs at 
each stage of post-trade processing and at each level of the global custody network’334.   
This means that ‘any significant shift from omnibus to individually segregated accounts 
would introduce significant costs and delays in post trade processing, and therefore 
market liquidity’335. 
 
In the latest report on the proposal for a Security Law Legislation (‘SLL’), the European 
Commission partly confirms its reservations on pooling.  The idea is to enhance 
                                                 
328 Bloxham (January 2014, paras. 8.94-8.97).  See also FCA (June 2014 paras. 1.15 and 5.23/5.26). 
329 Proposal for EU regulation on reporting and transparency in securities financing transactions, 29 
January 2014.  See also FSB (April 2012).  
330 Law Commission (October 2013).  
331 Under US Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation T and SEC (i.e. Securities Exchange Act) Rule 15c3-3 a 
prime broker may rehypothecate assets to the value of 140% of the client’s liability to the prime broker.  
In other countries (including the UK), there are no statutory limitations on the amount of client’s assets 
that can be rehypothecated.  Hence, unless parties do not decide to negotiate a limit on rehypothecation a 
prime broker is free to rehypothecate 100% of the value of assets deposited by clients. 
332 An interesting proposal suggested by Benjamin would be to introduce two separate regulatory regimes 
for two different types of custody service, i.e. ‘traditional custody’ (typically involving long-term 
institutional investors) and ‘client securities finance’ (concerning, for example, hedge funds whose assets 
are normally used as collateral for financing). The introduction of two separate regimes would allow 
regulators to better target investors’ needs without jeopardising market efficiency, Benjamin (2014, pp. 
327 – 328). 
333 These considerations are quotes from forthcoming research by Joanna Benjamin, not yet published but 
very kindly discussed with me in ante prima. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
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transparency336 firstly by offering the customer the option of choosing between 
individual segregated accounts and omnibus accounts337 and secondly by trying to 
introduce some form of restriction on pooling338. 
 
Nevertheless, certain conditions on pooling have already been introduced into other EU 
‘post-crisis measures’339 whereby the intermediary is required, for example, to (i) offer 
customers a choice between omnibus accounts and individual client segregation340, (ii) 
inform them of the costs and level of protection associated with these options341, (iii) 
invite clients to confirm their choice in writing342 and (iv) provide these services on 
‘reasonable commercial terms’343.  The European Commission intent is to facilitate the 
use of individual segregation by attempting to make customers more aware of the 
potential risks associated with omnibus accounts and to offer segregation at a 
‘commercially reasonable’ cost.  
 
These considerations show that although most of the uncertainties related to omnibus 
accounts have now (to a large extent) been removed, there are still certain problems 
                                                 
336 One of the main objectives of the future SLL is to 'ensure that the beneficial owners have appropriate 
transparency and control over their assets', European Commission (May 2013, para. 20).   
337 The existing practice allows the intermediary to decide whether the particular circumstances of the case 
make it commercially feasible to offer the option of individual segregation to clients.  If the European 
Commission’s proposal were accepted, the intermediary would be under a duty to offer such an option to 
all clients, regardless of the circumstances of the case. 
338 The European Commission introduces a restriction on this practice by stating that 'if an investor 
chooses to hold securities in an omnibus account, that account should clearly indicate that the securities are 
held in the name of the nominee but on behalf of the client', European Commission (May 2013, para. 15).  
'This suggested approach', continues the European Commission, 'could make account structures more 
transparent and strengthen the investor’s position in identifying his rights over securities, while choosing 
the most appropriate level of transparency and control', Ibid. para. 16.  The wording of this statement is 
not, however, very clear.  There are two possible ways to interpret this restriction on omnibus accounts and 
neither of them seems entirely convincing. If this statement means that a list of the investors’ names as 
well as their respective share in the pool of securities should be registered in the account of the higher-tier 
intermediary, the whole purpose of omnibus accounts would be jeopardised.  Alternatively, if the account 
should only mention that the securities are held in the name of an intermediary but on behalf of others, 
this clarification would not enhance transparency (in terms of 'who owns what') as there would be no 
reference to ‘which assets belong to whom’. 
339 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (‘EMIR’); Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on improving securities settlement in the European Union and 
on central securities depositories (CSDs) and amending Directives 98/26/EC (‘CSDR’) and 2014/65/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012.  See also and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
2011/61/EU (‘AIFMD’). 
340 Article 39 (5) EMIR, proposed Article 35 (3) CSDR and paragraph 40 of the Preamble AIFMD.  Prior 
to the introduction of these provisions, in most cases the intermediary would apply the option of using 
omnibus accounts unless the customer were to specifically require segregation.  
341 Article 39 (5) EMIR and proposed Article 35 (4) CSDR. 
342 Article 39 (5) EMIR. 
343 Article 39 (7) EMIR and proposed Article 35 (4) CSDR.  
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affecting client asset protection that can be overcome only through regulatory 
intervention. 
 
6. Summary of the analysis 
 
In most cases intermediaries hold securities on behalf of several investors in a single 
account without allocating specific securities to individual clients (i.e. omnibus account or 
pooled account).  This practice may challenge the investors’ ownership over the 
securities, given that it makes it difficult to determine the specific assets to which the 
right of each investor relates.  The main point is to establish firstly, which of the three 
theories related to the nature of the investor’s right can overcome this uncertainty and 
secondly, if there is a real need for a statutory intervention.   
 
The chapter shows that the theories of a right against a right and of an interest in 
securities can safeguard the investor’s right in an omnibus accounts.  However, despite 
this assurance both theories fall short of offering a novel solution to the problem of 
uncertainty but simply rely on the existing principle of co-ownership (based on the idea 
that each investor does not own specific securities but simply a portion or a fraction of a 
single bulk344).  Thus, following this analysis one could argue, for example, that C has a 
50% share in the bulk, without this statement necessarily affecting the nature of C’s 
interest (that can be either a right against B’s right or a right in a sub-property).   
 
The same argument can be used when referring to the theory of an indirect right in rem, 
given that such a theory can be easily applied to the idea of co-ownership.  In other 
words, nothing prevents us from stating that C holds (although only indirectly) a 50% 
share in the bulk of securities.   
 
In the latter case a problem may occur when looking at the practical consequences 
related to omnibus accounts, mainly the lack of transparency in the indirect holding 
system.  Indeed, in a pooled account, if C is prevented from keeping track and 
monitoring his/her securities along the holding structure, it is difficult to conceive C as 
the actual owner of the underlying securities standing at the top of the chain.  This 
                                                 
344 There are two ways of interpreting the principle of co-ownership given that the investor can be 
considered as sharing either a fraction of the share capital of the company or, alternatively, a portion of 
the pooled account. 
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difficulty arises regardless of whether C is considered to hold a proportionate share in 
the entire bulk rather than a specific number of individual units. Hence, unlike the first 
two theories the concept of an indirect right in rem does not seem to offer a clear 
understanding of the practice of using omnibus accounts.   
 
The chapter has also highlighted the issue that the principle of co-ownership has 
removed the uncertainties surrounding omnibus accounts and therefore, the investor’s 
interest in the bulk of securities can now be fully safeguarded.  There are, however, 
certain aspects which may still require some form of clarification.  For example, it would 
be useful to be able to rely on a statutory provision that determines whether the investor 
can dispose of his/her share in the bulk without having to obtain the consent of all the 
other co-owners.  This would mean introducing the concept of an implied consent 
between the parties along the lines of Section 20 (b) SGA 1979. 
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Chapter 4: Allocation of shortfalls: who bears the risk of loss?  
 
1. A conflict of choice between the ‘first in, first out’ rule and the ‘pro-rata 
sharing’ solution. 
 
As a general rule an intermediary is required to hold a sufficient amount of securities to 
satisfy the claims of his/her customers345.  This means that the number of securities held 
by the intermediary for the benefit of the account holders should be equal to the 
number of securities credited to the clients’ accounts.  The objective of this rule is to 
minimise the customers’ financial risks and to ensure the integrity of the intermediated 
holding of securities346.   Notwithstanding this fundamental principle, in market practice 
a potential loss in the clients’ accounts (better known as a ‘shortfall’347) is likely to occur 
at any time due, for example to an operational error348 or to fraudulent behaviour of the 
intermediary349.  If either of these circumstances do occur, the accepted rule is that the 
intermediary is then under an obligation to replace the missing securities or alternatively, 
to pay an equivalent sum of money to his/her customers350. 
 
A solution to the ‘shortfall problem’ is, however, more complex, particularly in those 
circumstances where the intermediary is insolvent351.  As emphasised by the English 
Law Commission, if the intermediary is unable to compensate his/her customers ‘the 
potential loss will crystallise into a real loss’352 which would then give rise to an 
                                                 
345 English Law Commission (June 2006, paras. 1.91 and 1.261).  See also UCC § 8-504 (a) and Article 24 
of the Geneva Convention. 
346 Article 24 (1) of the Geneva Convention (Official Commentary, cit., para. 24.1) 
347 A definition of shortfall is offered by the FMLC in its Commentary on Principles for Investment 
Securities Statute: '[a] shortfall arises where the securities actually held through an intermediary fall short 
of the aggregate of customer entitlements, so that the pool is insufficient to meet such entitlements', 
Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 4 in FMLC (July 2004). 
348 Operational errors are not uncommon in market practice due to the large number of transactions that 
are undertaken by intermediaries on a daily basis.  
349 In breach of his/her fiduciary duties an intermediary can use part of the clients’ securities for his/her 
own investment purposes and decide to transfer such assets to third parties.  
350 There are, however, cases in which a shortfall is not caused by the ‘improper’ behaviour of the 
intermediary.  For example, potential losses can also arise in those circumstances where 'the account 
holder has purchased securities but a settlement failure results in them not being delivered into its 
account', English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.90) and FMLC (July 2004, para. 6.2).  In these 
cases the intermediary is not responsible for the shortfall and, therefore, the losses will be borne by the 
account holders. Cfr. n. 351 in this chapter. 
351 In addition to insolvency, similar difficulties can arise even in those circumstances where the 
intermediary is under no obligation to compensate his/her customers (for example, if the fraudulent 
transaction was caused by an insolvent intermediary standing further up the holding chain for which the 
relevant intermediary is not responsible). 
352 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.91). 
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unsecured claim in the insolvency proceedings.  In this case, particular concern would 
be raised when dealing with omnibus accounts in so far as it is not quite clear which of all 
the account holders (whose securities are commingled in a single client account) would 
bear the risk of loss.  Let us imagine, for example, that on day 1 T holds 10,000 shares in 
favour of M and that on day 2, 20,000 shares are added to the same account in favour of 
N.  If then on day 3, 5,000 shares are mistakenly or fraudulently transferred by T to a 
third party, the question arises as to whether the loss should be allocated to either M or 
N or, alternatively whether it should be shared proportionately by both parties.         
 
Traditionally, English law has applied the so-called ‘first in, first out’ rule to overcome 
the issue of competing claims to assets which are held in a pooled account.  According 
to this rule, which was initially elaborated in Devaynes v. Noble (better known as the 
‘Clayton’s case’)353, the first assets included in the account are considered as the first 
assets drawn out of the account.  This means that in the example mentioned above, the 
‘first in, first out’ rule would allocate the loss of 5,000 shares to M but not N in so far as 
the latter’s assets were added to the initial fund at a later stage.   
 
The disadvantage of this rule is that it can ‘produce results of a highly arbitrary 
nature’354.  Indeed, the possibility of the account holders actually avoiding the loss and 
retaining all their assets relies exclusively on the accidental order in which the securities 
are credited to the omnibus account.  This approach is considered unfair and unequal 
since ‘it enable[s] a particular group of investors to establish an entitlement to a 
particular asset […] to the exclusion of other investors just because they invested on one 
day of the week rather than another’355.  There is also another important aspect 
addressed by most practitioners in their criticism of the ‘first in, first out’ rule.  Although 
this principle appears (at least at first sight) to be convenient and very simple to apply, in 
practice it can turn out to be quite the opposite.  For example, with regard to the 
practice of indirectly held securities it can be extremely challenging to apply the ‘first in, 
first out’ rule, given that the large volumes and rapid transfers of financial assets 
sometimes make it difficult (if not almost impossible) to identify those account holders 
whose assets were first credited to the omnibus account.  
 
                                                 
353 [1816] 35 E.R. 781, (1816) 1 Mer. 572.  For an analysis of this case see, for example, Ellinger et al. 
(2011, pp. 766 – 770); Martin (2009, pp. 691 – 696) and Smith (1997, pp. 184 – 194). 
354 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22. 
355 Id.  See on this point also Smith (1997, p. 194). 
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The presence of these obstacles explains why in market practice the ‘first in, first out’ 
rule is not so often applied.  In an attempt to overcome these hazards, at least to some 
degree, the parties are usually advised to insert in their contractual agreements a clause 
which allows the account holders to share proportionately the risk of shortfalls356.  The 
purpose of this clause (better known as the ‘pro-rata sharing’ solution or ‘pari passu’ 
rule357) is to allocate the losses in proportion to the number of securities held by each 
account holder in the investment fund.  For example, if M is entitled to one third of the 
shares in the omnibus account358 and N is entitled to the other two thirds359, M and N will 
bear respectively one third and two thirds of the losses.  However, an open question still 
needs to be answered: what happens in those circumstances where no clause is inserted 
by the parties in the custody agreement or where the contract is simply not clear on this 
issue?  
 
A possible answer to this question is offered by the Court of Appeal in Barlow Clowes 
International Ltd v Vaughan360.  The case concerns 11,000 investors who had advanced 
large amounts of money to Barlow Clowes International Limited (‘BCI’) with the 
intention of investing these sums in gilt-edged securities.  In particular, the investors had 
agreed to take part in a collective scheme where their money would be ‘mixed together 
and invested through a single pool’361. By the time BCI went into liquidation and the 
receivers were appointed, it became clear that most of the money had been fraudulently 
dissipated by the company (leaving a substantial shortfall in the amount available for 
distribution to the investors). The issue addressed to the court was to determine 
whether the remaining funds should be shared pari passu by all the investors or whether 
they should be distributed in accordance with the ‘first in, first out’ rule.   
 
The Court of Appeal refused to overrule the decision in the Clayton’s case but 
concluded that the ‘first in, first out’ principle should not be applied in those 
circumstances where such an application ‘would be impracticable or result in injustice 
                                                 
356 This was highlighted in CASS Rule, 2.3.3 G which stated that ‘firms are expected to advise the private 
client that … in the event of an unreconcilable shortfall after the failure (defined to mean insolvency 
events) of a custodian, clients may share in that shortfall in proportion to their original shares of the assets 
in the pool.’  The provision is, however, no longer in force.  
357 In Boughner v. Greyhawk Equity Partners Limited Partnership (Millenium) [2012] CarswellOnt 10466, [2012] 
ONSC 3185 (Ont. S.C.J. Commercial List), para. 37 this method was also defined as the expression ‘pro 
rata ex post facto’ approach. 
358 Following the example mentioned above M holds 10,000 shares out of a total of 30,000 shares. 
359 This means that N holds 20,000 shares out of a total of 30,000 shares. 
360 [1992] 4 All ER 22. 
361 Id. 
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between the investors’362, or ‘would be contrary to either the express […] or presumed 
intention of the [parties]363.  In other words, although the ‘first in, first out’ principle is 
the default rule to be applied where the assets of innocent parties are commingled in a 
single account, there may be situations where such a rule should not be applied and 
where ‘a preferable method of distribution [is] available’. 
 
These considerations (that also found support in later cases364) significantly narrow the 
scope of application of the ‘first in, first out’ rule.  Indeed, if this judicial interpretation 
were to be accepted, the rule established in the Clayton’s case would now rarely be 
applied, given that it can create difficulties in practice and ‘lead to unfairness in the 
majority of cases’365.  The question at stake is therefore, to understand which alternative 
method should be applied to allocate the remaining funds among the investors.  In 
Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan, the Court of Appeal argued that ‘instead [of 
applying the ‘first in, first out’ rule] the available assets and moneys should be 
distributed pari passu among all unpaid investors rateably in proportion to the amounts 
due to them’366. As emphasised by Woolf and Leggatt LJJ, the pro-rata sharing solution is 
regarded as being more appropriate in this case since (i) it avoids complex and costly 
calculations and (ii) it seems to be more consistent with the intention of the parties.  
                                                 
362 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22 (per Lord Justice Woolf).  The court argued 
that the application of the ‘first in, first out rule’ would be impracticable and produce unfair results among 
the investors362.  So far as fairness is concerned, in practice, as mentioned earlier, the use of ‘a rule of 
convenience’ (such as the one established in the Clayton’s case) can produce arbitrary results.  The 
argument has even greater value if one considers that in this case ‘the dates upon which investments were 
received by BCI often depended upon agents [...] combining the investments of a number of clients and 
then forwarding a lump sum to BCI’.  ‘In addition to relying upon the arbitrary results which follow from 
the "mechanistic" application of the ["first in, first out"] rule', the court bases its decision ‘upon the 
expense and time which will be involved in having to apply [such a] rule'.  Indeed, notwithstanding the 
advent of computer technology the task of applying this method is clearly complex.  Likewise, ‘the costs 
involved will [also] result in a depletion of the assets available to the investors’, Id. ‘In determining the 
appropriateness of the machinery used for resolving the claims of the investors among themselves, surely 
this should be a relevant consideration’, Id. 
363 In the specific circumstances of the case, the terms of the agreement required all the investors’ money 
to be paid into a common fund which was shared by all the parties in proportion to the amount of their 
original contributions.  This meant that there was no intention to hold and earmark single investments on 
the account of specific parties.  In particular, the nature and the circumstances of the fund showed that 
the parties could not have intended to allocate the risk of losses to certain investors but not to others.  
Hence, the ‘first in, first out’ rule should not be applied given that it would be in contrast with the implied 
intention of the parties (per Lord Justice Woolf). 
364 See Russell-Cooke Trust Co. v. Prentis [2002] EWHC 2227 (Ch), [2003] 2 All ER 478 and Commerzbank 
Aktiengesellschaft v. IMB Morgan Plc [2004] EWHC 2771 (Ch), [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 564.  For a critical 
view on the application of Clayton’s case see also (for Australia) Re French Caledonian Travel [2003] NSWSC 
1008, [2004] 22 A.C.L.C. 498 and (for New Zealand) Registered Securities Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 545, 553 and 
Re International Investment Unit Trust [2005] 1 NZLR 270, paras 50 – 54. 
365 Webb and Akkouh (2013, p. 326).  For a similar point see also Conaglen (2005, pp. 47-48) and Scott 
(1913-1914, p. 130, n. 15). 
366 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22. 
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With regard to the latter point, Woolf LJ accepts the idea that the investors’ intention 
was most likely to distribute the remaining funds in accordance with the pro-rata sharing 
solution rather than the ‘first in, first out’ rule367.  ‘This’, continues Leggatt LJ, ‘follows 
from the fact that because the investors envisaged that their money would be combined 
together, and therefore mixed in one or more bank accounts, before being invested in 
gilts, there is no reason to determine either the sequence in which payments into the 
account may have occurred or priority between investors.’368 As a result of these 
considerations, the court held that ‘each [investor] ha[d] an equitable charge on the fund 
in the account for the amount of his investment, and own[ed] an aliquot share of the 
investment pool.’369 
 
Consistent with this reasoning and with regard to the practice of indirectly held 
securities, the FMLC recommended the introduction of a statutory provision which 
states that ‘shortfalls should be borne proportionately’370.  The objective of this solution 
is to exclude ‘the application of the complex traditional […] rules whereby a particular 
shortfall is attributed to a particular person on the basis of timing of accounts entries’371.  
Once again, the benefit of the pro-rata sharing solution is to avoid ‘the risk of 
uncertainty, delay and expense in complex litigation’372.  
 
2. The ‘tracing approach’ supported by McFarlane and Stevens: a more 
appropriate way of distributing losses?  
 
McFarlane and Stevens criticise the decision in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan 
in that part where the Court of Appeal favours the application of the pro-rata sharing 
solution as opposed to the ‘first in, first out’ rule.  Similarly, they also express 
                                                 
367 ‘I have no doubt that it is correct to presume that the investors would have intended that what could 
be salvaged, as a result of the "common misfortune" they had suffered, should be dealt in accordance 
with the [pro-rata sharing] solution and not in accordance with the [first in, first out] rule’, Id.  
368 ‘In my judgment Mr Walker is correct when he submits that the rule in Clayton's Case applies in this 
context only where there is a wrongful [emphasis added] mixing of different sums of trust money in a single 
bank account.  The rule does not therefore apply where there is a collective investment scheme, whose 
participators must intend that their money should be mixed together and invested in or through a single 
pool [...]’, Id. 
369 Id. 
370 Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 4 in FMLC (July 2004). 
371 Id. 
372 Id.  
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reservations on the FMLC’s recommendation in so far as its arguments in favour of the 
pro-rata sharing rule are essentially ‘pragmatic rather than conceptual’373.  
 
‘One weakness in the authoritativeness of Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Vaughan’, 
continue McFarlane and Stevens, ‘is that the application of the rule in Clayton’s case 
was, on any view, inappropriate’374.  The reason for this is that Devaynes v. Noble dealt 
with ‘the rights of a banker and his customer to the funds in a bank account’375 and, 
therefore, did not involve a dispute between trust beneficiaries.  In particular, the court 
addressed the question of allocating any payment by the customer amongst the various 
debts owed to the bank.  This meant that the nature of the claim was entirely different 
from that identified in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan.376  In the latter case, the 
dispute ‘did not concern the issue as to which debt a particular payment should be 
presumed to discharge’377 but it simply aimed to resolve the problem of competing 
claims between the beneficiaries.  Hence, Devaynes v. Noble was of no relevance to 
deciding ‘who gets what in cases of shortfall’378.  
 
According to McFarlane and Stevens, a more appropriate solution would be to apply 
tracing rules to determine which investor bears the risk of loss379.  These rules (which 
have developed both at common law and in equity) attempt to identify ‘the account 
holder whose securities have been misappropriated from the pooled account and to 
allocate the full amount of the loss to that [particular] person’380.   
 
Let us consider, for example, that on day 1 T holds 10,000 shares for M and that on day 
2 another 10,000 shares are added to the same account in favour of N.  On day 3, T 
wrongfully sells 5,000 shares to third parties and uses the proceeds of the sale for its 
own purposes.  If on day 4, 7,000 shares are added to the clients’ account in favour of P, 
the question arises as to which investor bears the risk of a shortfall.  Pursuant to general 
principles of tracing, the loss of 5,000 shares is allocated pro- rata between M and N 
                                                 
373 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 41). 
374 Ibid., 42.  See on this point also Smith (2000, p. 78).  
375 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22 (per Lord Justice Leggatt) 
376 Smith (2000, p. 78).  For a similar view see the judicial trend in Canada and the United States Re Ontario 
Securities Commission v. Greymac Credit Corporation [1986] 55 O.R. 2nd 673 and In re Esteem Settlement [2002] 
Jersey L.R. 53. 
377 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 42).  
378 Id. 
379 Id.   
380 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.115). 
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(who will receive 8,500 shares respectively), while P is not affected by the shortfall and 
is, therefore, entitled to obtain the entire amount of his/her original contribution (i.e. 
7,000 shares).  The purpose of this principle is ‘to allocate a shortfall only among those 
persons that were account holders at the time that the improper transaction occurred’381. 
This means that ‘[s]ubsequent deposits into the account (whether by new or existing 
account holders) would be unaffected’382. In other words, following the analysis 
suggested by McFarlane and Stevens, P’s right against T’s right to the 7,000 shares is not 
jeopardized by the shortfall.  
 
The main difference between the so-called ‘tracing approach’ and the pro-rata sharing 
solution is that the latter (unlike the former) requires all [emphasis added] investors to 
share pari passu the risk of shortfalls, regardless of when the wrongful behaviour by the 
intermediary occurred383. 
   
In Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan the tracing approach was considered as a 
possible and more equitable alternative to the pari passu rule384.  However, the Court of 
Appeal decided that in the circumstances of the case it would have been too complex to 
identify the account holders whose securities had been misappropriated from the pooled 
account.  This is clearly emphasised by Dillon LJ when he argues that ‘the complexities 
of this method would […], in a case where there are as many depositors as in the 
                                                 
381 Ibid., para. 1.125 
382 Id. 
383 The approach suggested by McFarlane and Stevens also differs from the ‘first in, first out’ rule which 
simply allocates the entire amount of the losses to the investor who made the earliest deposit in point of 
time (i.e. M).  The core idea is that the ‘first in, first out’ rule has ‘nothing to do with tracing’ (Leggatt LJ 
in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan). See also the point highlighted by Smith where he states that 
the rule in Clayton’s case 'was initially thought to govern tracing [see Hallett’s Estate (Re) [1880] 13 (Ch) D. 
696 (C.A.)], but it soon became apparent that the results could be absurd'. 'As between banker and 
customer', continues Smith 'a rule of "first in, first out" makes perfect sense as a default position, [b]ut as 
between a breaching trustee and his beneficiary, who has nothing to do with the bank account, it makes 
no sense.' Hence, 'in the context of that competition, the application of Clayton’s case to tracing was 
overruled long ago', Smith (2000, p. 78). 
384 The tracing approach is also defined by courts as the ‘pro rata sharing on the basis of tracing’, ‘rolling 
charge’ or ‘North-American method’.  As explained by Dillon LJ in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. 
Vaughan such a method was ‘preferred by the Canadian and US courts to [the first in, first out rule], as 
more equitable’.  There is also another method based on tracing rules which is often used by North 
American courts, i.e. the ‘Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule’ or ‘LIBR’.  Under the LIBR approach, ‘a 
claimant to a mixed fund cannot assert a proprietary interest in the fund in excess of the smallest balance 
in the fund during the interval between the original contribution and the time when a claim with respect 
to that contribution is being made against the fund’, Cummings Estate v. Peopledge HR Services Inc. [2013] 
CarswellOnt 6685, 2013 ONSC 2781, [2013] W.D.F.L. 2886, para. 25.  
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present case and even with the benefits of modern computer technology be so great, 
and the cost would be so high, that no one has sought to urge the court to adopt it’385.  
 
McFarlane and Stevens criticise this decision and argue that the alleged complexity of 
the tracing process is overstated386.  Furthermore, they emphasise that the appropriate 
choice of whether to apply or not the tracing method or not should not depend on 
practical concerns but rather on the application of conceptual rules387.  For example, the 
case in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan concerns a trust over a pool of securities 
that are beneficially owned by various investors.  When part of those securities are 
wrongfully withdrawn from the account, the typical approach in English law would be 
to allocate losses only to those investors who effectively contributed to the fund from 
which the withdrawal was made388.  This approach (based on standard tracing rules) 
shows that the rights of the investors in an omnibus account do not rank equally or pari 
passu, given that any contribution to the fund (occurring after the withdrawal) is not 
affected by the shortfall389. 
 
Notwithstanding this general principle, McFarlane and Stevens believe that in certain 
circumstances it is still possible to apply the pari passu rule, ‘provided that [such a rule] is 
the basis of the trust created by the terms of [the] investment’390.  In other words, if the 
parties expressly agree that ‘the securities held by the intermediary are to be held in 
common for the benefit of all the investors from time to time’391, the pro-rata sharing 
solution may still be applied in cases of shortfalls. 
 
What happens, however, if funds are simply misdirected? Would it be possible for the 
parties to apply the pro-rata sharing solution, if the clients’ assets are used by the 
intermediary to purchase a yacht, for example (as in the case of Barlow Clowes International 
Ltd v. Vaughan)?  According to McFarlane and Stevens, in this particular case it would be 
inappropriate to apply the pari passu rule.  The reason for this is that ‘if trust funds are 
used to purchase a yacht only those investors with a right at that time should have an 
                                                 
385 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22 (per Lord Justice Dillon) 
386 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 42).  For a similar view see also Smith (1997, p. 268) and Id., (2000, 
pp. 86-87).  
387 Id. 
388 Gardner (2011, p. 318 ff.). 
389 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 43). 
390 Ibid., 44 
391 Id. 
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interest in the yacht’392.  Indeed, ‘[w]here the claim brought by the investor is in relation 
to what traceably survives of what he originally paid to invest, or to what traceably 
survives of securities which were held for him personally, it is inappropriate to apply any 
principle of pro-rata distribution’393. 
 
These considerations bring McFarlane and Stevens to the conclusion that the pari passu 
rule can only apply if both (i) ‘the dispute does not involve any claim to the proceeds of 
misdirected funds, but purely concerns shortfalls’394; and (ii) each investor agrees to 
share the fund with other account holders from time to time.  In all other circumstances 
the general rule would be to apply the traditional rules of tracing (which does seem to be 
more in line with English trust law). 
 
3.  A right against a right, an interest in securities or an indirect right in rem in 
allocations of shortfalls? 
 
The starting point of this debate is to establish which theory concerning the nature of 
the beneficiary’s right is better suited to solve the problem concerning the allocation of 
shortfalls: is it the concept of a right against a right, that of an interest in securities or 
that of an indirect right in rem? 
 
The answer to this question is that none of these three concepts can really help us to 
identify the most appropriate way of allocating losses in an omnibus account.  The reason 
for this is that the conceptual differences between a right against a right, an interest in 
securities and an indirect right in the underlying securities have no impact on the 
discussion about the method to be used when distributing losses among account 
holders.  Indeed, at least in principle all three concepts could be applied in cases of 
shortfalls.  Hence, if one were to argue that the tracing approach is the most appropriate 
solution to the problem of competing claims in a trust fund, the same conclusion could 
be reached regardless of whether the beneficiary’s interest is classified as a sui generis right 
or as a proprietary right.  Let us go back to the example where M and N are the only 
account holders at the time of the shortfall.  If later T decides to add 7,000 shares on the 
same account in favour of P, one could say that P’s right against T’s right or, 
                                                 
392 ‘Subsequent investors are unable to trace the value of their investments into any rights already held by 
the intermediary’, McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 44). 
393 Id. 
394 Id. 
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alternatively, that P’s interest in the sub-property or in the underlying securities is not 
affected by the shortfall395.  
 
Certain problems, however, may arise when attempting to apply the concept of an 
indirect right in rem to the practice of intermediated securities.  For example, securities 
may be wrongfully or fraudulently transferred to good faith purchasers and (as shown in 
the Rascals case) they can also be used or re-hypothecated by the intermediary.  If at the 
time of the shortfall no securities are transferred back to the account, the investor is 
simply left with a right396 against the intermediary to recover equivalent securities (not 
being in a position to track the underlying assets that were initially credited on his/her 
account)397.  This shows that what the account holder really acquires in an indirect 
holding system is not a right that attaches to a specific asset but simply a right in 
whatever is held by the intermediary at a certain point in time (i.e a package of rights 
against the account provider)398.  While this description seems to be inconsistent with 
the idea of an indirect right in rem, it can be accommodated in the concepts of a right 
against a right and of an interest in securities. 
 
Notwithstanding these considerations on the nature of the investor’s right, the question 
remains which of the solutions concerning the allocation of shortfalls is better suited to 
apply to the practice of intermediated securities? Is it the tracing approach (as suggested 
by McFarlane and Stevens), the first in, first out rule or the pro-rata sharing solution?   
 
4. A response to McFarlane and Stevens’ considerations on the tracing approach 
 
                                                 
395 Similarly, it is possible to argue in favour of the ‘first in, first out’ rule or the pro rata sharing solution, 
without this affecting one’s choice on the nature of the beneficiary’s right. 
396 Pursuant to general principles of trust, the account holder’s right is an (equitable) proprietary right.  
However, the account holder can be left with a mere contractual obligation in those circumstances where, 
for example, his/her beneficial interest in the securities is transferred to the intermediary under a repo 
contract or a stock loan agreement.  
397 As mentioned in chapter 2, in the event of wrongful or fraudulent conduct on the part of the trustee 
good faith purchasers are protected from adverse claims enforced by the beneficiaries (see, however, infra 
in conclusions).  Similarly, under a repo contract or stock loan agreement the account holder is prevented 
from enforcing a proprietary right against third parties (having simply a contractual right against the 
intermediary to obtain equivalent securities at a certain point in time).  Notwithstanding these limitations, 
it would be in any case practically impossible for the investor to trace the securities from one account to 
another along the holding chain of intermediaries.  See, on this point, text to nn. 39 – 43 in ch. 1 and text 
to nn. 426 – 428 in this chapter.      
398 See text to nn. 184 – 185 in ch. 2. 
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Certain criticisms could be advanced on the merits of McFarlane and Stevens’ analysis 
of the various methods used to distribute losses between beneficiaries. 
 
With regard to the ‘first in, first out’ rule, McFarlane and Stevens raise an interesting 
point when stating that the decision in Devaynes v. Noble has no relevance in determining 
the allocation of losses and distribution of trust funds between beneficiaries. 
 
This view is consistent with the position of both the US and Canadian courts, that have 
often stated that ‘[t]he rule in [the] Clayton’s case should be limited to the relationship 
between a bank and its customers [and that] it should not be extended to the 
relationship between […] innocent beneficiaries’399.  For example, in Ontario (Securities 
Commission) v. Greymac Credit Corporation Morden JA argues (i) that the ‘first in, first out’ 
rule is merely a fiction which was originally developed to regulate the appropriation of 
payments between banker and customer and (ii) that the application of such a rule to a 
different scenario (which involves a dispute between trust beneficiaries) may lead to 
‘irrational’400 and unfair results401.   
 
Unlike Canada and the United States, England has not yet rejected in toto the ‘first in, 
first out’ rule as the law applicable to co-mingled trust cases.  Nevertheless, the decision 
in Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan significantly narrows the scope of application 
of the rule in Clayton’s case (making it almost impossible for such a rule to be applied in 
practice)402.  Hence, setting aside conceptual considerations, no substantial difference 
remains between the positions held by the North American courts, on the one hand and 
the English courts, on the other.   
 
                                                 
399 Ontario (Securities Commission) v. Greymac Credit Corporation [1986] 55 O.R. 2nd 673, para. 1.  See for 
Canada also Boughner v. Greyhawk Equity Partners Limited Partnership (Millenium) [2012] CarswellOnt 10466, 
[2012] ONSC 3185, para. 81; Paddock v. Paddock 2008 CarswellOnt 8794, [2009] W.D.F.L. 2783, 78 R.F.L. 
(6th) 54, para. 37 and Law Society of Upper Canada v. Toronto Dominion Bank [1998] 42 O.R. (3d) 257, paras. 9 
– 13.  For the United States see Ruddle v. Moore 411 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and Re Walter J Schmidt & 
Co, ex p. Feuerbach [1923] 298 F. 314, 316.  See also Scott (1913-1914, p. 130) and Smith (2000, pp. 78 – 
79).   
400 Scott (1913-1914, p. 130). 
401 ‘When the law adopts a fiction it is, or at least it should be, for some purpose of justice.  To adopt it 
here [i.e. to co-mingled trust cases] is to apportion a common misfortune through a test which has no 
relation whatever to the justice of the case.  Such a result […] can only come from a mechanical 
adherence to a rule which has no intelligible relation to the situation,’ Re Walter J Schmidt & Co, ex p. 
Feuerbach [1923] 298 F. 314, 316, per Judge Learned Hand. 
402 See on this point text to n. 364 in this chapter. 
 
 
94
In an attempt to identify the approach that is best suited to solve the issue of competing 
claims between beneficiaries, McFarlane and Stevens maintain their criticism on the 
decision in Barlow Clowes International Ltd. v. Vaughan.  In particular, they consider the 
tracing approach to be the more appropriate solution given that (i) it produces more 
equitable results for the parties and (ii) it complies with English trust law. 
 
In terms of justice, there is probably little doubt that the tracing method is to be 
considered the fairest solution that can be applied in co-mingled trust cases.  The reason 
for this is that such an approach allocates losses only to those investors who were 
account holders at the time of the shortfall and therefore, does not affect the other 
beneficiaries who deposited their assets in the trust fund at a later stage403.  
 
One might argue that it is unfair to ‘penalise’ certain beneficiaries (rather than others) 
based on the timing of the shortfall404.  That argument, however, is not the most 
convincing one405.  Indeed, ‘[i]f this seems unfair, the unfairness is that which is inherent 
in the specific nature of proprietary rights’406.  According to Smith, ‘[i]f my car is parked 
next to yours, and mine is hit by lightning and consumed by fire while yours is 
untouched, I might think this is very unfair; [b]ut this is part of what it means for a thing 
to be mine, and another thing to be yours’407. 
 
Another point in favour of the tracing approach is that it seems to be consistent with 
English trust law, which has traditionally used tracing rules to allocate losses among 
beneficiaries.  This statement is indeed widely accepted.  
 
Unlike other methods of risk distribution (such as the pro-rata sharing solution and the 
‘first in, first out’ rule), the tracing approach is not based on a ‘pure fiction’ but attempts 
                                                 
403 This position is confirmed in Barlow Clowes International Ltd. v. Vaughan 22 (per Woolf and Leggatt LJJ). 
404 See, for example, counsel to Waldock in Boughner v. Greyhawk Equity Partners Limited Partnership 
(Millenium) [2012] CarswellOnt 10466, [2012] ONSC 3185, paras. 23 – 24. 
405 For a different opinion see English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.132) when it states that 
although the ‘rolling charge method could be considered the fairest of the pro rata formulae’, ‘the basic pro 
sharing method best reflects the common risk that account holders undertake’.  The reason for this is that 
‘[i]t is not the shortfall itself but the intermediary’s inability to remedy the shortfall that account holders 
must consider when choosing to hold securities through one or more intermediaries’, Id.  ‘As this credit 
risk may change over time it is the account holders that are assuming the credit risk at the moment of the 
intermediary’s insolvency that should bear the loss’, Id.  
406 Smith (2000, p. 81).  
407 Id.  See, on this point, also Smith (1997, pp. 303 – 305). 
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to reflect ‘the reality of what has occurred’408.  The core idea underlying tracing rules is 
to introduce a process which (i) attempts to truly safeguard the proprietary rights of 
each investor and, therefore, (ii) assigns losses only to those beneficiaries whose assets 
have actually [emphasis added] been misappropriated by the trustee. 
 
This process does not apply when using the ‘first in, first out’ rule and the pro rata 
sharing solution, as both can be considered ‘rules of convenience based upon a mere 
presumption of law’409.  For instance, in Barlow Clowes International Ltd. v. Vaughan the 
court favoured the application of the pro rata sharing solution and decided on the basis 
of a legal fiction, which assumed that all investors’ contributions to the trust fund had 
been made simultaneously410 and prior to the occurrence of the shortfall411.  This 
presumption was not necessarily in line with the actual circumstances of the case412 and 
was adopted by the court mainly for the purposes of convenience413.  The objective was 
to require each investor to share losses on a pro rata basis, regardless of the time when 
such an investor’s contribution was made to the trust fund. 
 
One of the main consequences of using the pro rata sharing solution is to jeopardise the 
proprietary rights of those beneficiaries who were not account holders at the time of the 
shortfall.  Let us imagine, for example, that on day 1 T holds 20,000 shares in favour of 
                                                 
408 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.115).  See, however, n. 413 in this chapter. 
409 The expression has been used by the courts merely in relation to the ‘first in, first out’ rule. However, 
(at least to a certain extent) it can be extended to the pari passu rule given that the latter, like the former, (i) 
is based on a legal fiction and (ii) is adopted primarily for purposes of convenience (being considered 
much easier to apply than the tracing approach). 
410 See, on this point, Gardner (2011, p. 319 n. 64). 
411 The argument can be considered even more convincing when applied to the ‘first in, first out’ rule, 
which is also based on a legal fiction.  More specifically, in this particular case it is presumed that the first 
withdrawals from a bank account are charged against the first deposits.  As emphasised by Scott, ‘[a]s 
between the depositor and the bank, this rule is fair enough; for it is a question of intent as to what part 
of the account is paid when the depositor makes a withdrawal, and since it is necessary to have some 
definite rule, in the absence of any evidence of actual intent, this rule is adopted because it comes as near 
as any to expressing the probable intent’ of the parties, Scott (2013 - 2014, p. 130).  The problem occurs 
when the rule is applied to co-mingled trust cases, given that ‘this presumption of law’ is considered 
wholly inappropriate in determining the relationship between the beneficiaries.  Indeed, in these 
circumstances it is difficult to believe that the ‘first in, first out’ rule is the closest that one could get to 
expressing the probable intent of the parties.  Cfr. text accompanying nn. 449 and 450 to this chapter.  
When comparing the ‘first in, first out’ rule to the pro rata sharing solution, the latter seems to be more in 
line with the probable intent of the parties and therefore produces a more appropriate solution for 
investors.  The answer, however, is likely to change if one compares the pari passu rule to the tracing 
approach (rather than to the ‘first in first out’ rule).  In this case it is easier to conclude that the parties’ 
probable intent was to allocate losses only to those investors who were account holders at the time of the 
shortfall (rather than assuming that all investors’ contributions had been made simultaneously). 
412 In Barlow Clowes International Ltd. v. Vaughan the investors’ contributions to the trust fund were made at 
different points in time (i.e. both prior to and after the occurrence of the shortfall). 
413 More specifically, the pari passu rule was considered the more appropriate choice in this case given that 
it avoided the complexities and the excessive costs associated with the tracing approach. 
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M and N and that on day 2, 5000 shares are fraudulently withdrawn from the account 
by the trustee.  If on day 3, 7000 shares are added to the clients’ account in favour of P, 
the tracing approach would prevent P’s proprietary rights from being affected by the 
shortfall.  This, however, would not be the case should the parties decide to apply the 
pro rata sharing solution.  In this event, P would find him/herself in the awkward 
position of losing part of the shares at the precise moment when the property had been 
acquired.  
 
These considerations seem to confirm that the pro rata sharing solution (as well as the 
‘first in, first out’ rule) is not a process that adheres to tracing rules but is rather a 
remedy set to distribute losses in a more simplified manner, thereby avoiding 
inconvenient delays and considerable costs.   
 
The theory which favours the tracing approach (as opposed to other methods of risk 
distribution) is confirmed by the US and Canadian courts which have often stated that 
‘losses to [a trust] fund should be allocated against the interests of the beneficiaries in 
proportion to their respective traceable interests in the fund at the time the loss 
occurred’414.  This means that as a general rule the tracing approach is considered by 
North American courts to be ‘the preferable [mechanism] to resolving competing claims 
to mingled trust funds’415. 
 
There are, however, certain exceptions to this general rule. The reason for this is that 
the tracing approach does not usually apply ‘where it is not practically possible to 
determine what proportion the mixed funds bear to each other, or where the claimants 
have expressly or by implication agreed among themselves to a distribution based 
otherwise than on a [tracing approach]’416.  In other words, there may be circumstances 
where the application of the tracing approach is considered ‘inconvenient’ or 
‘unworkable’, especially when dealing with large ‘numbers of accounts, investments and 
transactions, which make calculations too complicated and expensive to undertake’417.   
                                                 
414 Re Ontario Securities Commission v. Greymac Credit Corporation [1986] 55 O.R. 2nd 673, para. 15.  See on this 
point also Boughner v. Greyhawk Equity Partners Limited Partnership (Millenium) [2013] ONCA 26; Ruddle v. 
Moore 411 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1969) and Re Walter J Schmidt & Co, ex p. Feuerbach [1923] 298 F. 314, 316; 
Scott (2013 – 2014, pp. 78 – 79) and Lowrie and Todd (1997, p. 46 ff.) 
415 Boughner v. Greyhawk Equity Partners Limited Partnership (Millenium) 2012 CarswellOnt 10466, 2012 ONSC 
3185, para. 81. 
416 Toronto Dominion Bank v. 2026227 Ontario Inc. [2012] ONSC 2992, para. 37. 
417 Ontario Securities Commission v. Greymac Credit Corporation [1986] 55 O.R. 2nd 673, para. 45. 
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The position of the North American courts is clearly highlighted in the Canadian case 
Ontario (Securities Commission) v. Greymac Credit Corporation where Morden JA comments as 
follows: ‘While acknowledging the basic truth of Lord Atkin’s observation that 
“convenience and justice are often not on speaking terms” (General Medical Council v. 
Spackman, [1943] A.C. 627, 638), I accept that convenience, perhaps more accurately 
workability, can be an important consideration in the determination of legal rules.  A 
rule that is in accord with abstract justice but which for one or more reasons, is not 
capable of practical application, may not, when larger considerations of judicial 
administration are taken into account, be a suitable rule to adopt’418.   
 
For these reasons, the pro rata sharing solution is often chosen by the North American 
courts as a valuable alternative to the tracing approach, given that (i) it has the advantage 
of relative simplicity and (ii) unlike the ‘first in, first out’ rule, it also produces reasonable 
results for the parties419.  This is confirmed, for example, in certain cases where the 
Canadian courts have expressly decided in favour of the pro rata sharing solution420 
(being considered the most convenient method to distribute losses as well as an 
approach which better reflects the nature and purpose of a mixed trust account421). 
 
                                                 
418 Id. 
419 The main point of this argument is to qualify the tracing approach as the ‘general rule’ applicable to co-
mingled trust cases and to use the pro rata sharing solution only in exceptional circumstances.  However, 
there are different views on this matter.  For example, in The Law Society of Upper Canada v. Toronto 
Dominion Bank Blair J believes that in co-mingled trust cases the pro-rata sharing solution cannot be 
considered an exceptional remedy, given that it is usually [emphasis added] the more appropriate method 
to distribute losses between the beneficiaries. Indeed, although the tracing approach is likely to produce 
fairer results for the parties, ‘it is manifestly more complicated and more difficult to apply’ in practice 
(para. 32). 
420 See, among others, Toronto Dominion Bank v. 2026227 Ontario Inc. [2012] ONSC 2992, para. 54 and Law 
Society of Upper Canada v. Toronto Dominion Bank [1998] 42 O.R. (3d) 257, paras. 30 – 34. 
421 ‘A mixed trust fund is a device whereby a trustee […] holds funds in trust for different persons or 
entities. It is in many ways a mechanism of convenience, i.e., it avoids the necessity, and the cost, and the 
cumbersome administrative aspects of having to set up individual trust accounts, and the records relating 
to such accounts, for the transactions relating to every beneficiary. This practical characteristic of mixed 
trust funds should be recognized in considering the nature of such funds. It provides an economic and 
organizational benefit to the public. […] What follows from this … is that a mixed fund of this nature 
should be considered as a whole fund, at any given point in time, and that the particular moment when a 
particular beneficiary's contribution was made and the particular moment when the defalcation occurred, 
should make no difference.  The happenstance of timing is irrelevant. The fund itself … is an 
indistinguishable blend of debits and credits reflected in an account held by the trustee in a bank. […] It is 
a blended fund. Once the contribution is made and deposited it is no longer possible to identify the 
claimant's funds, as the claimant's funds. All that can be identified, in terms of an asset to which recourse 
may be had, is the trust account itself, and its balance’, Law Society of Upper Canada v. Toronto Dominion Bank 
[1998] 42 O.R. (3d) 257, paras. 43 – 44. 
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The absence of a rule that allows the tracing approach to be applied indistinctively in all 
circumstances (regardless of their complexity) raises the question of whether such an 
approach can be considered ‘convenient’ or ‘workable’ in the case of intermediated 
securities.  
 
McFarlane and Stevens believe that the tracing approach can be applied in these 
circumstances without difficulty422.  More specifically, they emphasise that ‘regardless of 
the number of claimants and transactions, the application of [the tracing approach] 
requires no mathematical operation more complicated than long division’423.  ‘Once the 
relevant data is imputed, a computer programme a few lines long could perform the 
calculations’424.  Hence, ‘[a] fear of numbers cannot be a sufficient justification for 
excluding this approach’425. 
 
This position does not seem to be willingly accepted by most practitioners, especially 
those who have often stressed the importance of introducing a statutory provision that 
favours the application of the pari passu rule426.  Indeed, for the tracing approach to be 
applied one must be able to identify the underlying operation that led to the shortfall 
and ‘track the [precise] order in which transactions in and out of the account 
occurred’427.  This may be possible only if the following conditions are met: (i) a limited 
number of trades take place on the omnibus account daily; (ii) all transactions are settled 
in ‘real time’ and on a ‘gross basis’ and (iii) the intermediary maintains accurate and up-
to-date records of client assets holdings. 
 
The failure of Lehman Brothers showed that the practice of intermediated securities 
usually entails a far more complex scenario than the one described above.  In most cases 
the intermediary is instructed to manage hundreds or thousands of trades each day.  
These transactions are often characterised by a high degree of technical complexity and 
                                                 
422 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 42).  
423 McFarlane and Stevens cite Smith (Smith (1997, p. 268). 
424 McFarlane and Stevens (2010, p. 42). See on this point also Austen-Peters (2000, p. 140). 
425 Id. 
426 English Law Commission (June 2006, paras. 1.131); Moss (2010, pp. 66-67) and Yates and Montagu 
(2013, para. 3.55) and Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 4 in FMLC (July 
2004). 
427 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.131). 
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at times by an atypical use of certain contractual agreements designed, for example, to 
avoid certain regulatory restrictions (as in the so-called ‘Rascals scheme’)428. 
 
More importantly, most transactions are not usually settled in ‘real time’ and on a ‘gross 
basis’ but are subject to a netting arrangement.  In particular, settlement takes place at 
predetermined times in the course of the business day, when all transactions relating to 
the same class of securities are offset against one another and only net transfers are 
made between the parties.  This process is known as ‘net settlement’ and has the 
advantage of drastically reducing the settlement costs (e.g. liquidity and collateral 
savings) as well as ensuring the efficient functioning of the market.  The downside of 
this system however, is the difficulty of tracking each individual transaction since such a 
system only shows a single net position for each account holder. 
 
The vast and varied activity in an omnibus account, as well as the use of netting in the 
course of clearing and settlement shows that in most cases it is extremely difficult to 
trace the precise order in which each transaction occurred.  This statement has an even 
greater value if one considers that in practice the clients’ records have also sometimes 
proven to be inaccurate and unclear429. 
 
Furthermore, as mentioned by the English Law Commission ‘the composition of the 
account holders as the size of their respective holdings may alter significantly from day 
to day’430.  This means that ‘the date on which the relative holdings of the account 
holders are measured is critical to the allocation of shortfalls’431.  In this respect, ‘the pro 
rata sharing solution based on entitlements at the date of insolvency enjoys a 
considerable practical advantage over the other alternatives’432.  A method (such as the 
tracing approach) that allocates losses based on the moment in which the improper or 
erroneous transaction occurred, could prove unworkable or even impossible, ‘if the 
composition of the account holders has changed dramatically by the time that the 
intermediary or its liquidator confirms [shortfall]’433. 
 
                                                 
428 See text to nn. 281 - 294 in ch. 3. 
429 Id. 
430 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.133). 
431 Id. 
432 Id. 
433 Id. 
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Setting aside these specific problems, even in the event where the application of the 
tracing approach is considered ‘possible’ or ‘workable’, significant time and effort may 
need to be expended to obtain all relevant information regarding the clients’ holdings.  
The main concern here is that an investigation of this kind can be a key challenge in 
cases of shortfalls since a lengthy period of time may pass before clients are able to 
effectively recover their assets.  This difficulty in obtaining a quick access to the 
securities may be the cause of severe losses to certain account holders and potentially 
lead to their financial failure.  Hence, in this case the risks to financial stability would 
certainly be significantly high. 
 
These considerations explain why Canada and the Unites States decided to introduce a 
statutory provision that excludes the application of the tracing rule in the practice of 
intermediated securities.  In particular, s. 97 (2) of the Canadian Securities Transfer Act 
(‘STA’) and §8-503 (b) of the United States Uniform Commercial Code (‘UCC’) 
emphasise that the account holders have a pro rata property interest in the omnibus 
account ‘without regard to the time [emphasis added] the entitlement holder acquired the 
security entitlement or the time [emphasis added] the securities intermediary acquired the 
interest in that financial asset’434. 
 
The general idea is that the doctrine of tracing is ‘increasingly difficult to apply to the 
fast moving and intangible rights, typically the subject of modern and sophisticated 
investment markets’435. 
 
Consistent with this reasoning, when the intermediary fails and the custody assets are 
being distributed in an insolvency proceeding, North American law provides that losses 
                                                 
434 Official Comment, § 8-503 UCC para. 1: ‘Subsection (b) makes clear that the property interest 
described in subsection (a) is an interest held in common by all entitlement holders who have entitlements 
to a particular security or other financial asset.  Temporal factors are irrelevant.  An entitlement holder 
cannot claim that its rights to the assets held by the intermediary are superior to the rights of another 
entitlement holder by virtue of having acquired those rights before or after, the other entitlement holder.  
Nor does it matter whether the intermediary had sufficient assets to satisfy all entitlement holders’ claims 
at one point, but no longer does.  Rather, all entitlement holders have a pro rata interest in whatever 
positions in that financial asset the intermediary holds’.  This provision however, does not determine how 
losses are distributed in insolvency proceedings, as in these cases the distribution rules are determined by 
the applicable insolvency law.  
435 Bloxham (January 2014, para. 3.15).  Similarly, ‘[r]evised Article 8 expressly abandons all tracing rules’, 
Facciolo (1999 – 2000, p. 623).  See on this point also Schroeder (1994, pp. 332 -334); Khimji (2007, p. 
99) and Rogers (1995, p. 692). 
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are ascertained for each type of securities and borne pro rata by all the account holders 
who share an interest in those securities (i.e. ‘the issue-by-issue pro rata sharing rule’)436. 
 
When the insolvency involves a stockbroker, United States law goes even further by 
introducing under the Bankruptcy Code and the Securities Investor Protection Act 
(‘SIPA’) a special regime for distributing assets.  The objective is to elaborate a very 
simple procedure which provides that ‘all customer property [emphasis added] is distributed 
pro rata among all customers in proportion to the dollar value of their total positions 
[emphasis added], rather than dividing the property on an issue-by-issue basis’437.   This 
means that losses are distributed on a pro rata basis to all customers, regardless of the 
nature of the securities which are involved in the shortfall.  As a result of these special 
rules, ‘the fortuity that there may be a shortfall in X securities but not in Y securities 
does not result in a windfall for Y securities entitlement holders and the X securities 
account holders do not bear the entire burden of the shortfall’438.  The intention is 
clearly to allow each client to have ‘a higher likelihood of a lower potential loss’ as well 
as satisfying his/her claim within reasonable time. 
 
The importance of ensuring the prompt recovery of clients’ assets was the subject of a 
heated debate in the UK during the financial crisis.  Indeed, the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008 posed serious challenges to the existing legal framework.  In particular, 
English insolvency law did not provide clear rules aimed at mitigating the impact that 
the failure of large investment firms may have on the financial market (e.g. by excluding 
the application of complex tracing rules to determine ‘who owns what’ and ‘who bears 
the risk of an eventual loss’ in the omnibus account)439. 
 
As emphasised by HM Treasury, one of the main problems in the Lehman case was that 
the insolvency regime required the Administrators ‘to achieve a high degree of 
confidence over the overall value of claims before they c[ould] take key decisions on the 
management of the estate […]’440.  This situation prevented the Lehman Administrators 
                                                 
436 For an analysis of the US regime applicable in cases regarding the insolvency of a bank see Mooney 
(2008, p. 16).  
437 Official comment, § 8-503 UCC para.1. 
438 Mooney (2008, p. 16). 
439  One of the main problems addressed by most practitioners is, for example, to provide an alternative 
to tracing (see on this point Bloxham (January 2014, para. 3.15) and Id. (April 2013, para. 5.30). 
440 HM Treasury (September 2010, p. 4). 
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from acting swiftly and entailed a considerable delay in the return of clients’ money and 
assets. 
 
The question at stake was to establish whether in specific circumstances (such as those 
experienced in the Lehman case) it is necessary to attribute a greater importance to 
‘speed’ rather than to ‘accuracy’441. 
 
A first answer to this question was offered in 2011 (‘SAR’), with the introduction of a 
special administration regime for investment firms442.  One of the objectives was to 
provide measures designed to facilitate the prompt return of clients’ assets.  For 
example, Regulation 12 (1) and (2) SAR addresses the issue concerning the allocation of 
losses in an omnibus account.  In particular, it states that if the administrator ‘becomes 
aware that there is a shortfall in the amount available for distribution’ of a particular 
class of securities, then the shortfall should be shared ‘pro rata by all clients for whom 
the investment bank holds [those] securities’ 443.  
 
In contrast with the McFarlane and Stevens analysis, the wording of this provision 
clearly suggests that losses should be allocated to the account holders, regardless of the 
time when the shortfall occurred.  The only condition introduced under Regulation 12 is 
to allow the Administration to establish a ‘bar date’, i.e. a date by which account holders 
must prove their claim444. 
 
The solution set out under Regulation 12 is similar to the one adopted by Lehman 
Brothers International Europe (‘LBIE’) in the Claims Resolution Agreement reached in 
2009 with some of its clients and counterparties.  Hence, the objective of this provision 
                                                 
441 FSA (September 2012, para. 4.4) and FCA (July 2013, para. 2.3).  This particular aspect was also 
discussed during the conference ‘Law After Lehmans’ held at the LSE on October 13th 2013.  
442 The Regulations apply to investment banks, which are defined in the Banking Act 2009. 
443 The clients will claim for the shortfall as unsecured creditors (based on the date when the special 
administration commenced), Regulation 12 (7) SAR. 
444 Regulation 11 SAR. 
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(which is based on a issue-by-issue pro rata sharing rule)445 is simply to give statutory 
effect to this type of agreement446.  
 
Similarly, Article 26 of the Geneva Convention introduces the pro rata sharing rule for 
account holders (on an issue-by-issue basis) that is applicable in the insolvency 
proceeding of an intermediary.  There are however, certain limitations to this general 
principle, given that it can only apply ‘unless otherwise provided by any conflicting rule 
[used] in that [intermediary’s insolvency] proceeding’447.  This condition would allow 
Contracting States to use alternative distribution rules (for example, along the lines of 
SIPA and the US Bankruptcy Code) which can be ‘quite different from the issue-by-
issue pro rata sharing [principle]’448. 
 
As for the proposal of a SLL, it seems most likely that the EU provision would leave to 
Member States the choice of identifying the mechanism governing the distribution of 
shortage449. 
 
To sum up, the practice of intermediated securities shows that it is rather difficult to 
accept McFarlane and Stevens’ idea that the tracing approach can easily be applied to 
financial markets.  On the contrary, it seems that the application of ‘any traditional 
principles of tracing in the case of investment securities may be […] practically 
                                                 
445 Regulation 12 has not yet been applied, since most of the cases (which were subject to the special 
administration regime) ended up involving primarily shortfalls in client money accounts (rather than in 
client securities’ accounts), Bloxham (January 2014, para. 2.15.1).  This rule, however, does not apply to 
shortfalls in client money accounts which continue to be allocated in accordance with general principles 
of trust law and to the client money regime as set out in CASS 7.  The FCA is now considering reviewing 
the client money distribution rules, FCA (July 2013, para. 2.1). 
446 There are, however, certain issues that are still outstanding and warrant consideration: for example, 
whether to (i) allow clients to obtain priority in cases of shortfall rather than classifying them as ordinary 
unsecured creditors; (ii) align treatment of client money and custody asset claims and (ii) consider the 
opportunity of applying special distribution rules (similar to the distribution scheme provided under SIPA 
and the US Bankruptcy Code) rather than dividing property on an issue-by-issue basis. 
447 The wording used to define this limitation suggests that 'the conflicting rule need not be a part of any 
insolvency law per se', Article 26 (2) of the Geneva Convention, Kanda et al. (2012, para. 26.11).  This 
means that the distribution rules used in an insolvency proceeding can be, for example, also the result of 
the application of general principles of property law (as in the case of banks under United States law), 
Mooney (2008, p. 55). 
448 Article 26 (2) of the Geneva Convention, Kanda et al., 2012, para. 26.11). 
449 Principle 10 European Commission (2010, para. 10.1).  According to the European Commission, ‘a 
harmonized loss sharing rule at EU level would impinge on rules of national insolvency law addressing 
the issue and potentially distort prioritization of account holders’ and security providers’ interests.  
Therefore, the envisaged principle only proposes that the national law should contain a clear and 
predictable solution, leaving the details and mechanisms of such solution to national policy’, Ibid., para. 
10.2.  See also European Commission (2011, para. 3.10.1.3). 
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impossible’450.  In addition to these practical difficulties, the pro rata sharing solution 
seems to be the closest one can get to expressing the probable intent of the parties, 
given that investors are generally more willing to share the risk of shortfall with the 
other account holders, rather than having to accept the formidable risk of bearing the 
entire burden of a potential loss451. 
 
Although SAR has significantly improved the legal framework in cases of shortfalls, 
there are certain issues that are still outstanding and warrant consideration: for example, 
whether to: (i) align treatment of client money and custody asset claims (which means 
extending Regulation 12 to client money) and (ii) consider the opportunity of applying 
the pro-rata sharing rule to all customers’ assets452 rather than dividing property on an 
issue-by-issue basis (along the lines of US law)453.  
 
5. Summary of the analysis 
 
The chapter tries to ascertain which method may best be used when distributing losses 
between account holders in omnibus accounts.  The choice is concentrated primarily 
between the tracing approach and the pro-rata sharing solution.  The main difference 
between these two options is that in the first case losses are shared merely among those 
investors who were account holders at the time of the shortfall, while in the second they 
are distributed pro-rata, regardless of the precise time when the account holders 
deposited the securities in the trust fund. 
 
None of the three theories related to the nature of the investor’s right helps us 
determine the most appropriate solution in cases involving intermediated securities. In 
principle, all three theories are applicable, given that the conceptual differences between 
a right against a right, an interest in securities and an indirect right in rem are irrelevant 
when choosing between the pro-rata sharing solution and the tracing approach.  For 
example, one could say that A and B bear the risk of loss in an omnibus account, 
regardless of the proprietary or sui generis character of their respective rights. 
                                                 
450 Schroeder (1994, p. 332). 
451 This point was raised by Guy Morton during the conference on ‘Intermediated Securities and Investor 
Rights’ held at the LSE on March 24th 2014.  
452 This solution would be in line with the distribution scheme adopted in the US Securities Investor 
Protection Act (SIPA). 
453 The author is deeply grateful to Joanna Benjamin for this suggestion. 
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However, the choice as to which of the different options concerning the allocation of 
shortfalls in an omnibus account would be most appropriate for use in the practice of 
intermediated securities still needs to be made. 
 
McFarlane and Stevens believe that the tracing approach should be regarded as the best 
solution to apply when distributing losses between account holders. This position, 
however, is debatable. 
 
More specifically from a theoretical prospective it is indeed true that the tracing 
approach should be preferred to the pro-rata sharing solution given that it attempts to 
truly safeguard the proprietary right of each investor by reflecting ‘the reality of what 
has occurred’454.  While the tracing approach allocates the risk of shortfall only to those 
account holders who have actually suffered economic losses, the pro-rata sharing 
solution extends such a risk to all account holders, assuming (on the basis of a legal 
fiction or a rule of convenience) that all securities have been registered simultaneously 
and prior to the occurrence of the shortfall. 
 
However, English and North American courts have shown that the pro-rata sharing 
solution should be applied in those cases where the tracing approach is considered 
‘inconvenient’ or ‘unworkable’. One of these cases may certainly include the practice of 
intermediated securities.  In this regard, the English Law Commission and the FMLC 
have often emphasised the difficulty of applying the tracing approach in an omnibus 
account given that in such circumstances it may be arduous for the parties to (i) 
establish the exact order in which each transaction occurred and therefore (ii) determine 
which account holder registered his/her securities prior to the occurrence of the 
shortfall.   Such a difficulty is likely to prevent investors from gaining immediate access 
to their securities, thereby increasing the risk of financial instability. 
 
The failure of Lehman Brothers and more importantly, its impact on the financial 
market confirmed these concerns and in the UK led to the introduction of Regulation 
12 SAR which states that losses in an omnibus account should be shared pro-rata ‘by all 
                                                 
454 English Law Commission (June 2006, para. 1.115). 
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clients for whom the intermediary holds the securities’455.  To a certain extent this 
provision brings English law in line with United States and Canadian law, which had 
already introduced a rule that favours the pro-rata sharing solution in the practice of 
intermediated securities. 
  
                                                 
455 Regulation 12 (2) SAR. 
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Chapter 5: The notion of control and the effects on third parties 
 
1. Perfection of a security interest over indirectly held securities: general 
considerations  
 
The following two chapters focus on the concept of control as a method of perfection 
of a security interest over indirectly held securities.  In particular, they evaluate the 
different ways in which control may be applied in practice, identifying its advantages and 
limitations as well as legal sensitivities in the context of financial markets.   Once again 
the overall objective is (i) to demonstrate which theory concerning the nature of the 
investor’s right can better define the exact meaning of control and (ii) to show whether 
the existing legal framework can meet the practical problems of intermediated securities. 
 
Before entering into a detailed discussion on the notion of control, an attempt to define 
what is intended by ‘perfection’ of a securities interest is warranted.    
 
The word ‘perfection’ has no defined statutory or judicial meaning under English law, as 
it was originally coined in Article 9 UCC456 and then gradually gained acceptance outside 
the United States.  However, the concept that lies behind the US terminology is not new 
to the English law of security and it refers to the various means by which a secured 
creditor can make its security interest effective against third parties457. 
 
In order to fulfil the perfection requirement, ‘the law usually458 requires […] the 
performance of some act which puts third parties on notice of the security interest’459.  
The rationale behind the need to ensure some form of public notice is that third parties 
                                                 
456 See § 9-308 to 9-316 UCC. 
457 Perfection is not a condition of validity of the security interest, but it is essentially designed to ensure 
that third parties are given notice of the existence of encumbrances on assets.  As a result, ‘perfection’ of 
a security interest is different from ‘attachment’ (another expression introduced by Article 9 UCC).  
‘Attachment’ indicates the creation of a security interest between debtor and creditor and it ensures that 
the security interest fastens (i.e. attaches) onto the asset so as to give the creditor rights in rem against the 
debtor himself.  This means that attachment refers to the validity of the security interest and its effects are 
strictly confined to the parties who take part in the security agreement, i.e. debtor and creditor.  See Beale 
et al. (2012, paras. 7.01-7.30); Gullifer and Goode (2013, paras. 2-01 – 2-02 / 2-16 – 2-33) and 
McKendrick and Goode (2009, pp. 689-719).  
458 There are, however, instances of ‘automatic perfection’ where mere attachment is sufficient. For an 
analysis see, among others, Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 2-19). 
459 McKendrick and Goode (2009, p. 689). ‘This requirement of public notice can be called a perfection 
requirement’, Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 2-16). The term perfection was also used by the English 
Law Commission in its final report ‘to refer to any steps necessary to render a type of security effective in 
the debtor’s insolvency’, Law Commission (2005, para. 3.6). 
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are not necessarily in a position to acquire knowledge of the existence of a security 
interest, particularly in those situations where the debtor remains in possession of the 
asset, or where the asset is intangible460.  
 
The English law of security has traditionally relied on two methods of perfection: the 
taking of possession and registration.  The former is the oldest form of publicity for 
security interests and consists of granting possession of the collateral (i.e. the asset taken 
as a security) to the creditor.  With this method public notice is simply achieved when 
the debtors are out of possession, as this circumstance ‘puts anyone dealing with [them] 
on inquiry’ 461.  The second method was adopted in England in 1900 and has been 
applied to a considerable number of charges since then462.  It is considered a more 
efficient method of publicity and it is applicable to a broad range of charges where 
possession is simply impractical (e.g. charges on land, certain types of intangibles, ships 
and aircraft or floating charges).  It is achieved through registration of the security 
interest in the Company Charges Register (if the interest is created by companies) or 
under the Bills of Sale Act (if the interest is granted by individuals).  The main purpose 
of registration is to avoid the ‘false wealth picture’463 given in those circumstances, 
where there is no visible perception of the existence of charges on the debtor’s asset.464  
In other words, it fulfils the important function of providing credit information to 
interested parties.465  Such information is often used by rating agencies, such as Standard 
and Poor’s, to estimate the credit-worthiness of an individual or a company and hence 
to evaluate the ability of a potential borrower to repay a debt.  In this regard, a poor 
credit rating may reveal a high risk of defaulting on a loan, and consequently lead to 
high interest rates, or even to the decision by the potential lender not to extend such a 
loan.    
                                                 
460 McKendrick and Goode (2009, p. 690).  
461 Id. 
462 See Section 14 of the Companies Act 1900.  The duty to register individual security bills of sale has a 
longer history in English law.  In relation to charges created by a company, prior to 2013 registration was 
limited to certain categories of security interests.  As from 2013, (with minor exceptions) all charges 
created by companies are registrable under s. 859A of the Companies Act 2006.  
463 Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 2-20). 
464 Therefore, the duty to register can be described as reflecting ‘the law’s dislike of the secret security 
interest, which leaves the debtor’s property apparently unencumbered,’ Goode (2009, para. 11.121). See 
also Bridge (2008, p.180) and Simpson and Dahan (2005, p. 3). 
465 A few years ago the registration system was subject to some criticism in England, being described as 
unnecessarily complex and restricted only to a limited number of charges.  See Bridge (2008, pp. 180 - 
181); Id. (2006, p. 268); Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 2-19); Beale (2004, p. 117); McKnight (2006, p. 
587).  As mentioned earlier, in 2013 a new regime was introduced. One of the major changes was to 
extend registration to all charges created by companies. See on this point, among others, Gullifer and 
Goode (2013, para. 2-18). 
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Under English law, transfer of control was recently recognised, for certain forms of 
intangible property (including indirectly held securities), as a third method of perfection.  
In particular, under Regulation 3 of the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) 
Regulations (FCAR), transposing Article 2(2) of the FCD466, a secured creditor who has 
‘possession or control’ over financial collateral is exempted from any registration 
requirement.467  
 
The idea of control as a means of perfection was first introduced in Article 9 UCC (in 
connection with the 1994 revision to Article 8 UCC regarding investment property) and 
was subsequently also adopted outside the United States in an attempt to make the 
existing legal framework more responsive to financial market needs. 
 
The main purpose of the ‘control’ concept is to reduce costs and prevent delays when 
transferring investment securities.468  Practitioners generally show a great reluctance to 
register charges, as ‘the paperwork involves an administrative burden that may be 
impracticable where collateral is turned over rapidly.’469 
 
                                                 
466 In June 2009, the EC Directive 2009/44 ‘amending Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in 
payment and securities settlement systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements 
as regards linked systems and credit claims’ was officially published in the EU Official Journal (‘EC 
Directive 2009/44’).  With respect to financial collateral arrangements the objective was to expand the 
number of financial claims which can be collateralised.  The main amendment to the FCD is the inclusion 
of credit claims eligible for the collateralisation of central bank credit operations, which are defined as 
‘pecuniary claims arising out of an agreement whereby a credit institution […] grants credit in the form of 
a loan.’  For the purposes of the EC Directive 2009/44, the 2010 Financial Markets and Insolvency 
(Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations 2010 No. 2993 has 
recently amended the FCAR. 
467 One of the main purposes of the FCD and implementing regulations is to remove the formal 
requirements (other than the need for ‘writing’ and the transfer of ‘possession or control’) in ‘the creation, 
validity, perfection, enforceability or admissibility in evidence of a financial collateral arrangement’ (Article 
3.1 FCD).  In other words, a financial collateral arrangement should not be made ‘dependent on the 
performance of any formal act’ (Article 3.1 FCD), which may impede the rapid dealing required by the 
international financial market. However, the Directive must also ‘provide a balance between market 
efficiency and the safety of the parties to the arrangement and third parties, thereby avoiding inter alia the 
risk of fraud’ (Recital 10 FCD).  This balance is achieved by requiring that (i) the financial collateral 
arrangement is evidenced in ‘writing or in a legally equivalent manner’ (Article 3.2 FCD) and (ii) the 
financial collateral is ‘in the possession or under the control of the collateral taker or of a person acting on 
the collateral taker’s behalf’ (Article 2.2 FCD). See on this legal issue also Regulations 3 and 4 of the 
FCAR. 
468 See Recitals 3, 9 and 10 of the FCD.  
469 Benjamin (2000, p. 107). 
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One way to think of control is to regard it as the ‘intangible’s equivalent to possession 
of tangibles.’470  The general rule is that a security interest in intangibles cannot be 
perfected by possession when ‘there is no indispensable res to be possessed (like a 
negotiable instrument).’471 Nevertheless, ‘some of these intangibles interests can be put 
under the control of a secured creditor to the exclusion of others, and this will put third 
parties on notice.’472  This means that for certain forms of intangible property the 
registration requirement (as a substitute to possession) may be deemed unnecessary as 
control seems to provide sufficient notice of the security interest to third parties473.  This 
formulation raises four specific questions: (i) what is the precise meaning of control? (ii) 
is it consistent with the ideas of a right against a right, of an interest in securities and of 
an indirect right in rem? (iii) does the FCD or the FCAR provide a clear definition of this 
new concept? (iv) does control cover floating charges and, if so, to what extent?  
 
2. The compound meaning of control  
 
There have been different definitions of the notion of control, which do not always 
seem to be mutually consistent (or at least not at first glance).   
 
A first attempt to define control was made by the FMLC in its Commentary on 
Principles for Investment Securities Statute in 2004.  According to the FMLC, control 
may be positive or negative:  ‘a person has positive control over assets where they are 
able to dispose of them’,474 alternatively or cumulatively,475 ‘a person has negative 
control over assets where they are able to block any other person from disposing of 
them.’476  In other words, ‘positive control’ is the ability of the secured party to have the 
assets sold or transferred without any further involvement of the debtor; while ‘negative 
                                                 
470 White and Summers (2000, p. 775). See also Bridge (2006, p. 268) who states that control should be ‘to 
certain forms of intangibles property what possession is to tangible property.’  But see also Official 
Comment, § 8-106 UCC para. 7, which clarifies that the UCC concept of control has a special meaning 
when applied to investment property, that is not equivalent to possession.  See text to nn. 589 and 590 in 
ch. 6.  
471 White and Summers (2000, p. 775). 
472 Id. 
473 The general policy behind this rule is clearly stated by the English Law Commission when it argues that 
‘registration should not be necessary in order to perfect a [security interest] if its existence should be 
sufficiently evident to third parties’, English Law Commission (2004, para. 2.150).   See also Gullifer and 
Goode (2013, para. 2-19). 
474 Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 6(b) in FMLC (July 2004).  For a 
definition of the two types of control, see also English Law Commission (2005, paras 5.46 – 5.50).  
475 See English Law Commission (2004, para. 4.24). 
476 Id. 
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control’ is the ability of the secured party to prevent the debtor from dealing with those 
assets. 
 
More recently, the FMLC proposed another definition of control that seems to differ 
from the first477.  In its Report Issue 87 – Control – Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd which was 
published in December 2010, the FMLC argues that the concept of control may include 
two forms: negative and practical (de facto) control478.  Negative control is achieved by 
way of a contractual agreement between the secured party and the debtor and it 
prevents the debtor from disposing of the collateral without the consent of the secured 
party.  Practical (de facto) control is ‘the ability of the [secured party] to prevent any 
dealing with the collateral by the [debtor], whether or not in doing so it would be in 
breach of its contractual obligations to the debtor’479.  
 
A more in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the concept of control is provided by 
Benjamin and Beale when they argue that it is possible to identify different types of 
control according to two main sets of distinctions480.  Firstly, control may be either 
positive or negative.  Consistent with the interpretation provided by the FMLC in July 
2004, ‘positive control is the ability to remove an asset from the collateral pool and 
negative control is the ability to prevent an asset from being so removed’481.  Secondly, 
‘either positive or negative control may be legal (i.e., the right to remove or prevent 
removal as the case may be) or operational (i.e., the practical ability to remove or 
prevent removal, by account entry or otherwise).’482  This second distinction is only 
partially detected in the FMLC’s reports of 2004483 and 2010484.  According to Benjamin 
                                                 
477 However, see also n. 483 of this chapter. 
478 FMLC (December 2010, paras 6.8 – 6.11) and Id. (April 2011).  See also CLLS - Financial Law 
Committee (October 2010); Parsons (2011, p. 6) and Parsons and Dening (2011, p. 168). 
479 FMLC (December 2010, para. 6.10).  
480 Benjamin (2007, para. 20.117 - n. 192) and Id. (2009, pp. 258 – 259).  On this point see also Beale et al. 
(2012, paras 10.24 – 10-40) and Zacaroli (2010, p. 184.   
481 Benjamin (2007, para. 20.117 - n. 192). 
482 Id. 
483 The distinction between operational and legal control is to be found under Principle 6(b) of the 
FMLC’s Investment Securities Statute, while the difference between negative and positive control is 
explained in the Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 6(b) in FMLC (July 2004).  
Despite these two separate distinctions, the report fails to draw a convincingly comprehensive outline as 
to how the classification operates between these two main sets of distinctions. 
484 FMLC (December 2010, para. 6.10).  As mentioned above, in its recent report the FMLC argues that 
the concept of control may include two forms: negative and practical (de facto) control.  A careful analysis 
of this interpretation shows that it includes Benjamin’s distinction between legal and operational control, 
but not the distinction between negative and positive control.  In other words, in this report the FMLC 
only takes into consideration negative (and not positive) control and it argues that negative control can be 
legal (i.e. the contractual right to prevent the debtor from disposing of the collateral) and/or practical (i.e. 
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and Beale, legal control is the ‘right’ of the secured party to dispose (positive control) or 
to prevent disposal (negative control) of the collateral and is achieved by way of a 
contractual agreement between the debtor and the secured creditor.  Alternatively or 
cumulatively, operational control is the ‘practical ability’ of the secured party to ‘control’ 
the delivery of the assets.  This situation typically occurs when the debtor and the 
secured creditor agree to transfer the collateral into the account of the secured party 
(rather than leaving the securities credited in the debtor’s account)485.  By doing so, the 
secured party is in a practical (de facto) position to either dispose of the securities 
(positive control) or prevent any other person from dealing with those assets (negative 
control).  Operational or practical control may be acquired by the secured party, despite 
the concomitant existence of a legal control over the collateral.  This means that the 
secured party may have a practical ability to ‘remove or prevent removal’486 of the 
collateral from the account, ‘whether or not in doing so it would be in breach of its 
contractual obligations to the debtor’487.  
 
Benjamin and Beale’s interpretation of the notion of control shows that in the practice 
of indirectly held securities it is possible to identify multiple forms of control, whose 
content is liable to change significantly according to the circumstances.  This new idea 
of control is not in contrast with the two interpretations provided by the FMLC.  On 
                                                                                                                                          
the de facto ability of the secured party to prevent any dealing with the collateral by the debtor). The reason 
for leaving out ‘positive control’ is that the FMLC’s report of December 2010 envisages only the types of 
control that fall within the protections afforded to security over financial collateral by the FCD.  As 
demonstrated in section 3 of this chapter, the test of control for the purposes of the FCD is only negative 
control (as positive control is insufficient).  These considerations were elaborated by the author following 
a meeting in October 2011 with Habit Motani (Partner at Clifford Chance and member of the FMLC 
Working Group for the Report Issue 87 on Control) and Emma Chell (Senior Associate PLS at Clifford 
Chance). 
485 One could argue that in the practice of indirectly held securities, the position of the intermediary is the 
closest one could get to de facto control.  Indeed, one of the key features of a system of indirectly held 
securities is that the party maintaining the account is considered the gatekeeper to the asset in the account: 
‘not only does it keep track of what comes in and goes out, but it is in the position to control such 
movements for the benefit of other parties interested in the account’, Thévenoz (2008, p. 443).  However, 
the focus in this chapter is to evaluate the transfer of control as a method of perfection of a security 
agreement over indirectly held securities, involving exclusively the relationship between the account 
holder/debtor and the creditor.  In other words, the main function of this study is to consider whether 
and to what extent the secured creditor is able to exclude the debtor from using and enjoying the 
collateral (notwithstanding the position of the debtor’s account provider in relation to the collateral).  For 
the purpose of this study, the position of the intermediary is relevant only to the extent that the secured 
creditor is the debtor’s intermediary.  In this case, the collateral is credited to the intermediary’s own 
account at a different higher level in the holding chain, or alternatively remains credited to the debtor’s 
account.  See on this point also FMLC (July 2010, para 6.6) and Zacaroli (2010, p. 184). 
486 Benjamin (2007, para. 20.117 - n. 192).  See also Beale et al. (2012, paras 10.18 – 10-35) and Gullifer 
and Goode (2013, paras. 4–22 and 6-32). 
487 FMLC (December 2010, para. 6.10).  In other words, in this case there is a need to obtain some form 
of action by the creditor in order to remove the collateral from the account (notwithstanding the debtor’s 
contractual right to dispose of the collateral). 
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the contrary, it includes them both by classifying the different forms of control 
according to two main sets of distinctions: control may be positive and/or negative as 
well as operational and/or legal.  This means that (consistent with the concept of 
property) the notion of control is composed of ‘building bricks, which can be used and 
put together in different ways’488.   
 
The classification suggested by Benjamin and Beale confirms that there is no absolute or 
single definition of control because this concept comprises different features that can be 
combined in a number of ways depending on the intention of the parties.  Indeed, a 
closer look at the practice of indirectly held securities shows that parties may choose 
from at least seven different combinations489. 
 
Practical, legal, negative and positive control 
 
The first combination comprises all four types of control, i.e. legal and practical control 
as well as positive and negative.  This particular situation is the ‘safest’ way of creating a 
security interest over the collateral and it consist both of (i) transferring the securities 
into an account ‘controlled’ by the secured creditor490 as well as (ii) conferring to such 
party the contractual right to dispose, and to prevent any other person from disposing, 
of the collateral. 
 
Practical, negative and positive control 
 
The second combination is acquired when the collateral is transferred into the creditor’s 
account but the debtor maintains the right to remove the collateral at any time prior to 
enforcement491.  In this case, the creditor is in a ‘de facto’ (but not legal) position to both 
sell or transfer the collateral and prevent the debtor from exercising his/her contractual 
rights over the collateral.  
                                                 
488 The expression was originally coined with regard to the traditional proprietary rights of enjoyment, 
alienation and possession. In other words, it referred to the ‘bundle of rights’ that may be exercised by the 
rightful owner or possessor with respect to a ‘thing’.  On this point see Bell (1989, p. 5).  As mentioned in 
the introduction of this thesis, by using this expression the main objective was to highlight that the same 
bundle of rights is not necessarily attached to all forms of property.  This ‘flexible’ idea of property can also 
be detected when analysing the concept of control.      
489 The author is grateful to Habit Motani and Emma Chell for describing these different combinations. 
490 Even though it can be considered the ‘safest’ way of creating a security interest, in practice this 
combination is likely to be preferred for full-title transactions. 
491 See the case Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd Re F2G Realisations Ltd (in Liquidation) [2010] EWHC 1772 (Ch). 
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Practical, legal and positive control 
 
The third combination comprises three types of control, i.e. practical, legal and positive.  
In practice, this means that the collateral is transferred to the account of the secured 
party who has also acquired a contractual right to sell or transfer these assets without 
further consent from the debtor. 
 
Practical, legal and negative control 
 
Consistent with the third combination, in this fourth case the secured party enjoys both 
practical and legal control.  The main difference between these two combinations is that 
in the latter case, unlike in the former, the secured party has a contractual right to 
prevent the debtor from dealing with the charged assets (negative control) rather than a 
right to dispose of the collateral (positive control). 
 
Legal and positive control 
Legal and negative control 
Legal, positive and negative control 
 
Each of the last three combinations is characterised by leaving the collateral credited on 
the debtor’s account.  Thus, in these cases the secured party only remains in a legal 
position (and not a practical one) to either dispose of the collateral (‘legal and positive 
control’), prevent others from disposing of such assets (‘legal and negative control’) or 
both options (‘legal, positive and negative’). 
 
The number of these different forms of control is increased even further owing to the 
existence of multiple degrees of legal control, whether positive or negative. For example, 
in cases of negative control, the debtor may undergo an absolute preclusion from 
dealing with the collateral or, alternatively, be restricted to exercising only limited rights 
(such as the right of substitution or to withdraw excess financial collateral492).  Similarly, 
                                                 
492 See text to nn. 500 – 502 in this chapter. 
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in cases of positive control the secured creditor may obtain either unlimited or more 
restricted rights to sell or transfer the collateral493.   
 
These examples provide further evidence of the compound nature of control, in terms 
of the creditor’s ability to exclude others from using and enjoying the collateral.  A 
careful analysis of the functioning of this new concept has shown that it is generally 
possible to identify multiple forms of control, where the content varies according to the 
intention of the parties.  Hence, one of the main issues is to establish which of these 
forms of control can be envisaged under the different theories describing the nature of 
the investor’s right.  
 
3. The theories of a right against a right, of an interest in securities and of an 
indirect right in rem in the context of financial collateral arrangements 
 
McFarlane and Stevens describe the right of a secured creditor over indirectly held 
securities as a persistent right rather than a proprietary right.  This means, for example, 
that if A grants a security interest to B over 10,000 shares which are credited to an 
account held by T for A, B acquires a right against A’s right, against T’s right in the 
10,000 shares.  Consistent with this reasoning, B’s security interest can be considered 
perfected only in those circumstances where B obtains control over the collateral (i.e. 
over A’s right against T’s right in the 10,000 shares).   
 
The same argument can be used with regard to the theory of an interest in securities.  
Hence, nothing prevents us from stating that a security interest over a sub-property can 
be perfected by way of control. 
 
A more challenging task seems to be that of adapting the notion of control to the 
concept of an indirect right in rem.  The core idea lying behind this concept is that it 
creates multiple proprietary rights over the underlying securities, rather than interests 
over separate assets.  If one were to accept this theory, then each person standing in the 
holding chain of intermediaries would be entitled to acquire control over the underlying 
                                                 
493 Moreover, in the case of negative control the debtor’s right of disposal may be subject to either prior 
authorisation by the creditor for each transaction or, alternatively, to a general authorisation released at 
the time of creating a security interest. 
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securities.  This means that the same asset cannot only be managed494 but can also be 
controlled by multiple parties at the same time.   
 
Such a description of an indirect holding system raises certain reservations, given that 
the notion of control implicates (at least in its most restrictive forms) the ability to 
preclude others from disposing of the asset.  Hence, with this notion in mind, it would 
be rather difficult to picture the underlying securities as being separately and 
simultaneously controlled by different parties495.  
 
Conversely, the theories of a right against a right and of an interest in securities can be 
easily accommodated to the practice of intermediated securities, as in both cases the 
account holder standing, for example, at the bottom of the chain acquires control over 
‘something’ which is legally distinct from underlying securities.   
 
The outstanding question is whether these two theories can also help us to understand 
more fully what exactly is meant by control: is it positive and/or negative, legal and/or 
practical?  The answer to this question is that all the different forms of control 
(suggested in the previous section) can be potentially adjusted to the theories of a right 
against a right and of an interest in securities.  This means that such theories do not 
seem to add significant value to the debate, the main difference being simply that of 
using a different ‘label’ to classify the right acquired by the secured creditor over the 
collateral.  Hence, once could argue that B’s right against A’s right or B’s interest in a 
sub-property can be perfected by way of control, without this statement offering any 
indication of the precise meaning of control496.   
 
The next step in this discussion is to determine whether the FCD casts any light on this 
matter, by identifying the different forms of control that can be applied in the practice 
of intermediated securities.  Although McFarlane and Stevens do not believe that new 
provisions should be introduced on the notion of control, it may be demonstrated that 
                                                 
494 See text to nn. 196 and 197 in ch. 2. 
495 The only way to explain this complex structure would be to describe the underlying securities as if they 
had been replicated onto the account at each level of the holding chain of intermediaries. 
496 For example, it is possible to have a combination of legal and negative control in those circumstances 
where B is in a legal position to prevent A’s right of disposal (regardless of whether the collateral is 
classified as a sub-property or as A’s right against T’s right in the 10,000 shares). 
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(due to the vague wording of the FCD) a statutory clarification is indeed a necessary 
requirement. 
 
4. The uneasy case for understanding the meaning of ‘control’ under the FCD 
and the FCAR 
 
Neither the FCD nor the FCAR defines exactly what constitutes ‘control’ and this 
uncertainty leaves ample room for debate.497 
 
In the 2005 Report on Company Security Interest, the scope and the meaning of control 
were analysed in detail by the Law Commission, although no ultimate definition was 
recommended.498  
 
Initially, the debate was focused primarily on the first set of distinctions suggested by 
Benjamin and Beale, in an attempt to understand whether EU law contemplates 
negative control, positive control or both. 
 
The wording seems to suggest that ‘negative control’ alone is probably sufficient to 
satisfy the perfection requirement, while ‘positive control’ alone is not.499  This 
interpretation relies on paragraph 10 in the Preamble to the FCD, which states that the 
directive covers ‘only those financial collateral arrangements, which provide for some 
form of dispossession’  
 
The rationale behind the dispossession requirement is to prevent the debtor from 
having control of the assets and hence from transferring or delivering them to third 
                                                 
497 The literature on the meaning of control under the FCD has been quite productive.  For an analysis 
see, for example, Goldsworthy (2013, p. 71); Chell et al. (2013, p. 43); Saoul (2013, p.143); Gullifer, p. 
377); Turing (2005, p. 4); McCormick (2006, p. 263); Fawcett (2005, p. 295); Beale (2004, p. 117). 
498 English Law Commission, (2005, para. 5.44).  The English Law Commission came to the conclusion 
that it could not define control for the purpose of the FCD as its meaning was far from clear in the 
Directive.  ‘We think it is in general very important that domestic measures implementing European 
legislation should give the parties clear guidance as to what is required.  However, a correct interpretation 
of the FCD is rather hazardous due to its particularly unclear wording.  We have argued that a party who 
has not prevented the debtor from dealing with the securities does not have ‘possession or control’ within 
the meaning of the Directive, but we reached this conclusion only by interpreting the relevant articles of 
the Directive in the light of the recitals,’ English Law Commission (2005, para. 5.60). Cfr. English Law 
Commission (2004, para. 4.29). 
499 See on this point English Law Commission (2005, paras 5.46 – 5.50); Beale et al. (2012, para. 10-30) 
and Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6-35). 
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parties.  If the debtor retains the ability to deal with the financial collateral, it cannot be 
considered as dispossessed.500 
 
The last sentence of Article 2(2) of the FCD seems to confirm this analysis when it 
specifies that any right of the debtor to substitute equivalent financial collateral or 
withdraw excess financial collateral shall not prevent the secured creditor from being in 
possession or having control of the assets.501  If the intention under the FCD were to 
contemplate the possibility of the debtor’s disposing of the collateral this provision 
would be unnecessary, as the right of substitution or to withdraw excess financial 
collateral should be included in the debtor’s retention of the right to trade the financial 
collateral.  Thus, the clarification under Article 2(2) would be superfluous for cases in 
which the debtor had such a power and ‘one would expect there to be some reference 
to that, but there is none.’502 
 
This interpretation seems to suggest that the test of ‘possession’ or ‘control’ of the 
secured creditor under Article 2(2) of the FCD is satisfied only in those circumstances 
where the debtor is deprived of the ability to dispose of the financial collateral.  This 
situation occurs when the secured creditor has either negative control alone, or both 
negative and positive control, but it does not allow for what the Law Commission calls 
‘positive control without negative control’503. 
 
There is another provision in the FCD that is often mentioned to confirm this 
approach, i.e. the provision on enforcement.  Under Article 4 of the FCD, in the event 
of default the creditor has the right to appropriate the collateral as a means of 
discharging the obligations of the debtor without the need to obtain a court order 
                                                 
500 Paragraph 10 in the Preamble is far from clear when it uses the expression ‘the provision of the 
financial collateral’ to explain the form of dispossession required under the FCD.  What does ‘provision’ 
mean?  In order to understand this concept, the wording of paragraph 10 in the Preamble has to be 
interpreted in line with paragraph 9 in the Preamble and Article 2(2), which states that a financial 
collateral arrangement is considered to be ‘provided’ when the financial collateral is ‘delivered, transferred, 
held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession or under the control of the collateral 
taker.’  This means that in order for the financial collateral to be in the ‘possession or control’ of the 
secured creditor, the debtor must be prevented from dealing with the collateral.  On this point, see Reg. 4 
(2) FMIR, English Law Commission (2005, paras 5.52 – 5.54); Gullifer and Goode (2013), para. 6-35).  
501 See also Reg. 3 FCAR.  However, Reg. 4 (2) FMIR replaces the expression ‘equivalent financial 
collateral’ with ‘financial collateral of the same or greater value’. 
502 English Law Commission (2005, para 5.54 - n. 66).  
503 Ibid., para 5.50.  
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(which is, instead, required in the case of foreclosure).504  However, appropriation by the 
creditor is possible only if the parties had previously agreed to this as part of their 
security financial collateral arrangement.505  Similarly, the wording of Article 4(1) of the 
FCD contemplates that parties may agree to limit the power of sale by deciding, for 
instance, that a judicial order is required to sell the collateral.506  This means that for the 
purpose of the FCD a security interest is effective against third parties (i.e. perfected by 
way of control) even in those circumstances where there is no power to appropriate the 
collateral or where there is only a restricted power of sale.  Having said that, the lack of 
any power to appropriate, or any restrictions on the sale in the agreement, seem to be 
inconsistent with the concept of ‘positive control’, which, on the contrary, requires the 
secured party to have the ability to sell or transfer the collateral without the debtor’s 
concurrence or ability to take any action.  Accordingly, it could be argued that ‘positive 
control’ is not sufficient to perfect a security interest and that ‘negative control’ alone is 
sufficient to satisfy the test of ‘possession or control’ required under Article 2(2) of the 
FCD. 507  
 
The approach that appears to be adopted by the FCD is not in line with the US law 
where, under revised Article 8 UCC, ‘positive control’ alone may be sufficient to perfect 
a security interest.  In Comment 7 to § 8-106 UCC, the Drafting Committee for the 
revision to Article 8 argues that the key to the control concept is the ability of the 
purchaser or the secured creditor to have the securities sold or transferred without 
                                                 
504 Art. 4 (1) FCD and Reg. 17 FCAR.  See also Reg. 4 (15) of the 2010 Financial Markets and Insolvency 
(Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations (‘FMIR’). 
505 Art. 4 (2) FCD.   
506 Art. 4 (1) FCD states that: ‘Member States shall ensure that on the occurrence of an enforcement 
event, the collateral taker shall be able to realise in the following manners, any financial collateral provided 
under, and subject to the terms agreed [emphasis added], in a security collateral arrangement: (a) financial 
instruments by sale or appropriation and by setting off their value against, or applying their value in 
discharge of, the relevant financial obligations and (b) […].’  The italicised words suggest that the right to 
realise the financial collateral is subject to the terms agreed upon by the parties in the financial collateral 
arrangement.  Therefore, nothing would prevent the debtor and the creditor from deciding to restrict 
such a right: they may decide to limit the secured party’s power of sale, so that, for instance, a court order 
is required.  On this point see Beale et al. (2012, para. 10-31).  See also English Law Commission (2005, 
para. 5.55 -n. 71).  Reg. 17 FCAR (which implements Art. 4 (1) FCD) was recently amended by Reg. 4 
(15) FMIR.  For an analysis of these amendments see Lomnicka (2012 b, paras. 18.27 - 18.32) 
For an analysis of Regulation 17 FCAR which  
507 There are, moreover, other indications that seem to confirm this orientation. According to Article 2(2) 
FCD and Regulation 3 FCAR, the existence of a right to substitute in favour of the debtor does not 
prevent the financial collateral from being under the control of the creditor; indeed, this specification 
‘would not be necessary if "negative control" was not required’ under the EU legislation, Gullifer and 
Goode (2013, para. 6-35 n. 243).  See also English Law Commission (2005, paras. 5.54 - n. 66 and 5.55 - 
n.71). 
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further action by the owner.508  In particular, under certain circumstances there is no 
requirement that the powers held by the purchaser or the secured creditor be exclusive, 
as the owner may have concomitant rights to substitute, to receive dividends and 
distributions as well as to trade those securities.509   
 
This form of control may occur (i) in the case of uncertificated securities when the 
issuer has agreed that it will comply with the instructions originally stipulated by the 
secured creditor without further consent by the registered owner (§ 8-106 (c) (2) UCC) 
and (ii) in the case of book-entry securities, when the debtor remains the entitlement 
holder and the securities intermediary has agreed to comply with the entitlement orders 
originated by the secured creditor without further consent by the entitlement holder (§ 
8-106 (d) (2) UCC).  In both cases, under §8-106 (f) UCC the concept of control is not 
vitiated merely because the parties have agreed that the registered owner or the 
entitlement holder can continue to give instructions to the issuer or securities 
intermediary or otherwise deal with the securities.510  
 
This means that the UCC concept of control has a specific meaning when applied to 
investment property and that it cannot be considered in toto as a true equivalent of 
possession.511  Comment 7 to § 8-106 UCC states that: 
 
 ‘The term control is used in a particular defined sense.  […] The concept is not 
 to be interpreted by reference to similar concepts in other bodies of law.  In 
 particular, the requirements of ‘possession’ derived from the common law of 
 pledge are not to be used as a basis for interpreting subsection (c) (2) or (d) (2).  
                                                 
508 Official Comment, § 8-106 UCC para. 7.  
509 § 8-106 (f) UCC. 
510 Wood (2007, para. 36-018).  On this point, see also Harris and Mooney (2011, p. 435).  In accordance 
with Comment 5 to § 8-106 UCC ‘[f]or a purchaser [or a secured creditor] to have control under section 
(c) (2) or (d) (2), it is essential that the issuer or securities intermediary, as the case be, actually be a party 
to the agreement.  If a debtor gives a secured party a power of attorney authorizing the secured party to 
act in the name of the debtor, but the issuer or securities intermediary does not specifically agree to this 
arrangement, the secured party does not have ‘control’ within the meaning of subsection (c) (2) or (d) (2) 
because the issuer or securities intermediary is not a party to the agreement.' 
511 On the contrary, the right of a secured creditor to give instructions can be considered as exclusive (i) in 
the case of a certificated security in bearer form when the certificated security is delivered to the secured 
creditor (§ 8-106 (a) UCC); (ii) in the case of a certificated security in registered form when the certificate 
is endorsed to the secured creditor or in blank by an effective endorsement (§ 8-106 (b) (1) UCC) or when 
the certificate is registered in the name of the secured creditor (§ 8-106 (b) (2) UCC); (iii) in the case of an 
uncertificated security when the secured creditor becomes the registered holder (§ 8-106 (c) (1) UCC); and 
(iv) in the case of book-entry securities when the secured creditor becomes the entitlement holder (§ 8-
106 (d) (1) UCC). 
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Those provisions are designed to supplant the concepts of ‘constructive possession’ and 
the like.’512 
 
However, although the Drafting Committee clarifies that this ‘new’ concept of control is 
intended to satisfy the needs of modern securities holding practices,513 it can still be 
argued that if the debtor retains complete freedom to deal with the collateral, the 
protection of the secured creditor will be significantly reduced, posing the risk of 
jeopardising the main purpose of a secured transaction.514  This may be avoided only in 
those circumstances where the debtor delivers assets of equivalent market value or, 
alternatively, provides some other form of adequate protection against credit risk 
exposure. 
 
Unlike Article 8 UCC, the FCD does not provide a precise definition of what amounts 
to ‘control’, although the leading opinion among UK academics and practitioners is to 
interpret the wording of the directive in the negative (rather than positive) sense.   
 
With respect to the second set of distinctions suggested by Benjamin and Beale, the 
FCD does not provide clear answers as to whether it includes situations of practical 
control and/or legal control.  The wording in the directive suggests that a combination 
of ‘legal control’ and ‘practical control’ can indeed satisfy the perfection requirement, 
while ‘practical control’ alone is not sufficient.  This interpretation relies on Article 2(2) 
of the FCD which prevents the debtor from retaining a right [emphasis added] to trade 
the charged assets (with the exception of a right of substitution or withdrawal of excess 
collateral).  Such a limitation on the debtor’s right [emphasis added] to dispose of the 
asset is inconsistent with a scenario where the collateral is transferred into the creditor’s 
                                                 
512 Comment 7 to § 8-106 UCC. 
513 Id. 
514 In the consultation paper, the English Law Commission evaluates § 8-106 (f) UCC and explains its 
initial doubts on this provision: ‘[w]hen we first learned of this provision of the UCC, we were worried by 
it.  We could envisage a scheme that allowed the debtor to substitute other investment securities for those 
originally subject to the [security interest]; but if the debtor retained complete freedom to deal with the 
entitlement, what security would the secured party have? […] After informal consultation we have realised 
that this was a misconception.  We had been thinking in terms of the old, fixed security: the debtor’s 
freedom to trade in the securities would indeed be inconsistent with that. However, the floating charge 
allows a debtor to dispose of assets subject to the charge so long as the charge has not crystallised (and, 
depending on the terms of the charge, there is no guarantee that the proceeds of such activities will fall 
within the charge). Thus there is nothing incompatible between allowing the debtor to deal with the 
entitlement and having a [security interest], though obviously it will provide the secured party with less 
certain security than if it can prevent the debtor dealing.’ See English Law Commission (2004, paras 4.62 
– 4.65).   
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account but the debtor retains the right [emphasis added] to remove the collateral at any 
time prior to enforcement (i.e. practical control without legal control)515.   
 
The argument that practical control alone is not sufficient to satisfy the perfection 
requirements under the FCD has been criticised by the FMLC.  In the Report of 
December 2010, the FMLC argues that security arrangements can be perfected either by 
way of legal or of practical (de facto) control516.  The inclusion of practical control as a 
means of perfection of a security interest is based on the policy considerations that 
underlie the directive.  In particular, paragraph 10 in the Preamble to the FCD refers to 
‘a balance between market efficiency and the safety of the parties to the arrangement 
and third parties, thereby avoiding inter alia the risk of fraud’517.  According to the 
FMLC, this balance can be achieved when the secured creditor has practical control as 
‘the physical holding of the securities would prevent any dealing by the [debtor] without 
the co-operation of the [secured creditor] and would be sufficient to prevent the 
[debtor] giving an appearance of false wealth’518.  However, setting aside these policy 
issues, little consideration is given to the wording of Article 2(2) of the FCD that 
prevents the debtor from retaining a general right [emphasis added] to trade the charged 
assets.  Indeed, in contrast with the FMLC’s argument, this specification under Article 
2(2) of the FCD is inconsistent with a scenario where the creditor has practical (but not 
legal) control. 
 
A more difficult aspect to establish is whether legal control alone can be considered 
sufficient to satisfy the perfection requirement.  There seem to be different views on 
this point, given that the wording of the FCD has proven to be somewhat vague and 
ambiguous.  In Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) Briggs J 
suggests that the minimum requirement for a secured creditor to reach control should 
be legal control alone, while practical control without legal control is not sufficient519. 
                                                 
515 Unlike the FCD, Article 8 UCC does include practical control alone.  See on this point Mooney and 
Harris (2011, p. 435): ‘…the fact that the secured party has control, and thus "the ability [emphasis added] 
to have the securities sold or transferred without further action by the transferor (UCC 8-106, Comment 
7)", does not necessarily mean that the secured party has the right [emphasis added], as against the debtor, 
to issue entitlement orders.  The circumstances under which a secured party enjoys the right to issue 
entitlement orders is determined by the agreement of the debtor and secured party.' 
516 FMLC (December 2010, paras 6.8 – 6.11).  See also Parsons and Dening (2011, p. 168) and CLLS - 
Financial Law Committee (October 2010, paras. 5.15 – 5.19). 
517 Recital 10 FCD. 
518 Parsons and Dening (2011, pp. 167-168) and FMLC (December 2010, paras 6.8 – 6.11). 
519 [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), paras. 131 and 136.  See, however, on this point English Law Commission 
(2005, para. 5.54) where the English Law Commission states: ‘[d]ispossession suggests that, for the 
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However, one question that remains unanswered is to what extent this form of control 
can ‘really be said to amount to dispossession’520 and therefore adequately protect the 
parties to the arrangements and third parties from the risk of fraud521 (as expressly 
required in paragraph 10 in the Preamble to the FCD).   
  
The uncertainties surrounding the notion of control under the FCD have remained even 
after its implementation through the FCAR in the United Kingdom.  In an attempt to 
‘underpin the FCAR’522, the English Law Commission analysed the scope and the 
meaning of ‘control’, but came to the conclusion that it was unable to define ‘control’, 
as the concept had to be interpreted in accordance with EU law and that the wording in 
the FCD was far from clear.523 
 
‘Our initial analysis’, writes the English Law Commission, ‘was that it was simply up to 
national law or the lex situs to define “control”, but we no longer think that is the case. 
We have to assume that the phrase has an “autonomous” meaning in European law - in 
other words, its meaning must depend on interpretation of the Directive and general 
principles accepted in Community law - and that national law must comply with that 
meaning.’524 
 
The lack of a clear definition of ‘control’ was one of the key points raised by the City of 
London Law Society Financial Law Committee in its response to the European 
Commission’s questionnaire evaluating the FCD.525  It was argued that without adequate 
assurance of what constitutes control within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the FCD, 
there is a risk that certain transactions may not be considered perfected for lack of 
sufficient control and hence may be void against an administrator or liquidator of the 
debtor or against a subsequent creditor.  This legal uncertainty can be considered as an 
                                                                                                                                          
collateral to be in the possession or control of the collateral taker, at least the collateral provider must be 
prevented (whether legally or [emphasis added] practically) from dealing with the collateral’.  
520 Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6–36). 
521 HM Treasury (August 2010, paras. 3.3).   
522 English Law Commission (2004, para. 2.147). 
523 Id. (2005, para. 5.44).  The English Law Commission proposes a clear set of rules to establish ways in 
which a chargee may obtain ‘control’ as well as deal with priority issues.  Although it may be argued that 
its proposals adhere too closely to the provisions of Article 8 UCC, which - as already mentioned - 
introduced the concept of ‘control’, the English Law Commission deserves the credit for having 
attempted to clarify and simplify this very complex area of law. 
524 English Law Commission (2005, para 5.52).  
525 Turing (2005, p. 4); McCormick (2006, p. 263); Fawcett (2005, p. 295.  See also HM Treasury (August 
2010, paras. 3.2/3.4) and HM Treasury (November 2010, paras. 2.18/2.21); the CLLS - Financial Law 
Committee (October 2010, p. 5); the FMLC (April 2011, p. 2).  
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obstacle to the actual enforcement of a security interest and, more in general, to the 
efficient use of financial collateral arrangements in the European financial market.  
 
Despite the legal uncertainties envisaged by market players, the recent amendments 
introduced to the FCD and the FCAR make no attempt to clarify what constitutes 
control for the purposes of the requirements that financial collateral be ‘delivered, 
transferred or otherwise designated so as to be in the possession or under the control of 
the collateral taker […]’526. 
 
The Geneva Convention offers a clear guideline to the internationally recognised 
methods for the transfer of intermediated securities and for their use as collateral.  If the 
EU Commission and the EU Member States were to ratify the Geneva Convention, a 
decision as to the meaning of control in the FCD would be necessary527.  The reason for 
this is that under the Geneva Convention, it is up to a contracting state to declare what 
kind of agreement or notice is necessary in order to make an interest in intermediated 
securities effective against third parties and, more importantly, such a declaration must 
specify what type of control is included in the agreement or notice (i.e. whether EU law 
requires ‘negative control’ and/or ‘positive control’ as well as ‘legal control’ and/or 
‘practical control’)528. 
 
                                                 
526 EC Directive 2009/44 and FMIR which has recently amended the FCAR.  In particular, Regulation 4 
(2) of the FMIR introduces a new definition of possession, which applies specifically to investment 
securities, but it does not provide a definition of control.  For an analysis of this provision see infra 
chapter 6 (section 2). 
527 See on this point Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6-35). 
528 While the Official Commentary to the Geneva Convention provides a definition of negative and 
positive control, no reference is made to the distinction between legal and practical control. However, a 
closer look at Articles 11 and 12 of the Geneva Convention shows that such provisions do include the 
second distinction.  In particular, Articles 11 and 12 of the Geneva Convention set out three methods for 
perfecting a security interest by way of control.  These methods are (1) crediting (and debiting) to an 
account, (2) conclusion of a control agreement and (3) earmarking of securities in an account. Further 
details on the methods recognised under Articles 11 and 12 of the Geneva Convention are provided in 
chapter 6 (section 4).  However, for the purpose of understanding whether the Geneva Convention 
requires ‘legal control’, ‘practical control’ or both, it is worth mentioning that the first method is 
characterised by transferring the collateral to the creditor’s account (which is a conditio sine qua non for 
obtaining practical control), while the second and the third methods are characterised by leaving the 
collateral credited on the debtor’s account (which is a requirement that excludes practical control).  This 
means that the Geneva Convention contemplates the possibility of having either a combination of 
practical and legal control as well as legal control alone.  But is practical control alone sufficient to satisfy 
the perfection requirement?  Article 12 (2) of the Geneva Convention leaves to the Contracting States the 
choice of determining whether practical control alone is sufficient for the perfection of a security interest, 
provided that one of the following conditions are met: (i) the secured creditor is the relevant intermediary 
(Article 12(3)(a)); (ii) a designating entry is made in favour of the secured creditor (Article 12(3)(b)); and 
(iii) the account holder enters into a control agreement with the secured creditor, the relevant 
intermediary or both parties (Article 12(3)(c)).  See on this point Kanda et al. (2012, paras. 12-1/12-36). 
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5. Floating charges and the unresolved debate on inclusion within the scope of 
the FCD 
 
Interestingly, under English law the interpretation proposed by most practitioners and 
academics would result in placing certain floating charges outside the FCD.  If the level 
of control required under Article 2(2) of the FCD was intended to exclude those 
circumstances in which the debtor retains the right to deal with the financial collateral, 
there would be doubts as to whether certain floating charges were included in the FCD. 
 
Before evaluating whether floating charges are consistent with the requirement of 
control provided under Article 2(2) of the FCD, it is worth clarifying the difference 
between floating charges and fixed charges.   
 
Typically, a fixed charge attaches to a particular asset immediately, or upon the debtor 
acquiring an interest in it.  The effect of such an attachment is that the debtor cannot 
deal with the asset free from the charge and needs to obtain the chargee’s permission if 
the asset is to be disposed of or transferred. 
 
A floating charge, by contrast, is a security interest over a pool of changing assets of the 
debtor, which ‘floats’ without attaching to any particular asset until it is converted into a 
fixed charge, i.e. ‘crystallised’ by attachment to specific assets.  This means that the 
debtor is free to dispose of the charged assets in the ordinary course of business without 
the consent of the secured creditor, until the occurrence of a default or other prescribed 
event that causes the floating charge to ‘crystallise’ on a particular asset.529  Thus, control 
of the charged assets by the debtor can be described as the defining feature of a floating 
                                                 
529 In Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd Romer LJ identifies three main aspects which would 
characterise the security interest as a floating charge: (1) the charge is granted over a class of present or 
future assets; (2) the content of that class of assets may change from time to time; and (3) the debtor is 
free to carry on the business in the ordinary way without interference from the creditor. See Re Yorkshire 
Woolcombers Association Ltd [1903] 2 (Ch) 284, 295.  On appeal in the same case the language was echoed 
by Lord Macnaghten: ‘I should have thought there was not much difficulty in defining what a floating 
charge is in contrast to what is called a specific charge.  A specific charge, I think, is one that without 
more fastens on ascertained and definite property or property capable of being ascertained and defined; a 
floating charge, on the other hand, is ambulatory and shifting in its nature, hovering over and so to speak 
floating with the property which it is intended to affect until some event occurs or some act is done which 
causes it to settle and fasten on the subject of the charge within its reach and grasp’, Illingworth v. 
Houldsworth [1904] AC 355, 358. 
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charge.530  The main purpose is to facilitate access to credit without paralysing the 
debtor’s business.531    
 
In spite of its commercial benefits, a floating charge is a rather weak form of security, as 
it is characterised by certain disadvantages for the secured creditor, including primarily 
lower priority than the fixed charge holders and than various statutory creditors532.  As a 
result, creditors in the financial market seek to ensure that their security interest does 
not constitute a floating charge, given that it provides limited protection in insolvency 
proceedings.  On the other hand, from a debtor’s perspective floating charges provide 
greater flexibility, particularly in the form of the debtor’s right to actively manage the 
assets during the life of the secured transaction.533  
 
Over the past few decades there has been an increasing demand for greater flexibility in 
the use of financial collaterals.  Common examples of such flexibility may include: (i) a 
bank account, which the debtor is allowed to continue to use; (ii) a pool of receivables, 
where the debtor is entitled to collect debts; and (iii) a portfolio of securities, where 
substitution rights and continuing margining provisions enable the debtor to adjust the 
composition of the collateral portfolio.  In particular, in the case of securities portfolios 
the ‘freedom of the debtor to deal’ has proven to be very important as the value of the 
financial assets serving as collateral may fluctuate from time to time.  This means, for 
example, that in order to maintain the original ratio between exposure and collateral, it is 
essential for the debtor to make constant adjustments, by either withdrawing securities 
or providing additional collateral so as to eliminate possible shortfalls.  This practice is 
called margining or marking to market and it may take place several times a day for the 
                                                 
530 The test to distinguish floating charges from fixed charges is not so much whether the charged assets 
may shift from time to time or whether the security interest can be granted over present and future assets.  
It would be possible, in practice, to create a fixed charge over a changing class of assets as well as over 
future assets.  In addition, floating charges can be granted even over assets that do not fluctuate at all in 
the ordinary course of business, Re Atlantic Computers Ltd [1992] (Ch) 505 (CA).  Thus, the crucial test is 
whether or not the debtor is at liberty to dispose of the assets without the consent of the creditor.  In 
other words, the test is control, Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1997] 4 All ER 115.  However, the courts have 
experienced considerable difficulties in distinguishing between floating and fixed charges, particularly in 
the context of a charge over book debts.  On this point, see Agnew v. IRC [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] 2 A.C. 
710; National Westminster Bank v Spectrum Plus and others [2005] UKHL 41. 
531 The floating charge was developed in the late 19th century to enable manufacturing and trading 
companies to raise loan capital while at the same time leaving them free to deal with their assets and pay 
their trade creditors in the ordinary course of business. 
532 See s. 176A Insolvency Act 1986 and para. 65 (1) of Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986. 
533 Yates and Montagu (2013, paras. 4.40 and 4.41); Benjamin (2007, paras. 17.91/17.110); Id. (2000, para. 
5.37); Fawcett (2005, p. 297) and Beale (2004, p. 119). 
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purposes of enabling the parties to manage their credit exposures.534  Similarly, it is also 
customary in secured transactions to provide for substitutions, when the original 
collateral assets are returned to the debtor upon delivery of new assets of an equivalent 
market value.  The rationale behind this practice is that ‘the debtor retains a position in 
the collateral assets, having the risks and rewards of ownership, and may therefore wish 
to actively manage the assets during the collateral transactions’.535  If the original 
collateral is falling in value, it is in the interest of the debtor to reduce losses by selling 
the assets; alternatively, if it is rising in value, the debtor may wish to regain a profit by 
selling the assets.  Typically, the kind of flexibility provided by the secured transactions 
described above is considered the ‘hallmark of a floating charge’536.   
 
In this regard, problems may occur when trying to establish whether floating charges are 
included within the scope of the FCD.  Indeed, the main advantage of applying the 
FCD would be to avoid the registration requirement for ‘the creation, validity, 
perfection, enforceability or admissibility in evidence of a financial collateral 
arrangement’537.  The wording of the EU legislation seems at first sight to exclude 
floating charges as, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the FCD, a secured creditor is 
exempted from any registration requirement only if it has ‘possession or control’ over 
financial collateral.538  In particular, the interpretation proposed by most practitioners 
and academics suggests that the test of ‘possession or control’ of the secured creditor 
under Article 2(2) FCD is satisfied only in those circumstances where the debtor is 
deprived of the power to retain the financial collateral. In other words, the ability of the 
                                                 
534 Yates and Montagu (2013, paras. 4.40 and 4.41). 
535 Id.  
536 Accordingly, a court might characterise such secured transactions as floating charges, regardless of how 
they are described in the financial collateral arrangement, Benjamin (2007, paras. 20.112/20.113); Id. 
(2000, paras. 5.37 – 5. 38).  In particular, a secured transaction described by the parties as a fixed charge 
may be ‘recharacterised’ by a court as a floating charge.  This occurs, for example, if the debtor is granted 
an unlimited power to withdraw or substitute securities in the collateral pool, which might be deemed to 
constitute sufficient control over the asset.  The term ‘recharacterisation’ is based on the principle that the 
courts look at the substance rather than the form of a transaction and that policy should prevail over 
freedom of contract.  This outcome is considered undesirable for a number of reasons, including the risk 
that a security interest has restricted protection in insolvency proceedings.  Generally, market participants 
seek to limit the risk of ‘recharacterisation’ through standard documentation, by using clauses which 
narrow the debtor’s authority and ‘squeeze’ the secured transaction into the category of fixed charges. 
However, even under these circumstances there will always be a margin of risk of recharacterisation, as at 
times the boundary line between floating charges and fixed charges is particularly difficult to draw. In 
particular, over the years the courts have tried to distinguish between fixed and floating charges over book 
debts and their money proceeds, but despite recent authoritative guidance, some doubts still persist, 
Agnew v. IRC [2001] UKPC 28; [2001] 2 A.C. 710; National Westminster Bank v Spectrum Plus and others [2005] 
UKHL 41. 
537 Recital 10 FCD and Art. 3 (1) FCD.  
538 Art. 2 (2) FCD.  
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debtor to dispose of the assets ‘destroys’ control, based on the argument that control 
must be negative (rather than merely positive). 
 
If this interpretation is correct, a floating charge would fall outside the scope of the 
FCD.  The main characteristic of a floating charge is the debtor’s freedom to deal with 
the charged assets in the ordinary course of business and this aspect is inconsistent with 
the concept of negative control.  
 
There is, however, an exception to this general rule.  Under Article 2(2), it is expressly 
stated that the debtor may continue to substitute or withdraw excess financial collateral 
and that such power does not prevent the secured creditor from being in possession or 
having control of the financial assets.   
 
The right to withdraw seems to be consistent with a floating charge, although the 
requirement that such a right should be limited only to excess financial collateral 
considerably reduces the debtor’s ability to dispose of the assets.539  Accordingly, while 
the debtor has a contractual right to withdraw the securities, such a right may only be 
allowed after the creditor has, for example, verified that the excess does indeed exist or 
that other criteria are met.540  
 
On the other hand, the FCD does not seem to pose any limitation to the debtor’s right 
to substitute new securities for those subject to the financial collateral arrangement.  
Nevertheless, the wording of the FCD cannot be interpreted as including a general 
advance authorisation to substitute, because such a clause would be inconsistent with 
the requirement that the financial collateral needs to be in the possession or under the 
control of the secured creditor.  It is therefore preferable for the parties to agree that 
‘the release of any securities by the creditor is dependent on the debtor having firstly 
furnished the substitute securities’ or having provided some other form of protection.541 
 
The FCAR goes even further, determining under Regulation 3 that the right to 
substitute is limited to ‘equivalent financial collateral’.542  This means that substitutions 
                                                 
539 Reg. 3 FCAR.  See also Reg. 4 (2) FMIR.  
540 However, it can be argued, in the light of the Spectrum case, that even this limited right to withdraw 
may not be enough to avoid characterisation as a floating charge, Worthington (2006 a, pp. 31 – 32). 
541 Gullifer and Goode (2008, para. 6-33). 
542 Reg. 3 FCAR.  However, see also Reg. 4 (2) FMIR. 
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are limited to securities of the same issues, or class, as the financial collateral which was 
initially granted to the creditor.543  Such a limited power to substitute casts doubt on the 
efficacy of floating charges as financial collateral arrangements.  Typically, a floating 
charge does not operate this way since the duty to substitute the original collateral with 
securities of the same issue significantly narrows the authority conferred to the debtor 
and may also jeopardise the function of substitution544.  For example, if the debtor 
decides to sell the original collateral securities because they are falling in value, the 
purpose of reducing losses would most likely not be achieved in those circumstances 
where the debtor was forced to substitute the original collateral with securities of the 
same issue.  The 2010 Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and 
Financial Collateral Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations (‘FMIR’), which amended 
the FCAR, seem to overcome the limitations concealed in the wording of Regulation 3.  
In this regard, Regulation 4 (2) of the FMIR replaces the expression ‘equivalent financial 
collateral’ with ‘financial collateral of the same or greater value’.  This new wording 
should no longer limit the right to substitute the original collateral solely with securities 
of the same issue or class.545 
 
Nevertheless, while the FCD and the FCAR expressly recognise that substitutions or 
withdrawals of excess collateral do not prejudice the control of the secured creditor, it is 
unclear whether the debtor’s ability to deal with the collateral in other circumstances 
negates such control. Indeed, there are a variety of circumstances beyond rights of 
substitution or withdrawal of excess collateral where the debtor may reserve rights over 
the collateral.  However, neither the FCD nor the FCAR mentions these other 
circumstances, which would most likely fall within the category of floating charges.546   
 
In the United Kingdom there was an attempt to bring at least some floating charges 
within the realm of the FCAR.  In particular, under Regulation 3 of the FCAR, it is 
                                                 
543 Reg. 3 FCAR. 
544 Before crystallisation of a floating charge, the debtor’s power to dispose of the collateral and carry on 
its business is fairly broad.  The extent of this power is shown in the decision by the Court of Appeal in 
Re Borax Co. [1901] 1 Ch. 326.  In this case the debtor had created a floating charge over all its property 
and assets both present and future (326).  The debtor subsequently sold the whole of its business to 
another company in exchange for shares and debentures in that company, but would nevertheless 
continue as a going concern.  The Court of Appeal held that the debtor was entitled to sell all its assets 
(and substitute a totally different property for them), if such a transaction was intended in furtherance of 
the business and not with a view to cease trading (340).  See also Re H. H. Vivian & Co Ltd. [1900] 2 (Ch) 
654. For an analysis of these cases see Calnan (2006, para. 4.37); Beale et al. (2012, para. 13.26) and 
Gullifer and Goode (2013, paras. 5.39 – 5.40). 
545 Reg. 4 (2) FMIR. 
546 Davies (2007, p. 72) and McCormick (2006, p. 266). 
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stated that floating charges are included ‘where the financial collateral charge is 
delivered, transferred, held, registered or otherwise designated so as to be in the 
possession or under the control of the collateral taker or a person acting on its behalf 
[…].’547  Furthermore, Regulations 8 and 10 of the FCAR are intended to disapply 
certain insolvency rules, which refer to floating charges and which, if applied, would 
restrict the enforcement of security interests in financial collateral.548 
 
Despite the express reference to floating charges, the interpretation of these provisions 
is not very clear.  Over the past few years, there has been heightened discussion in the 
market, with many scholars expressing opinions as to what level of control must be 
exercised by the secured creditor in order for a floating charge to fall within the FCAR. 
 
One way to interpret these provisions would be to bring within the FCAR only those 
charges which confine the debtor’s authority to trade securities merely to margining and 
substitution rights, as such interests are the only ones expressly protected by both 
Article 2(2) of the FCD and Regulation 3 of the FCAR.  On the other hand, market 
participants have often claimed the need to protect also other types of floating charges 
(where secured creditors are ‘able to remove assets in their discretion, not only under 
margining and substitution arrangements’549). 
 
The only aspect that seems certain in this debate is that ‘there must be a spectrum with 
fixed charges at one end (where control of the assets must be maintained by the 
creditor) and floating charges at the other (where no control of the creditor is exercised 
until crystallisation). A floating charge for the purposes of the FCAR then falls 
somewhere between these two.’550 
 
Several years have passed since the implementation of the FCD within the United 
Kingdom but its position on control still remains uncertain.  Without adequate 
assurances that certain floating charge arrangements fall within the FCAR, market 
participants are advised to register any charge which is not clearly a fixed charge551.  If 
                                                 
547 Reg. 3 FCAR. 
548 S. 176 A Insolvency Act 1986; s. 245 Insolvency Act 1986; s. 754 Companies Act 2006 and para. 70, 
Sch. B1, Insolvency Act 1986. 
549 Benjamin (2007, para. 20.117) and Id. (2009, pp. 258 – 259).  See also Turing (2005, p. 4); McCormick 
(2006, p. 266); Davies (2007, p. 73); Fawcett (2005, p. 297); Turing and Lester (2005, p. 67). 
550 Fawcett (2005, p. 297). 
551 Davies (2007, p. 72). 
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the charge is not registered and the secured creditor is found not to have sufficient 
control, such a charge may be void (under s. 874 of the Companies Act 2006) against 
the liquidator, administrator or any subsequent creditor .  This particular scenario is 
reflected in Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd Re F2G Realisations Ltd (in Liquidation)552 (‘Gray v. G-
T-P Group Ltd’), which is the first case that considers to what extent floating charges are 
included within the meaning of the FCAR.  In Gray v. G-T-P the Court interprets the 
concepts of ‘possession’ and ‘control’ very narrowly, hence including only a limited 
number of floating charges within the scope of the FCAR.  The decision was criticised 
as too restrictive particularly by market players who have stressed the urgent need for 
further clarity in the UK legal framework governing financial collateral arrangements553.  
In this regard, Reg. 4 (2) of the FMIR introduces a new definition of possession, which 
applies specifically to investment securities.  However, such a provision does not 
provide a definition of control, nor does it explain the conditions under which the 
FCAR can be extended to floating charges.  In Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) 
(In Administration) Briggs J thoroughly analyses the travaux preparatoires of the FCD so as 
to clarify the meaning and intended purpose of Article 2.  However, despite this analysis 
certain issues on the meaning of control still remain unresolved.   
 
The concern expressed by a number of market players over the decision in Gray v. G-T-
P as well as the amendments introduced by the FMIR and the more recent decision in 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) are analysed in greater detail in 
the next chapter.  Part of the inquiry will also aim to ascertain whether the new 
definition of possession set out under Reg. 4 (2) of the FMIR could be accommodated 
without difficulty by the theories of a right against a right and an interest in securities. 
  
                                                 
552 [2010] EWHC 1772 (Ch). 
553 See FMLC (December 2010, paras 4.10 – 4.11). 
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Chapter 6: The new idea of possession under the FMIR and the reluctance to 
introduce the notion of control 
 
1. Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd Re F2G Realisations Ltd (in Liquidation): the need 
for a clear legal framework governing financial collateral arrangements 
 
In Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd, the High Court of Justice considered whether the holder of 
a floating charge granted over financial collateral (specifically cash554) had the degree of 
control necessary under Regulation 3 of the FCAR to be exempted from the registration 
requirements.555  The parties had entered into a secured agreement where, although the 
collateral was credited to a bank account in the name of the secured creditor, the debtor 
continued to have unrestricted rights to withdraw money from the account prior to an 
event of default.  The Court decided that the secured agreement amounted to a floating 
charge that did not fall within the scope of the FCAR.  Hence, the (unregistered) charge 
was void for lack of sufficient control. 
 
In this case, the High Court of Justice had to face the ‘difficult’556 task of interpreting 
the precise meaning of ‘possession’ and ‘control’ under the FCD and reached the 
conclusion that (i) the concept of possession is intended to apply only to tangible assets 
and (ii) control, which concerns intangibles, means ‘the substantive legal right to deal 
with the collateral […] as opposed to mere administrative control,’557.  In particular, it 
emphasised that ‘possession has no meaning in English law as regards intangible 
property’558, so in this case (which concerned the use of money in the account) it was 
important to concentrate on the requirement of ‘control’559.  Although the secured 
creditor had ‘physical’ or practical control of the collateral (since it was credited into 
his/her account), this was held to be insufficient to fulfil the perfection requirements 
under the FCD as the debtor retained the right to dispose of the collateral.  This 
interpretation relies primarily on paragraph 10 in the Preamble to the FCD which states 
                                                 
554 In this case, the relevant financial collateral arrangement was the credit balance standing ‘from time to 
time’ in the bank account (Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd), para. 3).  Such a credit balance is considered ‘cash’ 
and thus ‘financial collateral’ for the purposes of the FCAR. 
555 For an analysis of this case see McKnight (2011, pp. 96-97) and Cooke (2010, p. 518). 
556 Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd), para. 41. 
557 McKnight (2011, p. 97).  
558 Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd), para. 54. 
559 ‘[…] since possession has no meaning in English law as regards intangible property, the real question 
here is whether the collateral taker, namely G-T-P, has control over the collateral, that is the monies over 
which the Declaration of Trust bites, to use the money itself’ Id. 
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that the directive applies only to ‘those financial collateral arrangements, which provide 
for some form of dispossession [emphasis added]’.  According to the Court, the reference 
to ‘dispossession’ in the directive was a clear indication that control is meant to prevent 
the debtor ‘from using or dissipating the assets in the ordinary course of business’560.  
Thus, control needs to be interpreted in the legal rather than merely administrative or 
practical sense. 
 
The decision in Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd. was heavily criticised by the FMLC in the 
report of December 2010561.  According to the FMLC, ‘the judge’s conclusion that 
possession has no meaning in English law as regards intangible property restricts the 
application of this concept to bearer securities in certificated form: a type of collateral 
which is rarely, if ever seen.’562  Furthermore, ‘the concept of possession has an 
“autonomous” meaning in EU law and it must be interpreted in accordance with the 
wording of the directive rather than with general principles of English law’.  In this 
regard, the FMLC continues, the wording of the directive seems to suggest that there is 
‘no distinction […] between different types of collateral’ and that ‘possession is intended 
to apply to all types of collateral’563.  In other words, ‘[p]ossession of securities […] 
should be regarded as synonymous with holding the securities, even in dematerialised 
form’564. 
 
With regard to the debtor’s disposal of the charged assets, the FMLC argues that the 
secured creditor has ‘possession or control’ for the purpose of the FCAR, 
notwithstanding the debtor’s unrestricted right to remove all the collateral at any time 
prior to enforcement.  The idea that the secured creditor has physical control of the 
collateral (since the charged assets are in an account in his/her name) is deemed to be 
sufficient in this case.  The FMLC believes that the debtor’s unrestricted right to dispose 
of the assets ‘would be no prejudice to the [secured creditor], as this would be no more 
                                                 
560 ‘[…] the Regulations are addressing what I termed ‘real legal control’ as opposed to simply 
administrative control.  Real legal control means that the collateral taker must be able to prevent the 
collateral provider from using or dissipating the assets in the ordinary course of business.’ Id. 
561 FMLC (December 2010, paras 4.10 – 4.11).  See also Parsons and Dening (2011, p. 168).   
562 FMLC (December 2010, para. 4.6).  There is ‘no basis in logic’, the FMLC continues, for giving a 
different treatment to certain types of collateral just because they are qualified as bearer securities in 
certificated form, Id. See also Parsons and Dening (2011, pp. 166-167). 
563 FMLC (December 2010, para. 4.8). 
564 Id. 
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than the parties had agreed’565.  Moreover, ‘the risk of a third party unwittingly acquiring 
an asset that is subject to a prior equity […] is eliminated where the [debtor] no longer 
holds the assets, regardless of whether it has the right to demand their return’566.  
 
In its report of December 2010, the FMLC stresses the need for further clarity in the 
UK legal framework governing financial collateral arrangements and proposes to 
introduce a definition of both possession and control567.  
 
With regard to the notion of possession, it is suggested to include the case where the 
financial collateral is credited to an account in the name of the secured creditor (or a 
person acting on his/her behalf), notwithstanding the debtor’s right to dispose of the 
assets568.  
 
As for control569, the FCAR should be amended to embrace the following two different 
scenarios. Firstly, the parties may agree to leave the collateral in the debtor’s account. In 
this case, in order to acquire ‘control’, the creditor needs to have a contractual right to 
prevent the debtor from dealing with the asset (legal and negative control)570.  Secondly, 
                                                 
565 FMLC, (December 2010, paras 4.10):  ‘even if the collateral provider were able to remove all the 
collateral from the arrangements on demand, so as to release it from the scope of the charge, there would 
be no prejudice to the collateral taker, as this would be no more than the parties had agreed.’ 
566 Ibid., para 4.11. The FMLC acknowledges the difficulty in showing consistency between such an 
interpretation and the wording of Article 2(2) of the FCD (when it specifies that any right of substitution 
or to withdraw excess financial collateral in favour of the debtor shall not prejudice the creditor from 
being in possession or having control of the assets).  In this regard, according to the FMLC the debtor’s 
power to dispose of the assets is not limited to those rights which are expressly indicated in the directive, 
i.e. the right of substitution or to withdraw excess financial collateral: ‘the objective of this provision is 
probably to remove any doubt about the impact of such a provision’ FMLC (December 2010, paras 4.12).  
In other words, ‘it is designed to ensure that the Regulations should be construed widely rather than given 
a narrow construction.’ Id. 
567 The intention is to allow all floating charges to be exempted from registration (bearing in mind that the 
proposal is limited to floating charges over financial collateral).  According to the FMLC, these 
amendments to the FCAR should have been included in the provisions that implement the EU Directive 
2009/44 EC.  On this point, see section 2 of this chapter.  
568 The FMLC also includes within the notion of possession the situation where the secured creditor is the 
debtor’s intermediary. In this particular case, the collateral may be either (i) credited into the debtor’s 
account, or (ii) transferred to the intermediary’s own account with another intermediary at a higher level 
in the holding chain or within a depository system (such as Euroclear, Clearstream or the Depository 
Trust & Clearing Corporation (‘DTCC’).  Thus, ‘there is very little risk that other creditors of the 
collateral provider would mistakenly think the collateral is available to them’, FMLC (December 2010, 
para. 6.7). 
569 For an analysis of the different types of control and how the FMLC’s definitions relate to Joanna 
Benjamin’s classification, see text accompanying nn. 484 – 493 in ch. 5. 
570 FMLC (December 2010, paras 6.8-6.11).  It is expressly stated in the report that ‘negative control can 
still be achieved in a collateral arrangement where the collateral provider has the right to substitute 
collateral or to withdraw excess collateral’.  Furthermore, ‘consent would, for the avoidance of doubt, 
include the case where the parties pre-agree terms on which consent is deemed to be given by the 
collateral taker to a disposal/charge’, Id. 
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the collateral may be transferred to the creditor’s account.  Under these circumstances, 
there is no need to obtain legal control as the creditor retains practical control571. 
 
2. The concept of possession applied to intangibles 
 
The UK legislation on financial collateral arrangements was recently amended through 
the FMIR.  The intention was primarily to implement EC Directive 2009/44 within the 
United Kingdom so as to expand the FCD’s scope of application to cover credit 
claims.572 However, the drafting of the FMIR was also an opportunity to overcome at 
least part of the uncertainties or the limitations concealed in the wording of the 
FCAR573. 
 
With regard to the method of perfection of financial collateral arrangements, Reg. 4 (2) 
of the FMIR introduces a new definition of possession, which applies specifically to 
investment securities574.  In particular, it states that for the purposes of the FMIR, 
possession ‘includes the case where [the] financial collateral has been credited to an 
account in the name of the [secured creditor] or a person acting on his behalf […]’575.   
 
The introduction of a new definition of possession seems to contradict the recent 
decision in Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd insofar as such a decision emphasises that 
‘possession has no meaning in English law as regards intangible property’576.   Although 
the solution to apply the notion of possession to investment securities was warmly 
welcomed by most market players577, it constitutes a clear break from the traditional 
principles of personal property. 
 
Prior to the introduction of the FMIR, it was widely accepted in English law that ‘in the 
case of intangible personal property, possession is impossible’.578  The reason for this is 
                                                 
571 Id.  
572 See Recital 5 of the Directive 2009/44.  
573 Parsons and Dening (2011, pp. 166-167).  See also FMLC (April 2011). 
574 Reg. 4 (2) FMIR. 
575 Id. 
576 Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd), para. 54. 
577 Parsons and Dening (2011, pp. 166-167).  See also FMLC (April 2011). 
578 Bridge (2002, pp. 15 and 144).  Recently, this principle has been confirmed in Your Response Ltd v. 
Datateam Business Media Ltd 2014 EWCA Civ. 281 where the Court of Appeal strengthens the idea that 
while ‘possession is concerned with the physical control of tangible objects’, ‘practical control is a broader 
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that ‘rights in these choses in action [as opposed to those in choses in possession] have 
to be asserted through the medium of legal action’579.  This is particularly emphasised by 
Lawson and Rudden, when they argue that ‘[t]he rules governing the recovery of 
property vary with the nature of the property’580: ‘[s]ome kinds of property can be 
possessed, others cannot’581. 
 
Reg. 4 (2) of the FMIR overrides these common law requirements by introducing a new 
idea of possession, which applies to investment securities.  The issue was also addressed 
in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) which concerned the 
interpretation of the FCD and FCAR prior to the 2010 amendments.  In his decision, 
Briggs J. confirms the idea that ‘it would be wrong to limit possession in such a way as 
to exclude any application to intangibles’582.  
 
It is difficult to understand the reasons that lie behind this position.  Indeed, for the 
purpose of Art. 2(1) of the FCD, ‘financial collateral’ includes both bearer securities in 
certificated form (which are treated as tangibles) as well as securities in dematerialised 
form.  Thus, there is no inconsistency with the scope of the directive in using the notion 
of possession for tangibles as well as for documentary intangibles and the notion of 
control for all other intangibles.  If the intention in the directive is to apply the concept 
                                                                                                                                          
concept, capable of extending to intangible assets and to things which the law would not regard as 
property at all’, Ibid., para. 23.  Interestingly, in this case no reference is made to Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR.     
579 Id.  See also Lawson and Rudden (1982, p. 20): ‘[c]hattels personal are classified as choses in possession 
and choses in action, according as they can be enjoyed by taking possession of them or only by bringing 
an action.’  Choses (or things) in action embrace diverse types of intangible (or incorporeal) property and 
they are traditionally divided into ‘pure intangibles’ (such as debts, copyright and goodwill) and 
documentary intangibles (such as share certificates, bills of lading and bills of exchange).  While ‘pure 
intangibles’ can never be possessed, ‘choses in action that amount to documentary intangibles can be 
possessed’, Bridge (2002, p. 15).  The reason for this is that in the latter case, unlike in the former, ‘the 
intangible right is so firmly locked up in the document embodying it’ (Ibid., 145) that it ‘takes on some 
characteristics of a chattel’ (Ibid., 8).  In other words, ‘the document recording the right is itself a tangible 
thing and thus a chattel, and the right is thoroughly fused with the document’, (Id.).  On this point see also 
Dearle v Hall Chancery Division, 24 December 1828, 38 E.R. 475, 485; 1 OBG Ltd and another v Allan and 
others [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 A.C. 1, 43 and 67;   
580 Lawson and Rudden (1982, p. 40). 
581 Id.: ‘[t]he rules governing the recovery of property law vary with the nature of the property.  Some 
kinds of property can be possessed, others cannot.  Of the former the possession can be lost and pass 
into the hands of a person not the owner, and recovery means a recovery of possession.  Of the others 
some, such as patents, copyrights, or goodwill, can be infringed, and the only meaning that recovery can 
have is a suit to restrain infringement and perhaps to obtain damage or a return of the profits made by the 
infringer. Where a trust fund is concerned, the only remedy can be a suit for enforcement of the trust or, 
in the last resort, for removal and replacement of the trustees.’ 
582 [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), para. 131.  ‘Intangibles’, Briggs continues, ‘are, and were by the time the 
Directive was being prepared, the very stuff of modern financial collateral’, Id.     
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of possession to all types of collateral, what reason would there be to add the concept of 
control as a new method of perfection?583  
 
This new idea of possession, which applies to all types of collateral (regardless of their 
nature) is consistent with the FMLC’s proposal that ‘possession of securities’ should not 
refer exclusively to bearer securities in certificated form but it should be extended to 
securities in dematerialised form584.  
 
Although the FMLC makes a valuable comment where it states that nowadays bearer 
securities issued in the form of a paper instrument are rarely used in practice585, it does 
not provide a convincing argument for having to apply the notion of possession to all 
types of collateral586.   
 
Furthermore, there is no reason for elaborating three methods of perfection (i.e., 
possession, negative/legal control and practical control).  A closer look at the FMLC’s 
recommendations shows that the concepts of possession and practical control are 
almost equivalent as (a) they have exactly the same meaning587 and (b) they apply to the 
same types of collateral.  The FMLC could have reached a similar outcome to the one 
obtained with its proposal by using on the one hand, possession for tangibles and on the 
other, control for intangibles588.  
 
Unlike Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR and the FMLC’s proposal, the interpretation which 
confines the notion of possession to tangibles and to documentary intangibles seems to 
be more in line with the US law where it states that ‘security interests in intangibles for 
                                                 
583 Alternatively, the directive could be interpreted in the sense of allowing EU Member States to choose 
between two different options: either extend the meaning of possession to include intangible assets or 
introduce the concept of control, which is specifically addressed to cover intangibles.  Consistent with this 
reasoning, the scope of the directive is simply to introduce a new method of perfection for financial 
collaterals, leaving the decision about how to name it to Member States.  
584 FMLC (December 2010, para 4.8). 
585 See on this point also Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 
(Ch), para. 131).  
586 FMLC (December 2010, paras. 4.6-4.8).  
587 With respect to indirectly held securities, both in cases of possession and practical control the collateral 
is transferred to the debtor’s account.  The only difference seems to be that unlike practical control, 
possession includes also those circumstances where the creditor is the debtor’s intermediary. 
588 There would have been no substantial difference in stating that control (either legal/negative or 
practical) applies (unlike possession) to securities in dematerialised form. Consistent with this reasoning, 
(i) legal/negative control would be required in those circumstances where the collateral remains in the 
debtor’s account and (ii) practical control (which is sufficient to fulfill the perfection requirement) would 
be achieved by transferring the collateral to the creditor’s account. 
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which there is no indispensable res to possessed (like a negotiable instrument) cannot be 
perfected by possession.’589  These forms of intangibles are perfected, under Articles 9 
and 8 of the UCC, by way of ‘control’590.  In particular, Comment 7 to § 8-106 UCC 
expressly states that ‘[a] principal purpose of the control concept is to eliminate the 
uncertainty and confusion that results from attempting to apply common law possession 
concepts to modern securities holding practices.’591  On these grounds, it would have 
been preferable to avoid using, under Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR, terminology that 
immediately recalls common law possession concepts.  However, English law has 
chosen to take a different path than the UCC.  Hence, whatever requirements the 
common law has imposed in defining possession, they have now been overridden by 
Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR.   
 
This definition of possession, which applies specifically to investment securities gained a 
positive response from the FMLC for rejecting the Court’s decision in Gray v. G-T-P 
Group Ltd.   Nevertheless, the wording of the provision reveals that Reg. 4(2) of the 
FMIR neither follows the recent decision in Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd nor seems to fully 
reflect the FMLC’s recommendations.  In this regard, unlike the FMLC’s proposal, Reg. 
4(2) of the FMIR does not provide a definition of control (in addition to possession) 
and prevents the debtor from retaining unrestricted rights to dispose of the collateral592.  
In particular, the provision specifies that the concept of possession allows the debtor to 
maintain certain rights over the assets provided that such rights ‘are limited to the right 
to substitute financial collateral of the same or greater value or to withdraw excess 
financial collateral.’593  
 
The wording of Reg. 4(2) FMIR clearly rejects the FMLC’s argument that the ‘physical’ 
or ‘practical’ holding of the securities is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
possession (notwithstanding the debtor’s right to remove all the collateral at any time 
                                                 
589 White and Summers (2000, p. 775).  
590 Thus, as for investment securities the UCC provides two principal methods for perfecting a security 
interest, i.e. filing and control (§ 9-312(a) UCC and § 9-314(a) UCC).  In particular, ‘[a]s one might 
suspect, the meaning of control differs depending on whether the collateral is a certificated security, an 
uncertificated security, or a security entitlement. See § 9–104(a) UCC and § 8-106 UCC.  In addition, a 
security interest in a certificated security may be perfected by taking delivery.  See § 9-313 (a) UCC and § 
8-301(a) UCC.  In the case of a certificated security, delivery [emphasis added] occurs when the secured 
party acquires possession of the security certificate § 8-301(a)(1) UCC’, Harris and Mooney (2011, pp. 
434-435). 
591 Comment 7 to § 8-106 UCC.  
592 Cf. FMLC (December 2010, paras 4.3, 4.4, 6.5/6.7 and 6.8/6.11). 
593 Reg. 4(2) FMIR. 
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prior to enforcement).  In this regard, it seems to embrace the traditional idea, which is 
often stressed by English scholars, that possession ‘is a question of fact as well as of 
law’594.  To a certain extent, the meaning of possession under Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR 
may consists of two essential elements: ‘first the exercise of factual control over the 
[assets]’595; and secondly, the ‘concomitant intention to exclude others from the exercise 
of control’596.  When dealing with indirectly held securities, the combination of these 
two elements is typically reflected in those circumstances where (i) the collateral is 
transferred on to the secured creditor’s account and (ii) the debtor is deprived of the 
power to dispose of such assets, which are subsequently ‘blocked’ on the creditor’s 
account, used or re-hypothecated by the creditor itself (subject, of course, to a 
contractual obligation to redeliver equivalent securities once the secured obligation has 
been performed).597  This scenario resembles the traditional meaning of possession to 
the extent that, as the creditor has ‘exclusive control’ over the assets, there is no risk of 
such assets being subject to competing claims.  However, the FMIR goes slightly further 
by also including in Reg. 4(2) a scenario where the debtor maintains ‘certain rights over 
the assets’, i.e. the right to substitute equivalent financial collateral or to withdraw excess 
financial collateral.598 The inclusion of this scenario under Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR was 
necessary in order to comply with the FCD where it specifies that ‘any right of 
substitution or to withdraw excess financial collateral in favour of the [debtor] shall not 
prevent the secured creditor from being in possession or having control of the asset’599. 
 
                                                 
594 Pollock and Wright (1888, pp. 10 – 20); Becker (1980, p. 190); Holmes (1963, p. 169); Bridge (2002, p. 
17) and Benjamin (2007, para. 16.07).  
595 Possession involves the physical control of the assets.  As an element of ‘practical’ control, ‘the 
existence of the de facto relation of control or apparent dominion [is] required as the foundation of the 
alleged [proprietary] right’, Pollock and Wright (1888, p. 10).   
596 The expression was used by Bridge with regard to the concept of possession over tangibles. See on this 
point Bridge (2002, p. 17).  Possession has been described often as ‘one of the most difficult concepts in 
English, or for that matter any other, law’, Lawson and Rudden (1982, p. 41).  The reason for this 
difficulty is that historically the concept of possession has taken many different shapes, depending on the 
circumstances (see among others, on this point Harris (1961, p. 69 and Pollock and Wright (1888, para. 1 
- 10.).  A very clear and comprehensive analysis of possession is offered by Frederick Pollock where he 
states that possession is a combination of three elements: (i) physical control or de facto possession, i.e. the 
exercise of factual control over the chattel; (ii) legal possession, i.e. the intention to exclude others from 
the exercise of control (in civil law jurisdictions such intention would be described as ‘animus possidendi’); 
and (iii) constructive possession, i.e. the right to possess or to have legal possession (this includes the right 
to physical possession).  With respect to constructive possession, Frederick Pollock emphasises that it is 
not considered an essential element of possession, as it only occurs when the first two aspects are 
separated from the rightful possessor).  These three elements ‘are quite distinct in conception and though 
very often in combination are also separable and often separated in practice’, Ibid., 26. 
597 It should be borne in mind that if the securities are used or re-hypothecated by the secured creditor, 
the transaction is likely to be re-characterised as a repo. 
598 Reg. 4(2) FMIR. 
599 Art. 2(2) FCD.  
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In this particular scenario, the collateral that is in the possession of the secured creditor 
seems to have ‘an identity distinct from its component parts’600.  Consistent with the 
wording of Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR, possession is acquired over the assets that from time 
to time are transferred into the creditor’s account rather than on the specific assets that 
were initially included in the collateral601.  Accordingly, provided that the overall value of 
the collateral remains unchanged, the ‘object in possession’ (i.e., the portfolio of assets 
that constitute such collateral) may vary from time to time, like a box whose contents 
change regularly. 
 
This approach is quite far from accepting the proposal suggested by the FMLC and was 
judged by most market players to be too restrictive and not sufficient to remove the 
uncertainties surrounding the notion of both possession and control.  On a number of 
occasions, the FMLC as well as the City of London Law Society Financial Law 
Committee stressed the need to introduce more substantive changes (on the perfection 
requirements) than those introduced through the FMIR.  In particular, they suggest that 
all floating charges over financial collateral (or at least those which form part of a 
wholesale arrangement) should be brought within the scope of the FCD and that a 
definition of control (in addition to possession) should be included within the law 
governing financial collateral arrangements602. 
 
During the consultation period, aimed at considering proposals by experts for the 
implementation of EC Directive 2009/44/EC, the HM Treasury expressly stated that ‘it 
will give further consideration to widen the issues raised around the treatment of 
floating charges.’603  However, in the consultation paper of December 2010, it also 
noted that these issues could not ‘be given proper consideration within the timescale 
imposed by the immediate need to make amendments to implement the Amending 
Directive [2009/44]’604, and that they could ‘be considered separately to those 
amendments’605 at a later stage.   
 
                                                 
600 McKendrick and Goode (2009, p. 65).  The argument was originally elaborated by Goode to explain 
the nature of a proprietary or possessory interest in a fund. 
601 Id. 
602 See letters of the FMLC (April 2011) and the CLLS - Financial Law Committee (October 2010). 
603 HM Treasury (November 2010, para. 2.21). 
604 Id. 
605 Id. 
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Concerns were raised by HM Treasury on the proposal to extend the regulations to all 
floating charges.  Indeed, ‘this would raise questions about the appropriate level of 
protection for third parties, particularly unsecured creditors who (in the absence of a 
registration requirement) would be unaware that a floating charge had been created by 
the company, and who may consequently believe their claim to be more senior than in 
fact it is’606.  This sort of consideration ‘is acknowledged by the FCD which cites (at 
paragraph 10 in the Preamble) the importance of balancing market efficiency, on the 
one hand, and the safety of parties to the arrangements and of third parties, on the 
other, thereby helping to avoid – among other things – the risk of fraud’607.  However, 
there may be certain floating charges that need to be exempted from registration in 
order to ensure financial stability and avoid systemic risk.  In this regard, HM Treasury 
considers the opportunity of including within the scope of the FCD those types of 
floating charges granted in favour of CREST settlement banks (known as system 
charges)608. 
 
It will be interesting to see whether HM Treasury eventually decides to introduce new 
forms of exemptions from the registration requirements.  If so, will these exemptions be 
included within the existing legal framework through the notion of control and, more 
importantly, which types of floating charges will benefit from such exemptions?  
 
In the absence of a statutory clarification on this point, Briggs J has recently attempted 
to analyse the exact meaning of control for the purposes of the FCD and came to the 
conclusion that practical control without legal control is not sufficient to perfect a 
security interest over financial collaterals609. Notwithstanding this restriction, Briggs J 
contemplates the possibility where the collateral remains on the account of the debtor, 
‘but on terms which give a legal right to the [secured creditor] to ensure that it is dealt 
with in accordance with its directions’610 (i.e. legal and negative control). 
                                                 
606 HM Treasury (August 2010, paras. 3.3).   
607 Id. 
608 HM Treasury (August 2010, paras. 3.5 and 3.6): ‘The daily average value of securities moving through 
the CREST system in March 2010 was in the order of £1,442 billion, while the daily average value of cash 
moving through CREST was in the order of £908 billion, including self-collateralising repo transactions.  
CREST settlement banks assume their exposures, in the great majority of cases, in reliance on floating 
charges from CREST members over their securities and other entitlements in CREST.  Given the extent 
of the use of system charges under CREST, there may be a case for bringing system charges within the 
scope of the protections of the 2003 regulations.  One way of achieving this might be to give protection 
to floating charges which qualify as "collateral security charges" under the 1999 Regulations'. 
609 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), paras. 131 - 132. 
610 Ibid., para. 136. 
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The question is whether in these circumstances the debtor can retain certain rights over 
the securities (other than the right of substitution or withdrawal of excess collateral).  In 
other words, what is the degree of (legal and negative) control that can be conferred on 
the secured creditor for the purposes of the FCD?  According to Briggs J. ‘the concept 
of dispossession of the debtor is little more than meaningless if the terms of the 
arrangement are such that the [debtor] can demand, at any time, either the return of the 
collateral, or its disposition in accordance with the [debtor]’s instructions, without any 
right in the [creditor] to refuse’611.  This means that in such cases it would not only be 
‘meaningless’ to consider the creditor as having control of the collateral but also 
‘contrary to business commonsense’ to describe the financial collateral as 
‘dispossessed’612. 
 
Briggs J clearly interprets the concept of legal and negative control in a rather restrictive 
manner.  However, he does believe that the debtor can exercise certain limited rights 
over the collateral613.  The problem is to establish what other rights (apart from 
substitution and withdrawal of excess collateral) the debtor may be entitled to exercise 
(e.g. voting rights or rights to dividends)614.  
 
To conclude, the extensive and ongoing debate over the meaning of possession and 
control for the purpose of the FCD seems to be proceeding in the direction of 
recognising in the United Kingdom at least four different combinations of control: (i) 
practical, legal, negative and positive control; (ii) practical, legal and negative control; (iii) 
legal and negative control and (iv) legal, positive and negative control.  Of these 
combinations the first two coincide with the new definition of possession provided by 
Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR, while the last two should most likely be included in the notion 
of control.  While Reg. 4(2) FMIR and the decision in Re Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) In Administration) have contributed to clarify the perfection requirements in 
                                                 
611 Ibid., para. 134. 
612 Id. 
613 Ibid., para, 132 
614 The decision in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) does not seem to clarify this 
point.  For an analysis of Briggs J’s interpretation of control see Gullifer and Goode (2013, para. 6–36) 
and Goldsworthy (2013, p. 73). 
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financial collateral arrangements, there is still some degree of uncertainty concealed in 
the existing legal framework615. 
 
3. The new definition of possession and the theory of a right against a right 
 
Recent developments on the meanings of both possession and control bring us to 
evaluate whether such developments are fairly consistent with the theories of a right 
against a right and of an interest in securities.  
 
With regard to control, it is possible to confirm that such a concept can be easily 
adjusted to the two theories concerning the nature of the investor’s right.  In other 
words, one could say that the secured creditor obtains, for example, a combination of 
legal and negative control, without this statement necessarily proposing any suggestion 
on the nature of the collateral (being either a sub-property or simply a right against 
right). Hence, once again the notion of control does not have a relevant impact on the 
debate concerning the problem of securities ownership in an indirect holding system616.  
 
Regarding the revised meaning of possession, the new concept is likely to create some 
friction with the theory of a right against a right.  McFarlane and Stevens make no 
reference in their article to this matter, given that Reg. 4(2) FMIR as well as the decision 
in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration)617 are subsequent to the 
publication of their work.  Having said that, it is difficult to imagine that they could 
favourably welcome Reg. 4(2) FMIR in the part where possession is applied to all types 
of collaterals, regardless of their nature618.   
                                                 
615 These considerations have recently brought the FMLC to propose an amendment of the existing legal 
framework so as to allow a less restrictive interpretation of the meaning of possession over intangibles 
and the introduction of the concept of control (partly along the lines of the decision in Re Lehman Brothers 
International (Europe) In Administration), FMLC, Issue 1: Collateral Directive - Analysis of uncertainty regarding 
the meaning of “possession or control” and “excess financial collateral” under the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 
2) Regulations 2003, December 2012.   The overall intention is to strengthen the rights that the debtor may 
retain over the collateral as well as accommodating English law to the practice developed in many other 
jurisdictions, Meaning of "possession", "control" and "excess financial collateral" under the Financial Collateral 
Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003, 13 April 2015.  In this regard, the HM Treasury has recently 
expressed its intention of giving further consideration to a possible amendment of the existing legal 
framework and is now evaluating the FMLC's proposal.   
616 There are, however, difficulties in accommodating the notion of control to the theory of an indirect 
right in rem.  See on this point text accompanying nn. 493 - 494 in ch. 5. 
617 [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), para. 131. 
618 Although McFarlane and R. Stevens’s article entitled ‘Interests in Securities. Practical Problems and 
Conceptual Solutions’ was published prior to the entry into force of FMIR, it is reasonable to assume that 
they would have had some difficulty in accepting the new meaning of possession.  
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One of the main principles lying behind the theory of a right against a right is that 
property is strictly limited to the use of specific things, i.e. of ‘object[s] that can be 
physically [emphasis added] located’619.  For example, ‘B’s ownership of a bike or of land 
can count … as a proprietary right (and so deserves a capital letter)’ since ‘bikes and 
land are both [material] things’620.  This means that proprietary rights do not include 
rights over intangibles which are classified by McFarlane and Stevens as sui generis rights.  
 
Following this analysis, the idea of extending the meaning of possession to include all 
types of assets (whether tangibles or intangibles) is certainly open to criticism.  Indeed, 
according to McFarlane and Steven, possession implies the taking of ‘physical [emphasis 
added] control of a thing’621 and is therefore restricted (like all other proprietary rights) 
to the use of tangibles.  
 
Contrary to the above argument, the theory of an interest in securities (based on a 
‘flexible’ idea of property) would find it easier to explain the new concept of possession.  
The underlying principle of this theory is that property is not limited to a close list of 
rights in rem and may include tangibles or intangibles as well as direct or indirect 
relationships with the asset.  In particular, over the centuries this flexible idea of 
property has allowed courts and statute law to accommodate rights in rem to commercial 
needs rather than creating new categories of law.   
 
Although in the case regarding financial collateral arrangements there was no real need 
to extend the notion of possession to intangible property622, Reg. 4(2) FMIR and the 
decision in Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) do confirm the 
(statutory and judicial) trend of stretching (wherever possible) the meaning of traditional 
legal concepts so as to include a larger number of circumstances623. 
 
4. Does control or possession comply with ‘publicity’ requirements?  
 
                                                 
619 McFarlane (2008, p. 132).  See n. 94 in ch. 2. 
620 Id. 
621 Ibid., 156. 
622 As mentioned earlier, it would have been more consistent with the scope of the FCD to limit the 
notion of possession to certificated securities in bearer form and use control for all other financial 
collaterals (see supra section 2 of this chapter).    
623 See text accompanying nn. 166 – 169 in ch. 2. 
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Setting aside the notion of possession another example of a legal concept whose 
meaning seems to have been adjusted to commercial needs is the idea of perfection. 
 
The general rule is that in order to make a security interest against third parties, it is 
necessary to use methods of perfection that ensure some form of public notice.  This 
principle raises the question of whether the new ideas of possession and control offer 
sufficient notice to third parties, so as to promote the stability and transparency of 
financial markets.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the method stated under Reg. 4(2) FMIR is the safest way of 
perfecting a security interest over indirectly held securities.  Indeed, transferring the 
collateral on the creditor’s account and preventing the debtor from disposing of the 
collateral is probably the closest one could get to the traditional meaning of possession.  
This means that the creditor is in a position to closely monitor the assets, with the result 
of avoiding the risk of competing claims624.    
 
The problem arises in cases where the secured creditor acquires merely legal control 
(which can be either negative or both positive and negative).  In this context, it is 
possible to identify two methods by which an account holder may grant legal control 
over his/her securities to third parties.   
 
The first method is the execution of a control agreement, which is typically a three party 
contract among the intermediary, the account holder/debtor and the creditor.625  The 
second method, is a designating entry in favour of the creditor in which securities are 
‘ear marked’ on the securities account of the debtor for the purpose of signalling the 
existence of a security interest626.   
 
A designating entry is entered into a securities account by the intermediary upon 
instruction from the account holder (i.e. the debtor) and may not be made if not 
authorised by the latter.  The main difference between these two methods is that the 
                                                 
624 Of course, this would be the case only under the assumption that the intermediary acts honestly and 
professionally and carefully follows the instructions given by the secured party. 
625 Article 12 (3) (c) of the Geneva Convention; Principle 4.1.5 (b) set out by the European Commission 
(2010, para. 9.2).  See also Recommendation 5 (a), LCG (August 2008, para. 5). 
626 Article 12 (3) (c) of the Geneva Convention; Principle 4.1.5 (a) set out by the European Commission 
(2010, para. 4.1.5).  See also Recommendation 5 (a), LCG (August 2008, para. 5). 
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former, unlike the latter, is a ‘private matter’ between the contracting parties and hence 
it is not visible on any account statement or to any persons authorised to review such an 
account.  The element common to both methods is that the intermediated securities 
remain credited in the debtor’s account and consequently, the secured party’s control 
over those assets is somewhat more limited than the method stated under Reg. 4(2) 
FMIR.  The degree of control is even further exacerbated if the debtor retains certain 
rights over the collateral as a result of a general authorisation granted by the secured 
creditor at the time of entering into the security agreement627.  
 
The main problem is whether legal control (without practical control) is able to alert 
third parties to the existence of a security interest.  A careful consideration of the 
Geneva Convention highlights that in this case a potential secured lender ‘has no way of 
assessing the existence, value and availability of the assets in the accounts other than to 
rely on the information disclosed by the intermediary with the consent of the account 
holder’628. For these reasons, it seems that this form of control cannot provide public 
[emphasis added] notice.  
 
This lack of publicity is emphasised when the security interest is created by way of the 
conclusion of a control agreement, which is a ‘private matter’ and so not visible to 
whoever has access to the account or to an account statement.  Therefore, in this case 
third parties must rely exclusively on the information provided by the intermediary.  On 
the other hand, designating entries offer an element of transparency, i.e. the visibility of 
the existence of this interest within the IT system of the intermediary or within the 
statement account.  Thus, third parties wishing to create a security interest over those 
assets may discover the existence of a previously created security interest when 
obtaining an account statement629. 
 
As emphasised in the Official Commentary of the Geneva Convention, this element of 
transparency is the reason why Article 19(7) allows contracting states to make ‘a 
declaration that, under its [domestic law], any interest granted by a designating entry has 
                                                 
627 Clearly, the creditor’s degree of control is broader in those circumstances where any possible action of 
the debtor over the collateral is subject to the prior authorisation of the secured creditor for each 
transaction.  
628 Thèvenoz (2008, p. 443). 
629 Kanda et al. (2012, paras. 1.46 – 12.28). 
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priority over any interest granted by a [control agreement]’630.  This concern was also 
raised by the European Commission in one of its consultation documents for the 
preparation of the SLD631 as well by the FMLC in its 2004 Commentary on Principles 
for Investment Securities Statute632.  The outcome was that both the European 
Commission and the FMLC recommended that ‘interest in book-entry securities, which 
are acquired by [designating entry] have priority over interests acquired in the same 
book-entry by means of a control agreement […]’633.   
 
However, the fly in the ointment is that such an element of transparency provided by 
designating entries ‘is restricted to the persons who get access to the account and only 
provides a snapshot of existing interest at the time of the access (or of the account 
statement)’634. 
 
As a result of these considerations it can be argued that in cases involving legal control 
alone the effectiveness of a security interest against third parties does not seem to be 
based stricto sensu on publicity requirements but rather on the ability of the secured party 
to simply protect the collateral from unauthorised dispositions. 
 
This brings us to partially reconsider the concept of ‘perfection’ of a security interest 
which – at least with regard to financial collaterals – does not seem to be necessarily 
associated with actions that put third parties ‘on notice’ of the security interest. 
 
5. Summary of the analysis 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 attempt to establish what exactly is meant by control (under Article 
2(2) of the FCD) when setting out the method of perfection of a security interest over 
indirectly held securities. 
 
                                                 
630 Ibid., paras. 12-30 and 19-7.  The general rule under Article 19 (3) of the Geneva Convention is that 
interests acquired through designating entries and control agreements are ranked on the basis of when 
each of them becomes effective (i.e. first in time priority rule).  However, paragraph 7 of the same Article 
allows a Contracting State to give priority to an interest granted by a designating entry. 
631 Principle 9 (1) (1) (c) set out by the European Commission (2010, para. 9.2).  See also 
Recommendation 8 (c), LCG (August 2008, para. 8.3.2). 
632 Commentary on Principles For Investment Securities Statute, Principle 7 (d) in FMLC (July 2004, p. 17). 
633 Recommendation 8 (c), LCG (August 2008, para. 8.3.2). 
634 Kanda et al. (2012, para. 12-30). 
 
 
148
As a general rule, control can be positive and/or negative as well as legal and/or 
practical.  This means that there is no absolute or single definition of control, since the 
content of this concept may vary significantly depending on the terms and conditions of 
the security agreement.  In this regard, it is possible to identify at least seven different 
combinations of control: (i) practical, legal, negative and positive control; (ii) practical, 
negative and positive control; (iii) practical, legal and positive control; (iv) practical, legal 
and negative control; (v) legal and positive control; (vi) legal and negative control and 
(vii) legal, positive and negative control.  The question is which of these combinations 
can be considered applicable for the purposes of the FCD? 
 
None of the three theories related to the nature of the investor’s right is able to provide 
an answer to this question.  The reason for this is that the theoretical debate on the 
proprietary or sui generis characterisation of the investor’s right is irrelevant when 
determining the exact meaning of control.  At least at first sight, all three theories can be 
applied, given that a security interest is perfected by way of control, regardless of the 
type of collateral involved (that can be either the sub-property, the right against a right 
or simply the securities standing at the top of the chain). 
 
With regard to the theory of an indirect right in rem, some difficulties may arise when 
looking closer at the practical consequences related to the notion of control. Indeed, if 
one were to accept this theory each account holder standing in the chain would find 
his/herself in the unusual position of having control over the underlying securities, 
simultaneously as well as independently of one another.  This description may come up 
against some friction with the concept of control, given that such a concept implies the 
possibility for the secured creditor to exclude others emphasis added from disposing of 
the collateral. On the contrary, the theories of a right against a right and of an interest in 
securities do not seem to create similar problems with the practice of intermediated 
securities. 
 
The point that remains to be determined (and that, moreover, cannot be solved by the 
theories related to the nature of the investor’s right) concerns the need to establish 
which of the seven different combinations mentioned above would be consistent with 
the FCD.  In the United Kingdom the debate on this issue has been rather a heated one 
due to the wording of Article 2(2) of the FCD being far from clear on this particular 
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point.  The entry in force of Reg. 4 (2) of the FMIR as well as the recent decision in Re 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) has (at least in part) cast some 
light on the issue, leading us to identify four different combinations which should fall 
within the scope of the FCD, i.e. (i) practical, legal, negative and positive control, (ii) 
practical, legal and negative control, (iii) legal and negative control and (iv) legal, positive 
and negative control. 
 
Of these combinations the first two are now included under Reg. 4(2) of the FMIR 
within the meaning of possession.  This provision may be difficult to reconcile with the 
theory of a right against a right, given that such a theory is based on the idea that all 
proprietary rights (including possession) are strictly linked to physical objects and 
therefore cannot be applied to any form of intangibles (such as securities).   
 
As regards these last two combinations, the decision in Re Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) (In Administration) confirms the idea that they should be included within the 
meaning of control.  However, it is yet not quite clear which specific rights the debtor is 
entitled to retain over the collateral without jeopardising the control of the secured 
creditor. More specifically, an appropriate question to put forward here might be: what 
are the rights (other than the right of substitution and withdrawal of excess collateral) 
that the debtor may be entitled to exercise over the securities? The market practice 
considers a statutory clarification on this point to be most urgent. 
7. Conclusions 
 
English law has been able to accommodate many issues concerning the practice of 
indirectly held securities to the well-developed principles of trust and sub-trust.  
However, the complexity of the custody chain as well as limits posed to the 
enforceability of the investor’s rights (along the multi-tiered holding structure), may 
cause reservations on the proprietary nature of such rights.  
 
In regard to this, McFarlane and Stevens proposed a solution defining the right of the 
investor as a ‘right against, or to, a right’ (rather than a right in rem).  More specifically, 
the investor (who stands at the bottom of the chain and acts as the beneficiary of a sub-
trust) is considered to hold a sui generis right, since such a right does not attach to a thing 
but simply relates to the right of another.  The advantage of classifying this interest as a 
right against a right is that it can better explain the structure of intermediation and 
demonstrate that there is no need for a statutory reform in this area of law. 
 
This thesis critically evaluates McFarlane and Stevens’ argument, showing firstly, that 
the proprietary classification of the investor’s right is to be preferred to a sui generis 
solution and secondly, that a statutory clarification may still be useful in certain 
circumstances, given that neither the proprietary nor the sui generis approach can offer 
adequate answers to all emphasis added problems involving the practice of 
intermediated securities. 
 
7.1 The concept of a right against the intermediary’s right cannot be considered 
more convincing than the proprietary theory  
 
Regarding the first of the above mentioned points, it is possible to identify two theories 
based on the proprietary nature of the investor’s right, namely the concept of an indirect 
right in rem and that of an interest in a sub-property or in a derivative asset.  While the 
first theory suggests that the investor holds an indirect right in the underlying securities 
(standing at the top of the chain), the second is based on the idea that the investor’s 
right does not attach to the underlying securities but simply to a different asset which 
coincides with the proprietary right of the relevant intermediary. 
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The thesis points out that the concept of an indirect right in rem may entail difficulties in 
explaining consequences related to the structure of intermediation.  For example, it fails 
to explain the application of PRIMA in cross-border transactions, without the 
introduction of a statutory exception to the well-established lex rei sitae rule.  At present 
PRIMA has only been introduced in SFD and FCD and these are limited exclusively to 
collateral arrangements.  In all other cases involving the resolution of proprietary issues 
the lex rei sitae rule continues to apply.  Hence, in order to satisfy the needs of market 
practice it would appear necessary to introduce a statutory provision that would extend 
PRIMA to all dealings involving intermediated securities.  Another example that could 
create difficulties is the lack of transparency typically associated to the practice of 
intermediated securities.  In particular, when using omnibus accounts the investor’s 
interest in the securities is only registered in the books of the relevant intermediary (with 
no reference being made to the investor’s title higher up the holding chain).  This lack 
of transparency is in conflict with the theory of an indirect right in rem, as it cannot 
provide an explanation as to why there is no clear tracing thread between the investor 
and the underlying securities. Thirdly, it may also be difficult to reconcile the theory of 
an indirect right in rem to the coexistence of multiple rights of possession and control 
along the holding chain of intermediaries.  Indeed, if one were to accept such a theory, 
each account holder standing in the holding chain would have possession or control 
over the underlying securities.  This description, however, can be somewhat confusing 
given that it conceives of more than one party having exclusive and immediate control 
over the same asset at the same time as well as independently of one another. 
 
Notwithstanding these considerations on the theory of an indirect right in rem, it is 
possible to assert that the concept of an interest in a sub-property or in a derivative asset 
is generally capable of explaining the complexity of the holding structure of 
intermediaries.  It can justify the application of PRIMA as a development of the 
traditional lex rei sitae rule635 as well as explaining the lack of transparency and the 
meaning of possession or control in an indirect holding system.  Thus, contrary to 
McFarlane and Stevens’ argument, the (latter) proprietary approach does not create 
inconsistencies when used to describe financial practice and therefore proves to be a 
valid theoretical basis for assessing the nature of the investor’s right.  
 
                                                 
635 This makes it possible to avoid the need for a statutory in cross-border transactions. 
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A closer look at the theory of an interest in a sub-property shows that it has much in 
common with the theory of a right against a right, the main difference being simply one 
of labels rather than substance.  More specifically, while the first theory recognises the 
right of the intermediary as the item of property emphasis added held by the investor, the 
second simply considers the investor’s right against the intermediary’s right as a sui 
generis title.  This means that the two theories are interchangeable and can be adapted 
without difficulty to the practice of intermediated securities. However, the author has 
included evidence demonstrating that the concept of an interest in a sub-property is to 
be preferred to that of a right against a right as it reflects the historical development of 
English legal taxonomy (which extends the category of proprietary rights to include a 
large number of intangibles, such as mere rights).   
 
In support of the proprietary characterisation of the investor’s right, it should be 
mentioned that initially, in the United States, the intention of the Drafting Committee 
for the revision to Article 8 UCC was to classify security entitlements as pure sui generis 
rights, without labelling them either as proprietary or personal rights636.  The objective 
was clearly to prevent academics and practitioners from analysing the new concept 
through the lens of the existing principles of contract or property law.  However, the 
Drafting Committee soon realized that lawyers would have had difficulties in 
understanding (and dealing with) this concept without qualifying security entitlements 
within the classical dichotomy between personal rights and proprietary rights.  For these 
reasons, during the final stages of the revision they decided to introduce § 8-503 UCC, 
that defines security entitlements as a ‘sui generis form of property interest’637 (on 
consideration of the many features of this concept that are typically associated to 
proprietary rights)638.   
 
As a result of this analysis, one could argue that the problem should not really be about 
choosing between a proprietary or a sui generis classification of the investor’s right but 
rather about identifying the specific asset or thing which attaches to the proprietary right 
of the account holder. 
                                                 
636 The proprietary classification of the investor’s rights has been recently confirmed in Pearson v. Lehman 
Brothers Finance SA [2010] EWCA 2914 (Ch) which defines the interest of a beneficiary under a trust as a 
right in rem rather than a sui generis right.  . 
637 Official Comment, § 8-104 UCC para. 2.   
638 The author is grateful to James S. Rogers’ considerations on this point (telephone conversation of May 
2014). 
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7.2 Is there a need for statutory reform? 
 
In regard to the second point, the theory of a right against a right and that of an interest 
in a sub-property cannot overcome all emphasis added the problems which may arise 
when attempting to apply the existing principles of trust law to the practice of 
intermediated securities.   
 
For example, in cases of shortfall neither of the two theories can help us determine the 
most appropriate solution for allocating losses in an omnibus account.  Although from a 
theoretical prospective the tracing approach can be considered the most appropriate 
answer to this problem, such an approach is extremely difficult to apply to the practice 
of intermediated securities and it is likely to prevent investors from obtaining immediate 
access to their own securities.  Such a difficulty has recently led to the introduction 
(under Regulation 12 SAR) of the pro-rata sharing solution which is meant to substitute 
the tracing rule in cases of failure of investment firms639.  While on the one hand, this 
provision has significantly improved the existing legal framework, on the other, it does 
not take into consideration certain issues, like for example the proposal put forward by 
practitioners to apply the pro-rata sharing rule to all customers’ assets (rather than 
dividing the property on an issue-by-issue basis)640. 
 
Similarly, the theory of a right against a right and that of an interest in a sub-property 
cannot explain the exact meaning of control, as a method of perfection of a security 
interest.  Consequently, in this case it is still necessary to establish which specific rights 
can be retained by the debtor (whilst at the same time allowing the secured creditor to 
maintain control over the collateral)641.  The FMLC and the CLLS - Financial Law 
Committee believe that (at least in cases where charges form part of a wholesale 
agreement) it would be useful for the debtor to have unrestricted rights over the 
                                                 
639 In this regard, Bloxham emphasises in his Final Review of the Investment Bank Special Aministration 
Regulations 2011 that during the last financial practice the problem with the UK Client Asset Protection 
Regime has been its exclusive reliance on trust law concepts, which are sometimes difficult to apply to 
sophisticated investment markets.  'The most commonly cited example' in this case, continues Bloxham, 
'is the doctrine of tracing', Bloxham (January 2014, para. 3.15).  Cfr. n. 648. 
640 This suggestion would pose the UK pro-rata sharing solution along the lines of the distribution scheme 
adopted in the United States under SIPA. 
641 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch), para. 132. 
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collateral642.  Even though this proposal may raise concerns on the level of protection 
for third parties643, it does highlight the need for greater flexibility in the use of financial 
collaterals, particularly in the form of the debtor’s rights to dispose of the collateral 
(which should not be limited to the mere right of substitution and withdrawal of excess 
collateral). 
 
As for the problem concerning insufficient certainty in an omnibus account, a solution is 
offered by the existing principle of co-ownership which is based on the idea that in a 
trust fund each beneficiary maintains a portion of a single bulk (rather than a right in 
specific assets).  Such a principle can easily be applied to the practice of intermediated 
securities644, regardless of whether the interest of the investor is defined as a right 
against a right or as an interest in a sub-property645.  There are, however, specific issues 
related to omnibus accounts which would certainly benefit from a statutory clarification.  
For example, it would be useful to introduce the concept of an implied consent between 
co-owners of a trust fund, given that such a concept would allow investors to dispose of 
their share in the bulk independently of one another646.  
 
These considerations show that the discussion on the nature of the investor’s right does 
not necessarily demonstrate that no statutory reform is required in the practice of 
intermediated securities.  Indeed, such a discussion can assist us in understanding more 
fully the complexity of the legal structure of intermediation (explaining, for example, the 
application of the no-look-through principle, the lack of transparency associated to 
omnibus accounts as well as the use of PRIMA when selecting the applicable law in cross-
border transactions).  Yet, there are still limited areas where the conceptual differences 
between a right against a right, an indirect right in rem and also an interest in a sub-
                                                 
642 See letters of the FMLC (April 2011) and the CLLS - Financial Law Committee (October 2010). 
643 See, on this point, HM Treasury (November 2010, para. 2.21) and Id. (August 2010, paras. 3.3).   
644 Pearson and others v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch) and (2011 EWCA Civ. 1544).   
645 Indeed, the conceptual differences between the two theories have no relevant impact on the discussion 
about the potential uncertainty of the subject matter in a trust fund.    
646 Consistent with this argument, it is worth mentioning another aspect that is not analysed in the thesis 
but that also requires a statutory intervention, i.e. the need to provide an adequate level of protection for 
good faith purchasers who acquire intermediated securities.  In this respect, while purchasers of directly 
held securities can benefit from the general rules of mercantile law, which protect the good faith 
purchaser of negotiable instruments, there is a lack of protection under English law for a purchaser who 
acquires intermediated securities by way of a transfer on the books of an intermediary.  The FMLC and 
the English Law Commission believe that there should be no difference in legal treatment between 
investors and that consequently good faith purchasers of intermediated securities should not be allocated 
the risk of the intermediary's negligence or fraud.  See on this point English Law Commission (May 2008, 
para. 5.6) and FMLC (July 2004, para. 6.8). 
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property have no impact on market practice and where the case for law reform has 
certainly been proven.   
 
As pointed out in its report to HM Treasury of May 2008, the English Law Commission 
looked favourably upon a legislative reform in the practice of intermediated securities 
but it believed that such a reform should be implemented, at least in part, at an 
international level, through the UNIDROIT Convention and the future EU 
legislation647.  Seven years have passed since the publication of this report and it now 
seems most unlikely that a common legal framework will ever be implemented in this 
specific practice, due to the Member States’ strong resistance to harmonisation of 
certain areas of law, particularly those related to insolvency and proprietary issues648.  As 
a result, it is recommended that a legislative reform be passed in the United Kingdom, 
so as to overcome the uncertainties remaining in this complex area of law and ensure 
greater security for transactions and entitlements. 
 
In his Final Review of the Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 2011 of January 
2014, Bloxham proposes a radical reform of the client asset protection regime.  In 
particular, he stresses the importance ‘in [...] modern and sophisticated investment 
markets’649 to stop relying on the existing principles of trust and introduce ad hoc 
legislation on intermediated securities650.  This proposal finds some resistance among 
                                                 
647 English Law Commission (May 2008, para. 1.17): 'As already mentioned, the FMLC have 
recommended that domestic legislation be passed to rectify various legal uncertainties and deficiencies 
concerning the ownership, transfer and pledge of intermediated securities under English law.  We believe, 
however, that subject to one exception concerning purchasers of intermediated securities, it makes little 
sense for us to propose a range of changes to English law while the work of UNIDROIT and the Legal 
Certainty Group is ongoing. A number of consultees have expressed the concern that we avoid a situation 
in which domestic legislation is passed only it to be modified shortly thereafter as a result of new 
European or international measures.  The Treasury shares this view.'    
648 At present the UNIDROIT Convention it has been signed by only one of the forty negotiating States 
(i.e. Bangladesh).  In addition, the working programme of the European Commission for 2015 does not 
include the SLL and therefore it seems likely that no further development on this project can be expected 
in the near future.  
649 Bloxham (January 2014, para. 3.15). 
650 Ibid., paras. 3.15 - 3.16: 'During the course of my discussions with interested parties, a number of 
different experts, notably from within the legal profession, forcefully made the point that a fundamental 
problem with the UK Client Asset Protection Regime is its reliance on general English property and trust 
law concepts, which are increasingly difficult to apply to the fast moving and intangible rights typically the 
subject of modern and sophisticated investment markets. The most commonly cited example is the 
doctrine of Tracing, but others (such as the varieties of set off) exist.  One of the objectives for the SAR 
in the Act is to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial services industry in the United 
Kingdom. I consider that in view of this clear and understandable policy objective, it makes sense to listen 
to those who take the view that a more radical review should be undertaken of the legal basis under which 
client entitlements can arise and in particular whether trust and property law concepts are still well enough 
adapted to interests in products in the financial markets. This should be done on the basis of a very 
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English scholars, who believe that ‘the use of property rights under a trust remains a 
sound private law basis for client asset protection in traditional custody’651.   
 
As mentioned earlier there are still important issues within the existing legal framework 
that may indeed require statutory intervention, but this cannot bring us to exclude in toto 
trust law concepts as the legal basis for the practice of intermediated securities.   
 
Indeed, it was emphasised, during the conference ‘Law After Lehmans’ held at the LSE 
on October 13th 2013, that (with the exception of certain aspects, such as the doctrine 
of tracing) the existing principles of trust were overall able to overcome the many issues 
arising from the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  Hence, rather than introducing a 
radically different regime (along the lines of Article 8 UCC), it is likely that English law 
will attempt to overcome the uncertainties remaining in the existing legal framework 
while continuing to rely on trust law concepts.  This confirms once again that contrary 
to McFarlane and Stevens' view, the general trend in English law is to elaborate 
(wherever possible) an elastic conception of property that can ‘readily adapt to the many 
efficiency-driven market practices’652. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                          
specific call for evidence. It may also require a preliminary investigation of what flexibility there is under 
mandatory European law to move to a radically different regime.',  Cfr. n. 638.   
651 Benjamin (2014, p. 333). 
652 Id. 
 
 
157
Appendix to Chapter 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
158
Bibliography 
1. BOOKS AND ARTICLES 
Ames, J. B. (1913). Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Amos, M. S. (1936/1937). The Common Law and the Civil Law in the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. Harvard Law Review 50, pp. 1249-1274. 
 
Austen-Peters, A. O. (2000). Custody of Investments: Law and Practice. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Barker, K. (1998). Equitable Title and Common Law Confusion: The Limits of 
the Fusionist Ideal RLR pp. 150 - 156.  
 
Becker, L. C. (1980). The Moral Basis of Property Rights in Pennock, J. R. & 
Chapman, J. W. (eds.), Property, Nomos XXII. New York: New York University 
Press, pp. 187 - 200.  
 
Beale, H. et al. (2012). ‘Perfection of Security Interests over Financial Collateral’ in 
Beale et al The Law of Personal Property Security. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 387 - 404. 
 
Beale, H. (2004). Reform of the Law of Security – Another View JIBFL 4, pp. 117 
– 122.  
 
Bell, A. P. (1989). Modern Law of Personal Property in England and Ireland. London: 
Butterworths. 
 
Benjamin, J. (2014). The Law and Regulation of Custody Securities Cutting the 
Gordian Knot CMLJ, 9, 3, pp. 327 - 338. 
 
Benjamin, J. (2009). Securities Collateral in de Lacy J. (ed.), The Reform of UK 
Personal Property Security Law Comparative Perspectives. London: Routledge – 
Cavendish, pp. 223 - 269.   
 
 
159
 
Benjamin, J. (2007). Financial Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Benjamin, J. (2003). Dematerialisation of Money Market Instruments in 
Worthington S. (ed.) Commercial Law and Commercial Practice. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, pp. 249 - 304. 
 
Benjamin, J. (2000). Interest in Securities. A Property Law Analysis of the International 
Securities Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bernasconi, C. et al. (2002). General introduction: legal nature of interests in 
indirectly held securities and resulting conflict of laws analysis in Potok, R. (ed.), 
Cross Border Collateral: Legal Risk and the Conflict of Laws. London: Butterworths 
LexisNexis, Ch. 1. 
 
Blackstone, W. (1765 - 1769). Commentaries on the Laws of England, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Bridge, M. G. (2014). The Sale of Goods. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bridge, M. G. et al. (2013) The Law of Personal Property, London, Sweet & Maxwell. 
 
Bridge, M.G. (2008). The Scope and Limits of Security Interests ECFR (Special 
Volume: The Future of Secured Credit in Europe), pp. 180 – 214. 
 
Bridge, M. G. (2006). The Law Commission’s Proposals for the Reform of 
Corporate Security Interests in Getzler, J. and Payne, J. Company Charges: Spectrum 
and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 267 - 290. 
 
Bridge, M. G. (2002). Personal Property Law, Clarendon Law Series. 3rd ed. Oxford: 
University Press.  
 
Calnan, R. (2006). Taking Security. Law and Practice. Jordans: Bristol.  
 
 
 
160
Chan, D. et al. (August 2007). The Securities Custody Industry. European Central 
Bank, Occasional Paper Series, no. 68. 
 
Chell, E. et al. (2013). Possession and control: financial collateral remains a Gray 
area, JIBFL 1, 43.  
 
Coke, E. (1639). The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: or a Commentary 
on Littleton. 4th ed. London. 
 
Conaglen, M. (2005). Contests Between Rival Trust Beneficiaries Cambridge L.J. 
64, pp. 45 - 48. 
 
Cook, W. W. (1915). The Powers of Courts of Equity Colum. L. Rev. 15, pp. 106 - 
141. 
 
Cooke, C. (2011). Lehman Brothers: certainty of trusts and the RASCALS 
litigation J.I.B.F.L. 3, pp. 136 - 137. 
 
Cooke, C. (2010). F2G Realisations: floating charges and the Financial Collateral 
Regulations JIBFL 9, pp. 518 - 519. 
 
Davies, G. (2007). Using Intermediated Securities as Collateral: Equitable 
Interests with Inequitable Results JIBFL 2, pp. 70 - 73.  
 
Collins L. et al. (2012). Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws. 15th ed. 
London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
 
Dilnot A. and Harris, L. (2012). Ownership of a fund JIBFL 5, pp. 272 - 274. 
 
Edelman, J. (2013). Two fundamental questions for the law of trusts LQR pp. 66 - 
86.  
 
Ellinger, E.P. et al. (2011). Ellinger’s Modern Banking. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
 
161
 
Facciolo F. J. (1999 – 2000). Father knows best: revised article 8 and the 
individual investor. Fla. St. U. L. Rev., 27, pp. 615 - 714. 
Fawcett, A. (2005). The Financial Collateral Directive: an examination of some 
practical problems following its implementation in the UK JIBLR, pp. 95 - 99.  
 
Gardella, A. (2007). Le garanzie finanziarie nel diritto internazionale private. Milan: 
Giuffré. 
 
Gardner, S. (2011). An Introduction to the Law of Trusts. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Goldsworthy, S. (2013). Taking possession and control to excess: issues with 
financial collateral arrangements under English law J.I.B.F.L. pp. 71 - 73.  
 
Goode, R. (2009). Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
 
Goode, R. et al. assisted by Bernasconi C. (2005). The Explanatory Report: Hague 
Securities Convention: Explanatory Report. Hague Conference on Private International 
Law.  
 
Goode, R. (2003). Are intangible assets fungible? LMCLQ pp. 379 - 387. 
 
Goode, R. et al. (1998). Oxford Colloquium on Collateral and Conflict of Laws 
B.J.I.B.F.L. 9 - Special Supplement.   
 
Goodman, J. (2012). Lehman “Rascals” J.I.B.F.L., 1 p. 57. 
 
Gorla, G. (1981). Diritto comparato e diritto comune europeo. Milan: Giuffré. 
 
Gorla, G. (1964). Diritto Comparato in Enc. Dir., XII. Milan: Giuffré.   
 
Gray J. and Metzing P. C. (2013). Defining and Delivering Judgement-Based 
Supervision: The interface with the legal system JBR 14, 3/4, pp. 228–240. 
 
 
162
 
Gray, K. and Gray, S. F. (2009). Elements of Land Law. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Grey, T. C. (1980). The Disintegration of Property, in Pennock J. R. & Chapman 
J. W. (eds.), Property, Nomos, XXII. New York University Press, pp. 69 - 85. 
 
Gullifer, L. and Goode, R. (2013). Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security. 5th 
ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
 
Gullifer, L. (2012). What should we do about financial collateral? C.I.P. 65, p. 377.  
 
Gullifer, L. (2010). Ownership of Securities. The Problems Caused by 
Intermediation in Gullifer, L. and Payne, J. (eds.), Intermediated Securities. Legal 
Problems and Practical Issues. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 1 - 31.  
 
Gullifer, L. and Goode, R. (2008). Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security. 4th 
ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
 
Guynn, R. D. (1996). Modernizing Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Laws - A 
Discussion Paper on the Need for International Harmonization. Capital Markets Forum, 
International Bar Association. 
 
Hanbury, H. G. (1935). Modern Equity 1st ed. London: Stevens & Sons Ltd. 
 
Hargreaves, E. (2011). The Nature of Beneficiaries’ Rights under Trust TL 4, pp. 
163-183.  
 
Harris S. L. and Mooney, C. W. (2006). Security Interest in Personal Property. Cases, 
Problems and Materials. 4th ed. New York: Foundation Press. 
 
Harris, J. (2002). Property - Rights in Rem or Wealth? in Birks P. and Pretto-
Sakmann Themes in Comparative Law. In Honour of Bernard Rudden (eds), Oxford 
University Press, pp. 51 - 63.  
 
 
163
 
Harris, R. (1961). The concept of possession in English Law in Guest, A. G. 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 69 - 106. 
 
Hawes, C. (2011). Tortious Interference with Goods: Title to Sue Canta LR 17, 2, 
pp. 331 - 353.  
 
Hayton, D. et al. eds. (2010). Underhill and Hayton Law of Trusts and Trustees. 
18th ed. London: Lexis Nexis.  
 
Hayton, D. J. (1994). Uncertainty of Subject-Matter of Trusts LQR 110, pp. 335 - 
340.  
 
Holland, T. E. (1882). The Elements of Jurisprudence. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Holmes, O. W. (1963). The Common Law (ed. by M. De Wolfe Howe). Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company and Harvard University Press.  
 
Honoré, A. M. (1961). ‘Ownership’ Chapter V, in Guest A. G. (ed.), Oxford Essay 
in Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 107 - 147. 
 
Hudson, A. (2013). Understanding Equity & Trusts. 4th ed. London: Routledge. 
 
Hudson, A. (2009). Equity and Trusts. 6th ed. London: Routledge-Cavendish. 
 
Huston, C. A. (1915). The Enforcement of Decrees in Equity. Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Johansson, E. (2009). Property Rights in Investment Securities and the Doctrine of 
Specificity. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.  
 
Kahan, M. and Rock, E. (2009). On Improving Shareholder Voting in Armour J. & 
Payne J. (eds.), Rationality in Company Law: Essay in Honour of DD Prentice. Oxford: 
Hart Publishing. 
 
 
164
 
Kanda H. et al. (2012). Official Commentary on the UNIDROIT Convention on 
Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Khimji, M. F. (2007). The Role of Legal Concepts in Commercial Law: 
Comments on Spink, Rogers and Scavone Can. Bus. L.J. 45, pp. 94 - 102.  
 
Langdell, C. C. (1908). A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction. 2nd ed. Cambridge MA: 
The Harvard Law Review Association.  
 
Lawson, F. H. and Rudden, B. (1982). The Law of Property. Clarendon Law Series 
2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Lawson, F. H. (1975). Common Law. International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
IV/2, VIII. Tübingen-Paris. 
 
Lomnicka E. (2012a). ‘Financing Devices Involving the Transfer or Retention of 
Title’ in Beale et al., The Law of Personal Property Security. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 177 - 244. 
 
Lomnicka E. (2012b). ‘Financing Devices Involving the Transfer or Retention of 
Title’ and ‘Enforcement of True Security Interests’ in Beale et al., The Law of 
Security and Title-Based Financing. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 235 - 
302 and pp. 559 - 590. 
 
Low, K. F. K. (2010). Equitable title and economic loss LQR, pp. 507 - 512. 
 
Lowrie S. and Todd, P. (1997). In Defence of the North American Rolling Charge 
Denning L.J. 12, pp. 43 - 62.  
 
Lyons, H. et al. (2012). Effect of intercompany arrangements on ownership of 
securities JIBFL, 3, pp. 195 - 196. 
  
 
 
165
Maitland, F. W. (1936). Equity. A Course of Lectures (2nd rev. ed. by Brunyate J.). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Martin, J. E. (2012). Hanbury & Martin - Modern Equity. 19th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell.  
 
Mattei, U. (2000). Basic Principles of Property Law.  A Comparative Legal and Economic 
Introduction. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
 
Matthews, P. (2002). From Obligation to Property, and Back Again? The Future 
of the Non-Charitable Purpose Trust in D. Hayton (ed.) Extending the Boundaries of 
Trusts and Similar Ring-Fenced Funds, Kluwer Law International, pp. 203 - 241. 
 
McCormick, R. (2006). EU Directive on Financial Collateral Arrangements: 
Replies of a Working Group of the CLLS Financial Law Committee to the 
Questionnaire of February 2006 to the Private Sector From the European 
Commission for the Drafting of the Evaluation Report JIBFL 6, p. 263.  
 
McFarlane, B. and Stevens, R. (2010 a). Interests in Securities. Practical Problems 
and Conceptual Solutions, in Gullifer L. & Payne J. (eds.), Intermediated Securities: 
Legal Problems and Practical Issues, Oxford, Hart Publishing, pp. 33 - 59. 
 
McFarlane, B. and Stevens, R. (2010 b). The Nature of Equitable Property, Journal 
of Equity, 4, pp. 1 - 28. 
 
McFarlane, B. (2008). The Structure of Property Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
 
McKendrick E. and Goode R. (2009). Goode on Commercial Law. 4th London: Lexis-
Nexis.  
 
McKnight, A. (2011). A review of 2010: part 2 Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 5 (2) March, 
pp. 95 - 112. 
 
 
 
166
McKnight, A. (2006). The Reform of English Law Concerning Secured 
Transactions JIBLR pp. 587 - 598.   
 
Micheler, E. (2014). Intermediated Securities and Legal Certainty. LSE Legal 
Studies Working Paper No. 3/2014. 
 
Micheler, E. (2010). The Legal Nature of Securities: Inspirations from 
Comparative Law in Gullifer, L. and Payne, J. (eds.), Intermediated Securities. Legal 
Problems and Practical Issues. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 131 - 148.  
 
Micheler, E. (2007). Property in Securities. A Comparative Study. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Moffat, G. et al. (2009). Trusts law: text and materials. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Mooney, C. W. and Kanda, H. (2010). Core Issues under the UNIDROIT 
(Geneva) Convention on Intermediated Securities: Views from the United States 
and Japan, in Gullifer L. and Payne J. (eds.), Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems 
and Practical Issues. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 69 - 129. 
 
Mooney, C. W. (2008). Law and Systems for Intermediated Securities and the Relationship 
of Private Property Law to Securities Clearance and Settlement: United States, Japan, and the 
UNIDROIT Draft Convention. Discussion Paper No. 2008-E-7. Imes Discussion 
Paper Series. Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies – Bank of Japan. 
G. Morton (2003). Commentary on The Dematerialisation of Money Market 
Instruments in Worthingon S. (ed.) Commercial Law and Commercial Practice. Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, pp. 249 - 304. 
   
Moss, G. (2010). Issues Arising from Insolvency in Gullifer, L. & Payne, J. (eds.), 
Intermediated Securities. Legal Problems and Practical Issues. Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
pp. 61 - 68. 
  
 
 
167
Nathan J. A. and Marshall, O. R. (1967). A Casebook on Trusts. 5th ed. London: 
Stevens.  
 
Neave, M. and Weinberg, W. (1978-1980). The Nature and Function of Equities 
U. Tas. L. Rev. 1, 6 pp. 24 - 38.   
 
Nolan, R. C. (2006 a). Equitable Property LQR 122, pp. 232 - 265. 
 
Nolan, R. C. (2006 b). Understanding the Limits of Equitable Property Journal of 
Equity 1, pp.18 - 40. 
 
Ooi, M. (2003). Shares and Other Securities in the Conflict of Laws. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Paech, P. (November 2012). Market Needs as Paradigm: Breaking Up the 
Thinking on EU Securities Law. LSE Law Working Paper Series.  
 
Palmer, N. E. (1986). The Vindication of Commercial Security over Commodities: 
Equitable Pledges and Conversion LMCLQ pp. 218 - 234.  
 
Parsons, R. (2011). HM Treasury’s consultation paper on financial collateral: 
extracts from the CLLS Financial Law Committee’s response JIBFL 1, pp. 6 - 11. 
 
Parsons, R. and Dening, M. (2011). Financial collateral – an opportunity missed 
Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 5 (3) May pp. 164 - 175. 
 
Payne, J. (2010). Intermediated Securities and the Right to Vote in the UK in 
Gullifer L. and Payne J. (eds.), Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical 
Issues. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 187 - 216. 
 
Penner, J. (2014). The (True) Nature of a Beneficiary’s Equitable Proprietary 
Interest Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence, 27, pp. 473 - 500. 
 
Penner, J. E. (2012). The Law of Trusts. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
 
168
 
Penner, J. (2009). The Structure of Property Law (Book Review) RLR pp. 250 - 
258. 
 
Penner, J. E. (1997). The Idea of Property in Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Penner, J. E. (1996). The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property UCLA Law 
Review, 43, pp. 711 - 820. 
 
Pettit , P. H. (2012). Equity and the Law of Trusts. 12th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Pollock F. and Wright, R. S. (1888). An Essay on Possession in Common Law. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
Pretto-Sakmann, A. (2005). Boundaries of Personal Property. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
 
Pretto-Sakmann, A. (2002). Primary Rights and Rights in Rem in Birks P. and 
Pretto-Sakmann Themes in Comparative Law. In Honour of Bernard Rudden (eds), 
Oxford University Press, pp. 65 - 80.  
 
Rahmatian, A. (2009). Review of B. McFarlane - The Structure of Property Law. 
Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008, MLR 72(5), pp. 877 – 881. 
 
Rogers, J. S. (2006). Conflict of Laws for Transactions in Securities Held Through 
Intermediaries Cornell Int’l LJ. 39 pp. 285 - 328.  
 
Rogers, J. S. (1996). Policy Perspectives on Revised UCC Article 8 UCLA Law 
Review 43 pp. 1431- 1503. 
 
Rogers, J. S. (1995). An Essay on Horseless Carriages and Paperless Negotiable 
Instruments: Some Lessons From the Article 8 Revision Idaho L. Rev. 31, pp. 689 - 
698. 
 
 
 
169
Rudden, B. (1987). Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus 
Problem in Eekelaar, J. and Bell, J. Oxford essays in jurisprudence (eds), Third Series. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 239 - 263. 
 
Rushworth, A. and Scott, A (2010). Total Chaos? Shell v Total LMCLQ pp. 536 - 
543.  
 
Saoul, D. (2013). Lehman: liens untied JIBFL 3, pp. 143 - 145.  
 
Schroeder, J. L. (1996). Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the UCC Killed 
Property Temp. L. Rev. 69, 4, pp. 1281 - 1341.  
 
Schroeder, J. L. (1994). Bundle-O-Stix: Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of 
Property Mich. L. Rev. 93, pp. 239 - 319. 
 
Schroeder (1994) Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of 
Secured Lending on Wall Street Colum. Bus. L. Rev. pp. 291 – 502. 
 
Scott, A. W. (1917). The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust Colum. L. 
Rev. 17, pp. 269 - 290. 
 
Scott, A. W. (1913-1914). The right to follow money wrongfully mingled with 
other money Harv. L. Rev. 27, pp. 125 - 138. 
 
Sherman and Sterling LLP (2012). United Kingdom: dematerialized securities – 
intercompany funding agreements J.I.B.L.R. p. 77. 
 
Simpson J. and Dahan, F. (2005). Publicity of Security Rights: Why and How 1 
JIBFL p. 3. 
 
Smith, M. (2008). Equitable owners enforcing legal rights? LQR, pp. 517 - 523. 
 
Smith L. (2008). Trust and Patrimony Revue générale de droit, 38, pp. 379 - 403 
 
 
 
170
Smith, L. (2000). Tracing in Bank Accounts: The Lowest Intermediate Balance 
Rule on Trial Can. Bus. L. J. 33, pp. 75 - 91. 
 
Smith, L. D. (1997). The Law of Tracing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Stone, H. F. (1917). The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust Colum. L. 
Rev. 17, pp. 467 - 501.   
 
Swayze, F. J. (1915). The Growing Law 25 Yale L. J. 25, pp. 1 - 19.  
 
Tettenborn, A. (1996). Trust Property and Conversion CLJ 55, pp. 36 - 42.   
 
Thévenoz, L. (2008). Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk, and the International 
Harmonisation of Commercial Law Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 13, pp. 384 – 452. 
 
Toube, F. (2011). Rascals: indirect holding systems and trusts Insolv. Int. pp. 74 - 
76.  
 
Turing, D. (2005). New Growth In The Financial Collateral Garden JIBFL 1, pp. 
4 - 9. 
 
Turing, D. (August 2005). Omnibus Accounts, European Commission Legal Certainty 
Group Document.  
Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financialmarkets/clearing/certainty/index_
en.htm. 
 
Turing, D. and Lester, K. (2005). Implementation of the EU Directive on 
Financial Collateral Arrangements in the United Kingdom JIBLR pp. 65 - 71. 
 
Turner, P. G. (2010). Consequential Economic Loss and the Trust Beneficiary 
CLJ, 69, 3, pp. 445 – 447. 
 
 
 
171
Turner, R. W. (1931). The Equity of Redemption: Its Nature, History and Connection with 
equitable estates generally. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Virgo, G. (2012). The Principles of Equity and Trusts. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Waters, D. W. M. (1967). The Nature of the Trust Beneficiary’s Interest Can. Bar 
Rev. 45, pp. 219 - 283. 
 
Webb, C. and Akkouh, T. (2013). Trusts Law. 3rd. ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
White, J. J. and Summers, R. S. (2000). Uniform commercial code: secured 
transactions. New York: Hornbook Series. 
 
Wood, P. R. (2007). Comparative Law of Security Interests and Title Finance. 2nd ed. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
 
Worthington, S. (2009). Equity and Property: Fact, Fantasy and Morals. The 
McPherson Lecture Series, IV. University of Queensland Press. 
 
Worthington, S. (2006-2007). The Disappearing Divide Between Property and 
Obligation: The Impact of Aligning Legal Analysis and Commercial Expectation, 
Tex. Int’l L. J, 42, pp. 917 - 940. 
 
Worthington, S. (2006 a). Floating Charges: Use and Abuse of Doctrinal Analysis 
in Gezler J. and Payne J. (eds.) Company Charges: Spectrum and Beyond. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Worthington, S. (2006 b). Equity. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Worthington, S. (2001). Shares and shareholders: property, power and 
entitlement: part I The Company Lawyer, 22 (9), pp. 258 - 266. 
 
 
 
172
Worthington, S. (1999). Sorting Out Ownership Interest in a Bulk: Gifts, Sales 
and Trusts J.B.L. pp. 1 - 21. 
 
Yale, D. (1961). Lord Nottingham’s Chancery Cases. vol. II. London: Selden Society. 
 
Yates, M. and Montagu, G. (2013). The Law of Global Custody. 4th ed. West Sussex: 
Tottel Publishing.  
 
Vaaler, B. R. (1996). Revised Article 8 of the Mississippi UCC: Dealing directly 
with indirect holding Miss. L.J. 66 (2) pp. 275 - 323.   
 
Vandevelde, K. J. (1981). The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: the 
Development of the Modern Concept of Property Buff. L. Rev., 29, pp. 325 - 368.  
 
Zacaroli, A. (2010). Taking Security over Intermediated Securities: Chapter V of 
the Unidroit (Geneva) Convention on Intermediated Securities in over 
Intermediated Securities in Gullifer L. & Payne J. (eds.), Intermediated Securities. 
Legal Problems and Practical Issues. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 167 - 184. 
 
2. POLICY DOCUMENTS 
 
Association for Financial Market in Europe - AFME (8 April 2013). Post Trade 
Settlement Committee Task Force on Settlement Internaliser (with links to Account Structure) - 
Settlement Internaliser considerations: issues and proposals. Retrieved from 
http://www.afme.eu. 
 
Association for Financial Market in Europe – AFME (March 2012). Post Trade 
Settlement Committee Task Force on CSD Account Structure - CSD Account Structure: 
Issues and Proposals. Retrieved from http://www.afme.eu.  
Bloxham, P. (January 2014). Final Review of the Investment Bank Special Administration 
Regulations 2011. 
 
Bloxham, P. (April 2013). Review of the Investment Bank Special Administration 
Regulations 2011. 
 
 
173
 
English Law Commission (October 2013). Consultation Paper No 215, Fiduciary 
Duties of Investment Intermediaries.  
 
English Law Commission (May 2008). Updated Advice: The UNIDROIT Convention 
on Substantive Rules regarding Intermediated Securities. Retrieved from 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/. 
 
English Law Commission (March 2006). Project on Intermediated Investment Securities. 
First Seminar: Objective for a Common Legal Framework. Retrieved from 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk.   
 
English Law Commission (June 2006). Project on Intermediated Investment Securities. 
Second Seminar: Issues Affecting Account Holders and Intermediaries. Retrieved from 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk.  
 
English Law Commission (2005). Company Security Interests - Report No 296. 
 
English Law Commission (2004). Company Security Interests - A Consultative Report 
No. 176.   
 
European Commission (May 2013). Securities Law Legislation, Non-paper of the Services 
of the Directorate-General Internal Market and Services. 7th meeting of the Member 
States Working Group. 
 
European Commission (October 2012). Discussion Paper ‘Legislation on Legal 
Certainty of Securities Holding and Dispositions, 6th Meeting of the Member States 
Working Group. 
 
European Commission (2011). Summary of Responses to the Directorate-General Internal 
Market and Services. Second Consultation. Legislation on Legal Certainty of 
Securities Holding and Dispositions. 
 
European Commission (2010). Legislation on Legal Certainty of Securities 
 
 
174
Holding and Dispositions. Second Consultation Document of the Services of the Directorate-
General Internal Market and Services.  
Financial Conduct Authority - FCA (September 2014). Getting the right investor 
outcomes. 
Financial Conduct Authority - FCA (June 2014). Review of the client assets regime for 
investment business – Feedback to CP13/5 and final rules.  
  
Financial Conduct Authority - FCA (July 2013). Review of the client assets regime for 
investment business (CP 13/5). 
 
Financial Markets Law Committee – FMLC (December 2015). Meaning of 
"possession", "control" and "excess financial collateral" under the Financial Collateral 
Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 2003. Retrieved from http://www.fmlc.org/.   
 
Financial Markets Law Committee – FMLC (December 2012). Issue 1: Collateral 
Directive - Analysis of uncertainty regarding the meaning of “possession or control” and 
“excess financial collateral” under the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations 
2003. Retrieved from http://www.fmlc.org/.   
 
Financial Markets Law Committee – FMLC (April 2011). Implementation of EU 
Directive 2009/44/EC on settlement finality and financial collateral arrangements. Retrieved 
from http://www.fmlc.org/.  
 
Financial Markets Law Committee – FMLC (December 2010). Issue 87 Control 
Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd. Retrieved from http://www.fmlc.org/.  
 
Financial Markets Law Committee – FMLC (July 2004). Issue 3 Property Interests in 
Investment Securities – Analysis of the Need for and Nature of Legislation Relating to Property 
Interests in Indirectly Held Investment Securities With a Statement of Principles for an 
Investment Securities Statute. Retrieved from http://www.fmlc.org/. 
 
Financial Services Authority - FSA (September 2012). Client assets regime: EMIR, 
multiple pools and the wider review (CP12/22).  
 
 
175
 
Financial Services Authority - FSA (January 2010). Client Money & Asset Report. 
 
Financial Stability Board - FSB (April 2012). Securities lending and Repos: Market 
Overview and Financial Stability Issues - Interim Report of the FSB Workstream on Securities 
Lending and Repos. 
 
HM Treasury (November 2010). Consultation Paper, Implementation of EU Directive 
2009/44/EC on settlement finality and financial collateral arrangements. 
 
HM Treasury (September 2010). Special administration regime for investment firms. 
 
HM Treasury (August 2010). Consultation Paper, Implementation of EU Directive 
2009/44/EC on settlement finality and financial collateral arrangements.  
 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (January 2014). 
Recommendations Regarding the Protection of Client Assets. Retrieved from 
http://www.iosco.org. 
 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (February 2013). 
Recommendations Regarding the Protection of Client Assets. Consultation Report. 
Retrieved from http://www.iosco.org. 
 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (February 2013). 
Appendix A – Client Asset Protection Summary. Retrieved from 
http://www.iosco.org. 
 
Legal Certainty Group – LCG (August 2008). Solutions to Legal Barriers related to Post 
trading within the EU - Second Advice of the Legal Certainty Group. Retrieved 
from http://www.ec.europa.eu/. 
 
Private Property Law to Securities Clearance and Settlement: United States, Japan, and the 
UNIDROIT Draft Convention. Discussion Paper No. 2008-E-7. Imes Discussion 
Paper Series. Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies – Bank of Japan. 
 
 
176
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - OECD, 
(September 2011). New Sources of growth: intangible assets. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/46349020.pdf. 
The City of London Law Society (“CLLS”) - Financial Law Committee (October 
2010). HM Treasury: A Consultation on the Implementation of EC Directive 2009/44/EC 
on Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral Arrangements: August 2010.  Retrieved 
from www.citysolicitors.org.uk. 
 
The Group of 30, (1989). Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities 
Markets Report. Retrieved from http://www.group30.org/publications.htm. 
 
UNIDROIT (December 2004). Explanatory Note of the Preliminary Draft of the 
UNIDROIT Convention on substantive legal rules regarding securities held through securities 
accounts. Retrieved from http://www.unidroit.org/.  
 
3. TABLE OF CASES 
 
UK 
 
Agnew v. IRC [2001] UKPC 28, [2001] 2 A.C. 710. 
 
Ashurst v. Pollard [2001] 2 All ER 75.  
 
Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] A.C. 567, [1968] 3 W.L.R. 1097, 
[1968] 3 All E.R. 651.  
 
Barlow Clowes International Ltd v. Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22. 
 
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v. IMB Morgan Plc [2004] EWHC 2771 (Ch), [2005] 2 
All ER (Comm) 564.  
 
Concorde Constructions Co Ltd v. Cogan Ltd. [1984] 29 BLR 120.   
 
Dearle v Hall [1828] 3 Russ. 1, 38 E.R. 475. 
 
 
177
 
Devaynes v. Noble [1816] 35 E.R. 781, [1816] 1 Mer. 572.   
 
Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291. 
 
Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch).  
 
Foskett v. McKeown [2001] I AC 102.   
 
Gray v. G-T-P Group Ltd Re F2G Realisations Ltd (in Liquidation) [2010] EWHC 1772 
(Ch). 
 
Hallett’s Estate (Re) [1880] 13 Ch. D. 696 (CA). 
 
Hayim v. Citibank NA [1987] AC 730. 
 
Healey v. Healey [1915] 1 KB 938.  
 
Hunter v. Moss [1993] 1 WRL 934, [1994] 1 WRL 452. 
 
Illingworth v. Houldsworth [1904] AC 355. 
 
International Factors v. Rodriguez [1979] QB 351. 
 
LBIE v. RAB Market Cycles [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch). 
 
Lehman Brothers International (Europe) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd and others, [2010] 
EWCA Civ. 917, [2012] UKSC 6.  
 
Leigh & Sillivan v. Aliakmon Shipping Co. Ltd (The Aliakmon) [1986] AC 785. 
 
Livingstone v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) (1960) 107 C.L.R. 411. 
 
London Borough of Hounslow v. Jerkins [2004] EWHC 315 (QB).  
 
 
178
 
Mac-Jordan Construction Ltd v. Brookmount Erostin Ltd [1992] BCLC 350.  
 
MCC Proceeds Inc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [1998] 4 All E.R. 675 CA.  
 
McPhail v. Dalton [1971] AC 424. 
 
Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock Exchange [2001] 1 WLR 
1150.  
 
National Westminster Bank v Spectrum Plus and others [2005] UKHL 41. 
 
Neste Oy v. Lloyds Bank plc [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 658.  
 
1 OBG Ltd and another v Allan and others [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1.   
 
Parker-Tweedale v. Dunbar Bank Plc. (C.A.) [1991] Ch. 12.  
 
Pearson and others v. Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch), [2011] 
EWCA Civ. 1544.   
 
Prazic v. Prazic [2006] EWCA Civ. 497. 
 
Nelson v Greening & Sykes (Builders) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1358.  
 
RAB Capital Plc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [2008] EWHC 2335 (Ch).  
 
Rayack Construction v. Lampeter Meat Co. Ltd. [1979] 12 BLR 30.  
 
Re Atlantic Computers Ltd [1992] Ch 505 (CA).  
 
Re CA Pacific Finance Ltd. [2000] 1 BCLC 494.  
 
Re Celtic Extraction Ltd [2001] Ch 475 (CA).  
 
 
179
 
Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1997] 4 All ER 115.  
 
Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 (PC). 
 
Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements [1970] AC 508. 
 
Re Harvard Securities Ltd [1997] 2 BCLC 369.  
 
Re H. H. Vivian & Co Ltd. [1900] 2 Ch. 654.  
 
Re Jartray Development Ltd. [1982] 22 BLR 134.  
 
Re Kayford Ltd (in liquidation) [1975] 1 WLR 279.  
 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 
(Ch).  
 
Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (No. 2) [2009] EWCA Civ 1161. 
 
Re London Wine Company (Shippers) Ltd [1986] PCC 121. 
 
Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd.; Re Ellis, Son & Vidler Ltd [1994] 1 WRL 1181, [1995] 1 
All ER 192.  
 
Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606. 
 
Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284.  
 
Roberts v Gill & Co and another [2010] UKSC 22, [2011] 1 A.C. 240.  
 
Russell-Cooke Trust Co. v. Prentis [2002] EWHC 2227 (Ch), [2003] 2 All ER 478.  
 
Saunders v Vautier [1841] 41 E.R. 482. 
 
 
180
 
Shell UK Ltd v. Total UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ. 180, [2011] QB 86.  
 
Stroud Architectural Services Ltd v John Laing Construction Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 276.  
 
Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 145, [2003] 1 WLR 1606 note.  
 
Tailby v. Official Receiver [1888] 13 App Cas 523.  
 
Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] I AC 340. 
 
Tito v. Waddell (No 2) [1977] (Ch) 354. 
 
UK Ltd. v. Total UK Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ. 180, [2011] QB 86. 
 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 
669. 
 
Australia 
 
Re French Caledonian Travel [2003] NSW SC 1008, [2004] 22 A.C.L.C. 498.  
 
White v. Shortall [2006] NSW SC 1379. 
 
New Zealand 
 
Registered Securities Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 545.  
 
Re International Investment Unit Trust [2005] 1 NZLR 270. 
 
Canada 
 
Boughner v. Greyhawk Equity Partners Limited Partnership (Millenium) [2013] ONCA 26, 
[2012] ONSC 3185. 
 
 
181
 
Cummings Estate v. Peopledge HR Services Inc. ONSC 2781, [2013] W.D.F.L. 2886. 
 
Law Society of Upper Canada v. Toronto Dominion Bank [1998] 42 O.R. (3d) 257. 
 
Ontario Securities Commission v. Greymac Credit Corporation [1986] 55 O.R. 2nd 673. 
 
Paddock v. Paddock [2008] CarswellOnt 8794, [2009] W.D.F.L. 2783, 78 R.F.L. (6th) 
54 
 
Toronto Dominion Bank v. 2026227 Ontario Inc. [2012] ONSC 2992. 
 
United States 
 
Re Esteem Settlement [2002] Jersey L.R. 53. 
 
Re Walter J Schmidt & Co, ex p. Feuerbach [1923] 298 F. 314.  
 
Ruddle v. Moore 411 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
 
Court of Justice of the European Union  
 
Webb v. Webb Case C 294/92 [1994] QB 696. 
 
4. TABLE OF LEGISLATION 
 
European legislation 
 
Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 
2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) 
No 1095/2010. 
 
 
 
182
Directive 2009/44/EC amending Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment 
and securities settlement systems and Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral 
arrangements as regards linked systems and credit claims. 
  
Directive 2006/73/EC implementing Directive 2004/39/EC as regards organisational 
requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of 
that Directive. 
 
Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 
85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC. 
 
Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements. 
 
Directive 2001/24/EC on the reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions. 
 
Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems.  
 
Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union 
and on central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 2014/65/EU 
and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012. 
 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade 
repositories.  
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings. 
 
Conventions 
 
Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, October 2009.  
 
Hague Convention on the law applicable to certain rights in respect of securities held with an 
intermediary, December 2002. 
 
 
 
183
UK legislation 
 
Banking Act 2009. 
 
Companies Act 2006.  
 
Companies Act 1900. 
 
Enterprise Act 2002.  
 
Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral Arrangements) 
(Amendment) Regulations No. 2993/2010. 
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Securities Transfer Act 2006. 
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5. TABLE OF ACRONYMS  
 
Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch = ‘ABGB’ 
 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 2011/61/EU = ‘AIFMD’ 
 
Association for Financial Markets in Europe = ‘AFME’ 
 
Assets under Management = ‘AUM’ 
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Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch = ‘BGB’ 
 
Canadian Securities Transfer Act = ‘STA’  
 
Certificateless Registry for Electronic Share Transfer = ‘CREST’ 
 
Central Securities Depository = ‘CSD’ 
 
Chapter = ‘Ch.’ 
 
Client Asset Sourcebook = ‘CASS’ 
 
City of London Law Society = ‘CLLS’  
 
Confront = ‘Cfr.’ 
 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation = ‘DTCC’ 
 
Financial Conduct Authority = ‘FCA' 
 
Directive on financial collateral arrangements (2002/44/EC) = ‘FCD’ 
 
Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulations = ‘FCAR’  
 
Financial Markets Law Committee = ‘FMLC’ 
 
Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral 
Arrangements) (Amendment) Regulations = ‘FMIR’ 
 
Financial Services Authority = ‘FSA’ 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 = 'FSMA'  
 
Footnote = ‘n.’ 
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Footnotes = ‘nn.’ 
 
Ibidem = ‘Ibid.’ 
 
Idem = ‘Id.’ 
 
International central securities depository = ‘ICSD’ 
 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law = ‘UNIDROIT’  
 
International Organization of Securities Commissions = ‘IOSCO’ 
 
Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 2011 = ‘SAR’ 
 
Legal Certainty Group = ‘LCG’ 
 
Lehman Brothers International – Europe = ‘LBIE’  
 
Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule = ‘LIBR’ 
 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (2014/65/EU) = 'MiFID II'  
 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (EC) 2004/39 = 'MiFID' 
 
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (600/2014/EU) = ‘MiFIR’   
 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws = ‘NCCUSL’ 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development = ‘OECD’ 
 
Place of the Relevant Intermediary Approach = ‘PRIMA’ 
 
Repurchase Agreements = ‘Repos’ 
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on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories = 
‘EMIR’ 
 
Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 on securities settlement and on Central Securities 
Depositories = ‘CSDR’ 
 
Settlement Finality Directive (98/26/EC) = ‘SFD’  
 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 = ‘SGA’ 
 
Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 = ‘SGAA’ 
 
Securities Investor Protection Act = ‘SIPA’ 
 
Securities Law Legislation = ‘SLL’ 
 
United States Uniform Commercial Code = ‘UCC’ 
